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Abstract 
 
 
The role of national parliaments in the European Union (EU) has gained prominence in 
the last decade among academics and practitioners alike in relation to the alleged 
democratic deficit of the EU. The existing literature has largely focused on the formal 
powers of national parliaments. However, the formally strongest parliaments are not 
necessarily the most active, and vice versa. This thesis argues that this divergence 
between formal rights and actual activity exists because not formal scrutiny powers, but 
public Euroscepticism, the presence of parties for which Europe is salient and which 
care deeply about Europe (‘issue entrepreneurs’) as well as internal party cohesion on 
the EU are the most important factors influencing activity. Public Euroscepticism leads 
to more debate and resolutions when issue entrepreneurs are present and when parties 
have a coherent position on Europe. Recent measures and future plans to further 
increase the formal powers of national parliaments might not lead to more activity and 
might thus not help to ameliorate the democratic deficit. Methodologically, this thesis 
relies on computer-assisted content analysis, multilevel models as well as elite 
interviews. Each of the three papers focuses on a different aspect of parliamentary 
activity. The first paper focuses on the ‘communication function’ of parliaments and 
presents an analysis of parliamentary debates in EU affairs. The second paper 
quantitatively analyses the determinants of parliamentary activity in the form of 
resolutions, relating to the government control or ‘scrutiny function’. The third paper 
investigates parliamentary scrutiny activity in-depth in a case study of the ‘Fiscal 
Compact’. The thesis argues that national parliaments should mostly concentrate on 
their communication function in EU affairs, while other functions might best be carried 
out by the European Parliament. It thus suggests that different parliamentary functions 
can best be fulfilled by different institutions in the EU multilevel system.   
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Introduction 
 
The Research ‘Puzzle’ and the Main Argument of the Thesis 
 
 In the European Union (EU), citizens can provide democratic input via two 
channels: first, they can directly elect the members of the European Parliaments (EP); 
secondly, citizens can make their voices heard via an indirect route of democratic 
control which runs from the citizens to their national parliaments and from the national 
parliaments to the national governments. The national governments are, in turn, 
represented in the Council of Ministers. The transfer of powers from the national to the 
European level has weakened the power of national parliaments. This process is termed 
‘de-parliamentarisation’ (Holzhacker, 2002; Maurer and Wessels, 2001; Moravcsik, 
1994). National parliaments have been losing out from European integration in various 
ways – European integration allows the government to manipulate the domestic agenda, 
an increasing number of laws is made at the European level and national parliaments are 
faced with an information deficit (Moravcsik, 1994, p. 8-10). Even though consecutive 
treaty changes have strengthened the EP significantly, it still cannot fulfil the same 
legitimising function as a parliament in a national political system. The reason for this 
lack of legitimacy is that no European ‘demos’ exists which the EP could represent 
(Chryssochou, 1998; Kiiver 2012; Schmitter, 2000; Siedentrop, 2001). This implies that 
there is currently no ‘common political identity which serves as a basis upon which all 
governmental or parliamentary decisions can be interpreted as being expressions of 
democratic self-determination‘(Decker, 2002, p. 258). This dual lack of legitimacy – the 
loss of power of national parliaments and a still relatively weak European Parliament 
that cannot completely compensate for these losses – is said to constitute what is called 
the ‘democratic deficit’ of the European Union.  
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 The perceived loss of powers of national parliaments due to European 
integration led to a debate in many countries on how this loss of influence could be 
remedied, especially since the Treaty of Maastricht (e.g. Maurer and Wessels, 2001; 
O’Brennan and Raunio, 2007). In all member states, over the last two decades, the 
formal powers of national parliaments in EU affairs have been significantly increased, 
albeit to varying extents. A common feature was the establishment of European Affairs 
Committees (EACs) to oversee the government in EU affairs in all EU member states 
(Hix and Raunio, 2000). The extent to which parliaments receive information on EU 
legal acts and negotiations was also increased in many countries (Karlas, 2011, p. 259).  
 Politicians and academics alike hoped that stronger formal rights would lead to 
more active oversight by Members of Parliament (MPs) in EU affairs, and thus an 
improvement in accountability (Maurer, 2001, p. 30). This optimism might not have 
been justified. Some studies present anecdotal evidence that the formal strength of a 
parliament does not determine how scrutiny takes place in practice. As a case in point, 
the Austrian parliament seems to be rather passive, even though it has very strong 
formal rights (Hegeland and Neuhold, 2002; Pollack and Smolinski, 2003, 2012). 
Similarly, Sprungk finds that the French Parliament seems to be more active than its 
German counterpart, even though it has weaker formal powers (Sprungk, 2003, 2007). 
Formal powers and actual activity are thus not necessarily congruent; there can be 
divergence between the two. Positive divergence is evident when a parliament is more 
active than its formal powers would suggest. In contrast, negative divergence exists 
when a parliament is less active than its position according to its formal powers, as 
described in the literature, indicates. This paradox and empirical puzzle gives rise to the 
following research questions: 
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What determines the activity of parliamentary scrutiny in practice? and Why are some 
parliaments more active than others, even though they have weaker formal rights? 
 
The main argument of this thesis is that the extent to which Europe is seen as 
salient and as critical by the parties in parliament – and thus the extent to which they 
can be regarded as ‘issue entrepreneurs’ – is the most important determinant of 
parliamentary activity in EU affairs with regard to both the communication and the 
scrutiny function. In the present context, issue entrepreneurs are defined as parties for 
which European integration is salient and which are Eurosceptic (Hobolt and De Vries, 
2015, p. 3). If issue entrepreneurs are strongly represented in parliament (both in the 
plenary and in committees), then more parliamentary debates about Europe take place in 
the plenary and more resolutions are issued on the topic. The reason for this is that the 
preferences of issue entrepreneur parties are more in line with the preferences of the 
voters, than in the case of divided mainstream parties. Formal powers of national 
parliaments in EU affairs do not seem to play an important role in determining their 
actual activity in the form of resolutions or debates. The analysis offered here can thus 
explain the divergence between the formal rights of national parliaments in EU affairs 
and their actual activity. In so doing, the thesis differentiates itself from existing work in 
the subfield of the study of the role of national parliaments in the European Union.  
As a consequence, a rather mixed picture of the causal chain of formal powers of 
national parliaments, activity in EU affairs and actual effectiveness of scrutiny emerges. 
Formal powers of national parliaments do not seem to influence actual activity, so the 
hope that increasing formal powers of national parliaments in EU affairs will help to 
alleviate the democratic deficit of the EU is unfounded. At the same time, actual activity 
is the consequence of Eurosceptic tendencies in the electorate and at the party level. 
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However, such activity does not translate into actual effectiveness: the parties, which 
are most active often issue resolutions which are mostly political ‘smoke and mirrors’ 
and include relatively little substantive scrutiny. Nevertheless, the presence of issue 
entrepreneurs increases the extent to which parliament is reactive to the voters’ 
preferences on EU affairs and the extent to which the topic is debated in the plenary – 
thus helping parliament to communicate EU affairs to the citizens.  
 In the first paper of this thesis on parliamentary debates, it becomes clear that 
issue entrepreneurs are the most important determinants of debates on Europe, which 
are an expression of the ‘communication function’ of parliaments (Norton, 1993). When 
the public is Eurosceptic, a lot of debate on Europe takes place if the presence of issue 
entrepreneurs in the plenaryis strong. Issue entrepreneurs try to exploit the fact that they 
are more in line with their electorate on the issue of Europe than other parties and 
trigger debates on Europe. In contrast, parties which are internally divided on Europe 
tend to be less active when faced with strong public Euroscepticism to prevent this 
division from becoming apparent. Issue entrepreneurs can thus be seen as the drivers of 
debate on Europe.  
However, the analysis shows that parliaments are responsive to major events 
such as Treaty changes and discuss these extensively. Moreover, they are also reactive 
to the voters opinion on the European Union with regard to the extent to which they 
debate it in the plenary. This responsiveness only becomes apparent when issue 
entrepreneurs are represented in parliament. These parties force the mainstream parties 
in debates on Europe, which the latter would like to avoid. In that sense, the presence of 
issue entrepreneurs has a positive effect from a normative perspective in that it forces 
parliament as a whole to take its communication function in EU affairs seriously. 
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 In the second paper on the activity of national parliaments in the form of 
resolutions, which relate to their government ‘control and scrutiny’ function (Norton, 
1993), it becomes evident that issue entrepreneurs are also the drivers of this form of 
activity. When the presence of issue entrepreneurs is strong, more resolutions are issued 
in the context of strong public Euroscepticism. The opposite is the case for pro-
European parties. Moreover, issue entrepreneurs clearly initiate much more critical 
resolutions than mainstream parties. In addition, the resolutions of issue entrepreneurs 
contain longer preambles and shorter operational parts, indicating that they focus more 
on general political points than on actual technical scrutiny. The actual ‘depth’ of 
scrutiny of resolutions initiated by these parties is thus limited. In contrast to other 
studies (Auel, Rozenberg and Tacea, 2015), no relationship between the formal powers 
of parliaments and their activity in the form of resolutions could be found.  
The findings of this study with regard to the government control function of 
parliament are thus less encouraging from a normative point of view. The presence of 
issue entrepreneurs seems to prevent parliaments from performing in-depth scrutiny of 
particular legal acts. Issue entrepreneurs thus seem to have a differentiated impact with 
regard to the different parliamentary functions. For the government control or scrutiny 
function, the issue entrepreneurs seem to prevent thorough scrutiny from taking place, 
which has a detrimental impact on democratic accountability in the EU. 
 The third paper, a case study on the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG), commonly referred to as 
the Fiscal Compact, confirms the results of the quantitative analyses. Issue 
entrepreneurs have indeed politicized the debate on the Treaty and were especially 
active in the form of debates and resolutions. However, as expected from the findings of 
the two quantitative papers, issue entrepreneurs frequently connect policy-specific 
  
  14 
discussions to more general criticism on the European Union and contribute little with 
regard to actual technical scrutiny. They often use extra-parliamentary venues, such a 
judicial review or public demonstrations. The media covered the activity of issue-
entrepreneurs with regard to the Fiscal Compact disproportionately. However, it can be 
argued that given the focus on political issues and the lack of focus on technical points, 
the type of activity initiated by issue entrepreneurs does not frequently lead to more 
effective scrutiny. By contrast, mainstream opposition parties are rather more active and 
focus on technical points. They often try to extract concessions by the government on 
smaller technical points by engaging in ‘side payments’ when their votes are required 
because of specific thresholds, such as in the case of the Fiscal Compact. MPs of the 
government majority very rarely become active in a critical way. A clear exception here 
is the UK, where the Eurosceptic EU Scrutiny Committee of the House of Commons is 
frequently very critical of the government. The case of the United Kingdom also shows 
that when internal dissent in a party is very high, as in the case of the Conservative 
Party, scrutiny activity increases. The reason for this is that the party leadership is no 
longer able to effectively suppress dissent. In general, strong technical expertise on an 
issue and resources for thorough technical and legal analysis contribute to more in-
depth scrutiny. These factors are more likely to be found among mainstream 
(opposition) parties than among issue entrepreneurs. The third paper also shows that 
even mainstream parties engage in less ‘in-depth’ scrutiny when increased politicisation 
leads to the overburdening of a committee and the crowding out of time and resources.  
 The findings of this thesis thus provide limited evidence to support the hope that 
an increase in formal powers of national parliaments in EU affairs will lead to more 
activity, which will in turn lead to more effective scrutiny which will help national 
parliaments to improve democratic accountability in the European Union. In contrast, 
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this thesis holds that formal powers, activity and effectiveness are separately influenced 
by a number of factors, which are not necessarily interlinked. Thus, an increase in 
formal powers of national parliaments can be seen as a consequence of normative 
considerations by parliamentary actors (Winzen, 2014, p. 2). These considerations 
include the extent to which national parliaments or the European Parliament is seen as 
the best venue to alleviate the democratic deficit of the European Union and the general 
perception of the desirability of European integration (ibid.). However, reform efforts 
are constrained by existing parliamentary rules and institutions (ibid.). As explained 
above, the actual activity of national parliaments is then not explained by their formal 
powers, but by the presence of issue entrepreneurs in the party system, internal party 
cohesion and public Euroscepticism. The activity of national parliaments in EU affairs 
is thus not directly influenced by their formal powers.  
Moreover, activity does not directly translate into effectiveness, given that 
activity is mostly driven by issue entrepreneur parties which focus more on political 
issues rather than on technical scrutiny. These parties do, however, bring about more 
debate on Europe in the plenary. Generally, a more positive picture emerges of national 
parliaments in debating EU affairs than in directly controlling the government in that 
matter. This finding is in line with earlier claims in the literature that parliaments can 
have a stronger impact with regard to the communication function and should rather 
concentrate on the latter rather than the government control or scrutiny function (Auel, 
2007, p. 504). In the following section, it is elaborated how the debate on the 
democratic deficit and de-parliamentarisation in the European Union provides the 
rational for this thesis and how this thesis contributes to the debates on these topics. 
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The Democratic Deficit, De-parliamentarisation and Accountability 
 
This section will briefly outline the literature on the democratic deficit, 
accountability and the connected claim that national parliaments have lost power due to 
de-parliamentarisation. The de-parliamentarisation thesis serves as the normative 
justification and motivation for a stronger involvement of national parliaments in EU 
affairs. Arguably, a stronger involvement of national parliaments could increase the 
democratic legitimacy of the EU. However, as it will be shown, the formal powers of 
national parliaments are not crucial to achieve more accountability, but the extent to 
which parliaments get actively involved depends on the presence of issue entrepreneurs 
and internal dissent. The literature on the democratic deficit, de-parliamentarisation and 
accountability gives rise to the need to study the actual activity of national parliaments 
in EU affairs. The debate on the role of national parliaments in the EU and their 
different institutional structures and forms of involvement is not only informed by an 
academic interest in explaining institutional and behavioural variation. The discussion is 
in fact closely related to the question of whether there is indeed a ‘democratic deficit’ in 
the European Union.  
 The claim that parliaments are losing power, also called the de-
parliamentarisation thesis, did not only emerge in the context of European integration or 
the discipline of European Studies, but has been articulated since the early 20
th
 century 
(Bryce, 1931, in Auel, 2011, p. 75). In the 1970s, comparativists observed that 
legislatures were losing power vis-à-vis the executive, and diagnosed patterns of 
variation between countries for this phenomenon (Blondel, 1970). One reason identified 
for this ‘decline of parliaments’ was the increasing complexity of policy making in 
modern capitalist societies as a consequence of modernisation and industrialisation, 
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which favour the executive with its specialised bureaucracy over the legislature 
(Andersen and Burns, 1996). As a second reason, some authors identified the rise of 
cohesive parties which mitigate the role of the individual legislator (Heidar and Koole, 
2003; King, 1976). Lindseth even argues that the decline of parliaments started a 
century ago, with the onset of World War I, which led to a concentration of power in the 
hands of the executive (Lindseth, 2010, p. 64). Thus, there was a general shift of power 
from legislatures to executives. 
 European integration might well be a factor aggravating the process of de-
parliamentarisation. Moravcsik (1994) points out that national parliaments lose power 
due to European integration for four different reasons. First, European integration 
allows the government to manipulate the domestic agenda, by presenting unpopular 
measures as the product of pressures from the European level – ‘blameshift’ as part of 
what Putnam calls the ‘two-level game’ (p. 8). Second, a large amount of domestic laws 
is made at the European level, and national parliaments can only make minor changes at 
the implementation stage (in the case of directives) (p. 10). Third, national parliaments 
suffer from a severe information asymmetry in European affairs: since the governments 
are involved in EU negotiations and have strong contacts to EU institutions via their 
permanent representations in Brussels, they are much better informed than national 
parliaments (p.12). Finally, on the ideational level, the influence of European 
integration might increase the support for certain government policies (p.13). The claim 
that national parliaments lose power due to European integration – or Europeanisation, 
even though not explicitly framed as such – has been the implicit assumption of much 
of the work on the role of national parliaments. 
 Other authors have challenged the idea that parliaments are clearly ‘losers’ of 
European integration. Hix and Raunio (2000) have argued that backbenchers have been 
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able to ‘fight back’, even though the authors do not dispute that national parliaments 
have generally lost influence since the 1950s and that the EU aggravated this process (p. 
163). They argue that European integration has triggered institutional reform in national 
parliaments – most notably the establishment of European Affairs Committees (EACs) 
– that has allowed parliaments to regain their powers (p. 163). Backbenchers and 
opposition MPs have been able to close the ‘information gap’ mostly by targeted and 
specialised committee work, according to Hix and Raunio (p. 162). Dunia and Oliver 
are even more sceptical regarding the alleged negative effects of European integration 
for national parliaments than the aforementioned study and argue that European 
integration has even significantly strengthened the powers of national parliaments 
(Dunia and Oliver, 2005). According to these authors, European integration has acted as 
a ‘catalyst’ for the developments of the power of national parliaments (p 176).  
 Arguably, processes of de-parliamentarisation have been exacerbated by the 
Eurozone crisis. In the context of the Eurozone-crisis, the European Council as the 
forum of heads of states and government has become increasingly important and more 
and more involved in details of economic policy making (Bickerton, Hodson and 
Puetter, 2014, p. 712). This tendency has further disadvantaged the position of national 
parliaments in the European Union vis-à-vis their governments (Auel and Hoeing, 2015, 
p. 376). As a reaction to this further loss of powers, national parliaments have received 
increasingly strong rights in overseeing the governments’ involvement in economic 
policy making at the European level, with the German Bundestag being a prime 
example (Hoeing, 2012). Previous studies on the involvement of national parliaments in 
the Euro crisis have claimed that the formal powers of parliaments in EU affairs and the 
macro-economic situation in a country are the most important determinants of 
  
  19 
parliamentary activity in the context of the Eurozone criss (Auel and Hoeing,  2015, p. 
386, 389).  
While the Euro-crisis has reshaped the relationship between national parliaments 
and executives, it has also led to important changes of the scrutiny rights of parliament 
in the plenary and in specialised committees themselves. Throughout the EU, 
Eurosceptic parties have increased their vote share in a number of member states, while 
public opinion on the European Union grew increasingly sceptical (Eurobarometer, 
2015). Governments thus find themselves in a classic two-level game (Putnam, 1988) 
when negotiating questions of EMU (Bellamy and Weale, 2015, p. 260). They have to 
be reliable negotiation partners at the European level but must simultaneously be 
accountable and responsive to the constituents (ibid).  
A further increase in the powers of national parliaments has been proposed to 
solve this dilemma (ibid.). The rationale behind this suggestion is that further inter-
parliamentary cooperation would guarantee ‘that EU measures treat each of the member 
states with equal concern and respect as self-governing polities’ (p. 272). However, as 
this thesis will make clear, the crisis has exacerbated dynamics with regard to the 
activity of Eurosceptic issue entrepreneurs in national parliaments which makes it even 
more unlikely that the formal powers of national parliaments will be extensively used in 
a constructive way. The impact of the crisis on the six countries covered in this thesis 
has been varied – including a debtor cuntries such as Ireland and Spain as well as a 
creditor country such as Germany. As Paper 1 shows, there has been an inrease in 
activity in the form of dabtes in times of crisis. Paper 3 focuses extensivey on the 
Fiscacl Compact, and also discusses general dynamics of parliamentary actity in times 
of crisis. In general, the inclusinon of the time period of the crisis arguably strengthenes 
the argument of this thesis: powers of parliaments and their actual activity became ever 
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more appareant. On the one hand, government backbenchers and mainstream opposition 
parties find themselves faced with increasingly centralised decision making processes at 
the level of the European Council and the expectation of the public of playing an active 
role in controlling the former. On the other hand, Eurosceptic parties – sometimes new 
entrants, sometimes existing for some time and having discovered Europe as a pertinent 
issue in the context of the crisis- claim to be in line with the electorate and ‘common 
sense’ arguments regarding the handling of the crisis. These parties have thus much 
more leeway than mainstream parties in framing the issue of Europe for their purposes  
The present thesis takes the theme of de-parliamentarisation and the response of 
an increase in formal scrutiny rights as a motivation for a study on the role of national 
parliaments in the EU in practice, i.e. their activity. Thus, de-parliamentarisation is a 
key concept which is necessary to understand the argument of this thesis. Studies which 
focus exclusively on formal rights tend to generate an overly optimistic picture of 
parliaments’ influence. Therefore, it is important to highlight the inconsistencies 
between formal rights and actual activity, as the present thesis does. If formal rights do 
not significantly influence the actual activity of parliaments, there is little use in 
constantly increasing their powers, as has happened continuously in the last two 
decades. It is necessary to rethink the way parliamentary input in the EU can be 
increased. An important aspect would be an increase in public deliberation on the EU in 
the form of parliamentary debates. Tans argues that national parliaments, especially 
through an increase in the number of debates on European issues – and thus more 
publicity for discussions on Europe – could help to increase the democratic legitimacy 
of the European Union (2007, p. 246). The present thesis acknowledges this point and 
focuses especially on the debates in Europe in the national parliaments’ plenaries, since 
this public form of scrutiny is the most important way in which national parliaments can 
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help to increase transparency and legitimacy in the EU (Auel, 2007, p. 504). As 
becomes clear in this thesis, parliamentary activity driven by issue entrepreneurs is 
generally more successful in communicating EU issues than in overseeing the 
government. The communication function might be the aspect of parliamentary activity 
in which national parliaments can have a bigger impact in EU affairs (ibid.).  
 A second key factor to overcome the democratic deficit by the involvement of 
national parliaments is to increase the accountability of national government to their 
parliaments in EU affairs (Auel, 2009, p. 14). Bovens argues that 
 
Accounting for oneself, taking responsibility, and justifying oneself, never, (…) 
happen in a vacuum; there is always something or someone who asks the question or 
makes the accusations. Such asking happens mostly at the instigation and in the 
presence of some forum (…)’ (Bovens, 1998, p. 23; emphasis in original). 
 
The forum, in the present context, is a parliamentary committee or the plenary. 
Accountability is seen here as the extent to which the government justifies its actions in 
front of parliament. The parliament can force the government to do so by producing 
detailed resolutions and memoranda. Even though the government will not necessarily 
adopt the position of the parliament, it will have to justify why it did not do so and will 
have to explain its alternative course of action to the parliament (Sprungk, 2010, p. 10). 
As becomes clear in the following sections, exploring the potential for the involvement 
of national parliaments in this process is part of the motivation of this thesis.  
 
Cross-National Variation in Formal Scrutiny Systems 
 
 This section reviews the literature on the formal powers of parliaments which is 
used as a baseline for the comparison of formal powers and actual activity. Early studies 
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concentrated mostly on the US Congress. Since the 1970s, scholars have explicitly 
studied the role of national parliaments in EU affairs. These early studies were mostly 
descriptive, but offered first hints that formal rights and actual activity might diverge. 
Scholars then compiled rankings of formal powers of national parliaments in EU affairs. 
These form an important baseline for assessing the impact of formal rights on actual 
activity. Formal rights are used as a control variable in the analyses, to assess whether 
formal rights or party political variables can explain variation in scrutiny activity. The 
position of the respective parliaments will be derived from the rankings in the literature 
(summarised in Table 1 on p. 28 below). If formal rights do not determine scrutiny 
activity, but issue entrepreneurs do, it is clear why formal rights and actual activity 
frequently diverge. In contrast to this thesis, most authors assume that formal rights can 
be lead to actual activity.   
 
The Rankings of Formal Powers of National Parliaments 
 
As a next stage of the research agenda, scholars tried to generate ‘rankings’ of 
the formal rights of rights of national parliaments in EU affairs. Scholarship on formal 
rights of national parliaments in EU affairs is very important for the present project, 
since these rankings present the benchmark from which the formal powers can be 
operationalised as a control variable in the analysis of actual scrutiny activity in the 
papers.  
One of the first attempts to categorise different scrutiny arrangements, according 
to their formal scrutiny power was undertaken by Bergman (1997; [Bergman I]). He 
introduced three relatively simple criteria which distinguish different formal scrutiny 
arrangements. The criteria are related to the following questions: first, do the 
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participation rights of parliament cover all EU policy areas, or are they restricted to the 
‘First Pillar’ (the former EEC)? Second, is the full parliament (i.e. the chamber as a 
whole) involved, or only a specialised committee? Finally, how binding is the power of 
the parliament’s mandate? Bergman distinguished three different levels of mandating 
power: the first level (1) merely describes an exchange of information. The vast 
majority of chambers can be found in this category. Level two (2) implies that under 
normal circumstances the governments will follow the recommendation of the EAC. 
Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK fall in this category. Finally, level three 
(3) implies that the government is bound to the policy formulated by the EAC. The only 
parliaments in this category are the parliaments of Austria and Germany. In a paper 
published in 2000, Bergman updated his typology (Bergman, 2000; [Bergman II]). 
Based on his own estimates he ranks the member states on a scale from 1-15 (p. 418). 
The Folketing of Denmark is ranked first, while the Parliament of Greece is seen as the 
weakest chamber.  
A first step in the direction of a more encompassing framework was the work by 
Maurer and Wessels (2001). First, they analyse the extent to which rules for the 
involvement of parliaments are institutionalised or informal. This is operationalised as 
the existence of an EAC and the ratio of the size of the EAC and the chamber (p. 438). 
Second, they mention the extent of documents which are forwarded to the parliament 
(scope) (p. 440). Third, Maurer and Wessels analyse the arrangements set in place to 
filter and select documents for the chambers to avoid them from being ‘swamped’ (p. 
439). Finally, the timing and management of the scrutiny process, i.e. the point in time 
when the parliaments receive the documents from the government, is taken into account 
(p. 446). Based on these considerations, Maurer and Wessels divide the parliaments in 
four groups. The first group, ‘national players’, have a real impact on their government 
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(Denmark and Austria). The next categories are called ‘latent national players’ 
(Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden) and ‘would be national players’, who are 
unable to challenge their government (France, the UK, Belgium, Spain and 
Luxemburg). The parliaments of Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Italy arguably do not 
have any means to influence their governments’ positions – they are ‘slow adaptors’ 
(Goetz and Meyer-Sahling, 2008, p. 7). Besides this assessment of ‘power’, Maurer and 
Wessels also group parliaments according to their different means of carrying out 
scrutiny. They distinguish between the constellation in which the parliament is active 
(EAC, standing committees, or plenary), the nature of scrutiny (supportive or 
challenging the government) and the phase in the policy cycle at which the parliament 
becomes active (ex ante, before the legal act is voted on in the Council, or ex-post, after 
the votes has taken place) (Maurer and Wessels, 2001).  
 Many of the later rankings build on the work by Maurer and Wessels. Rauino 
(2005) adopts their approach, but modifies some aspects of it. His first indicator is the 
involvement of specialised committees (p. 321). The involvement of standing 
committees is particularly strong in Finland, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy 
and Sweden (ibid.). The second indicator Raunio lists is access to information. This 
indicator is subdivided in timing and scope, i.e. the range of documents that is 
transferred to parliament. Raunio’s third indicator is the extent to which the parliament 
can give ministers a binding mandate. The first indicator is based on Bergman’s work 
(2000), and the latter two on Maurer and Wessels’ volume (2001). Based on these 
indicators, Raunio calculates the overall scrutiny power of the parliaments in the form 
of fuzzy-set scores for his subsequent Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA; see 
Ragain, 2008). The highest value here is 0.83 and is reached by Denmark and Finland 
(p. 324). Austria and Sweden reach 0.67, Germany and the Netherlands 0.5, France and 
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the UK 0.33 and all remaining parliaments 0.17. No parliament receives the highest 
value of 1 or the lowest possible value of 0. Raunio finds that the domestic strength of 
parliaments and public Euroscepticism are the most important factors contributing to 
strong formal scrutiny powers (p. 336). 
 All the rankings mentioned above only covered the ‘old’ member states. Karlas 
published the first real overview including the Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEECs) (2011) which was later extended to include all member states (2012). He 
developed a very encompassing set of indicators to assess the formal ‘powers’ of 
parliaments. First, Karlas takes into account the scope, i.e. whether EU legislative 
proposal and/or the governments negotiation position are scrutinised, for which he 
assigns a parliament between 0 and 2 points (p. 1101). Second, he examines whether 
EU legal acts are only scrutinised in EACs or also in standing committees (ibid). Third, 
Karlas analyses the influence mechanisms, for example regarding whether mandates are 
frequently adopted or whether a scrutiny reserve is used (ibid.). Fourth, he establishes 
the extent to which the parliamentary mandate is binging (ibid.). Finally, Karlas takes 
into account whether the upper chamber of parliament is involved in the process as well 
(ibid.). The scores are then added up with twelve points being the highest achievable 
score. Karlas then ranks the parliaments accordingly (p. 1102). He finds that the 
member states joining in 2004 adopted rather strong formal scrutiny systems (p. 1109). 
According to Karlas, strong committees systems and a fragmented party system are the 
most important determinants of the formal powers of national parliaments in EU affairs 
(p. 1110). 
 More recently, Winzen has conducted a quantitative meta-analysis of the 
development of formal scrutiny systems over time (2012). He collected data on the 
formal scrutiny systems from the various country case studies available and brought the 
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descriptions into a comparable format. His main focus lies with information rights, the 
involvement of EACs and sectoral committees as well as on mandating rights (p. 661). 
Winzen aggregates the values on these points and then compares the formal strength of 
parliaments on a scale from 0 (minimum) to 3 (maximum) (p. 662). The collection of 
data on formal powers over a longer period of time represents a very important 
empirical contribution, and is very helpful for the present research project, as a 
benchmark for the formal strength of national parliaments. The present thesis aims to 
show that it is not formal rights, but party political and public opinion factors that are 
the most important determinants of scrutiny activity. Winzen finds that the depths of 
integrations and public Euroscepticism are the most important factors influencing 
formal scrutiny powers (2013, p. 317) 
The ‘Observatory of National Parliaments after Lisbon (OPAL) project has also 
ranked the formal powers of national parliaments for the time period from 2010 until 
2012 (Auel and Tacea, 2015). The ranking is based on expert country reports, 
parliamentary standing orders and Conférence des Organes Parlementaires Spécialisés 
dans les Affaires de l'Union des Parlements de l'Union Européenne (COSAC) reports 
(p.13). They include the access to information, scrutiny infrastructure and oversight in 
their ranking scores (p. 9). The results of the analysis where included in a recent 
encompassing work on the role of national parliaments in the European Union (Hefftler, 
Neuhold, Rozenberg and Smith, 2015).  
Thus, the different approaches to classifying parliaments have different strengths 
and weaknesses. The most important indicators used by the rankings are the scope of 
parliamentary involvement, the forum in which scrutiny takes place (plenary, sectoral 
committees, or EAC), the point in time when the parliaments received the documents, 
and the extent to which mandating rights are binding. These factors will also serve as 
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the most important indicators of a parliament’s formal rights in the present study. The 
theoretical shortcoming of the abovementioned accounts is that they assume that formal 
rights can be equated with actual scrutiny activity. Table 1 (p. 28) provides a summary 
of the different rankings and assesses the relative formal powers of the parliaments. To 
make the rankings comparable, those rankings that use numerical values were 
categorised in three categories of ‘weak’, ‘strong’ and ‘moderate.’ As the table shows, 
there is relatively strong congruence between the different rankings.  
It is important to note that none of the studies which seek to explain the 
emergences and determinants of formal powers of national parliaments in EU affairs 
has identified the presence of Eurosceptic parties as an important factor, while public 
Euroscepticism is frequently mentioned. Thus, it is unlikely that the same factors 
determine the activity of national parliaments in EU affairs as well as their formal 
powers. Mainstream parties might chose to adopt strong scrutiny powers when the 
public is Eurosceptic as a form of ‘window dressing’, but only when issue entrepreneurs 
are present do parliaments actually become active.
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Table 1: Rankings of the formal scrutiny powers of national parliaments in European Union affairs. 
Country Bergman I Bergman II Maurer&Wessels Raunio Karlas Winzen OPAL 
Austria 3 (Strong)  4   (Strong) Strong 0.67 (Moderate) 6.5 (Moderate) 1.83 (Moderate) 0.51 (Moderate) 
Belgium 1 (Weak)  11 (Weak) Weak 0.17 (Weak) 2 (Weak) 0.67 (Weak) 0.24 (Weak) 
Bulgaria - - - - 3 (weak) 2.00 (Moderate) 0.41 (Moderate) 
Cyprus - - - - 2 (Weak) 0.33 (Weak) 0.27 (Weak) 
Czech Republic - - - - 4.5 (Moderate) 1.83 (Moderate) 0.58 (Moderate) 
Denmark 3 (Strong)  1  (Strong) Strong 0.83 (Strong) 8 (Strong) 2.67 (Strong) 0.69 (Strong) 
Estonia - - - - 8.5 (Strong) 2.33 (Strong) 0.67 (Strong) 
Finland 2 (Moderate)  2   (Strong) Strong 0.83 (Strong) 8.5 (Strong) 2.50 (Strong) 0.84 (Strong) 
France 1 (Weak) 10 (Moderate) Weak 0.33 (Weak) 5.5 (Moderate) 1.17 (Moderate) 0.55 (Moderate) 
Germany 3 (Strong) 5   (Strong) Moderate 0.50 (Moderate) 7 (Strong) 2.17 (Strong) 0.78 (Strong) 
Greece 1 (Weak) 15 (Weak) Weak 0.17 (Weak) 2 (Weak) 0.83 (Weak) 0.26 (Weak) 
Hungary - - - - 7 (Strong) 2.00 (Moderate) 0.48 (Moderate) 
Ireland 1 (Weak) 9  (Moderate) Weak 0.17 (Weak) 2 (Weak) 1.50 (Moderate) 0.46 (Moderate) 
Italy 1 (Weak) 8  (Moderate) Weak 0.17 (Weak) 5.5 (Moderate) 1.67 (Moderate) 0.46 (Moderate) 
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Country Bergman I Bergman II Maurer&Wessels Raunio Karlas Winzen OPAL 
Latvia - - - - 6.5 (Moderate) 2.50 (Strong) 0.53 (Moderate) 
Lithuania - - - - 8.5 (Strong) 2.50 (Strong) 0.73 (Strong) 
Luxembourg 1 (Weak) 12 (Weak) Weak 0.17 (Weak) 3 (Weak) 0.67 (Weak) 0.56 (Moderate 
Malta - - - - 2.5 (Weak) 1.50 (Moderate) 0.46 (Moderate) 
Netherlands 1 (Moderate) 7   (Moderate) Moderate 0.50 (Moderate) - 1.83 (Moderate) 0.66 (Strong) 
Poland - - - - 5 (Moderate) 2.00 (Moderate) 0.44 (Moderate) 
Portugal 1 (Weak) 13 (Weak) Weak 0.17 (Weak) 6.5 (Moderate) 1.50 (Moderate) 0.43 (Moderate) 
Romania - - - - 6 (Moderate) 2.33 (Strong) 0.35 (Weak) 
Slovakia - - - - 6.5 (Moderate) 2.50 (Strong) 0.49 (Moderate) 
Slovenia - - - - 7.5 (Strong) 2.00 (Moderate) 0.60 (Strong) 
Spain 1 (Weak) 14 (Weak) Weak 0.17 (Weak) 2 (Weak) 0.83 (Weak) 0.40 (Moderate) 
Sweden 2 (Moderate) 3   (Strong) Strong 0.67 (Strong) 7.5 (Strong) 1.83 (Moderate) 0.72 (Strong) 
UK 2 (Moderate) 6   (Moderate) Weak 0.33 (Weak) 4.5 (Moderate) 1.67 (Moderate) 0.52 (Moderate) 
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Towards an Analysis of Scrutiny Practice 
 
 While the literature on formal scrutiny rights of national parliaments in EU 
affairs is by now plentiful, an analysis of the actual behaviour of MPs regarding 
parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs in general is still relatively scarce. The first studies 
concerned with scrutiny practice tried to explain on a general, conceptual level why 
parliaments might not be active scrutinisers. Thus, Auel and Benz argue that 
parliamentarians face a particular dilemma in EU affairs (2005). They argue that when 
MPs strongly tie the position of the government by binding mandates, they take away 
the government’s room for manoeuvre in negotiations (Auel and Benz, 2005, p. 373). 
Binding mandates might weaken the negotiation position of the government and thus be 
against the national interest (ibid.). On the other hand, if MPs give the government too 
much leeway, they undermine parliamentary control and thus the democratic legitimacy 
of the EU (ibid.). According to Auel and Benz, this is a general dilemma which all 
parliaments face (ibid.). There are differences regarding how parliaments solve this 
dilemma based on ‘the allocation of agenda power and the intensity and shape of party 
competition’ (p. 376). In this sense, the authors claim that formal rights do not lead to 
strong scrutiny practice and argue that institutional factors play a role in explaining 
variation (p. 388). 
However, this argument differs from the argument presented here in several 
ways. The present study claims that formal rights are of secondary relevance compared 
to the presence of issue entrepreneurs and internal dissent within parties combined with 
public Euroscepticism. Moreover, Auel and Benz explain how institutional factors can 
hamper the use of scrutiny instruments (negative divergence), but they do not touch 
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upon the issue that some parliaments are actually more active than their formal powers 
would suggest (positive divergence). Thus, Auel and Benz compare only broad systems 
of parliaments, and do not try to insulate different party political factors which might 
explain differences in scrutiny practice. Their analysis thus obscures much of the 
variation which arguably exists between member states. In contrast, the present study 
will analyse systematically why formal rights and actual activity diverge by 
disentangling the effect of different independent variables in explaining scrutiny 
activity. Empirically, Auel and Benz test their claim only on a small number of 
parliaments and on assertions regarding the general functioning of the system, not based 
on particular legal acts or explicit comparisons across countries and over time. By 
applying a mixed-method approach, this thesis makes it a point to provide a more 
extensive test, across systems and over time, of the factors that explain the discrepancy 
between formal rights and actual activity.  
 Focusing on particular types of parliamentary activity, a number of studies have 
emerged which analyse the relationship between the parliament and the public with 
regards to European affairs. De Wilde analyses how effective parliament is in 
communicating EU issues (2014). He shows that the extent to which mass media ‘pick 
up’ parliamentary debates is limited (ibid.). De Wilde also finds some variation 
regarding the institutional setting of the legislature, with more debates taking place in 
‘debating parliaments’, such as the House of Commons (ibid.). Garcia Lupato, 
comparing debates in Spain and Italy, has undertaken a similar analysis (2014). The 
focus on parliamentary debates is a highly relevant aspect of parliamentary scrutiny, and 
will as such also be covered by the proposed project. However, the authors focus only 
on one particular policy area (the EU budget), so they can draw no conclusions 
    
32 
 
regarding the impact of different policy areas. In contrast, this thesis seeks to compare 
the parliamentary scrutiny for a number of countries and over time. 
 A comparative approach to plenary activities regarding EU affairs, focusing on 
debates, has been attempted by Auel and Raunio (2014b). Auel and Raunio compare the 
coverage of EU issues in the lower chambers of the parliaments of four countries 
(Germany, Finland, France and the UK). They aim to generate data on the overall 
involvement of parliaments in debates and compare the parliamentary involvement for 
three different legal acts (Auel and Raunio, 2014b, p. 14). Auel and Raunio find that the 
largest share of EU debates in the German Bundestag, which is characterised by a 
general pro-EU consensus, whereas the share of EU debates is particularly low in the 
British House of Commons, in which both main parties are divided over Europe (p. 21).  
Even though their study is a very insightful first step to analyse scrutiny practice 
in the plenary, it suffers from important methodological shortcomings. First, Auel and 
Raunio cannot present comparable data on quantitative involvement of the parliaments 
in EU affairs, but have to rely on different indicators for different parliaments, for 
example on the number of days for which an EU issue is put on the agenda (p. 17). 
However, it could well be possible that the EU is mentioned and discussed in the 
context of a debate on another topic, but the authors only count debates which are 
explicitly flagged as ‘EU debates’ by the parliaments themselves. An in-depth analysis 
of parliamentary debates should rely on manual or computer-assisted coding of a larger 
number of debates. Finally, Auel and Raunio only concentrate on parliamentary debates, 
without taking other activities in the plenary, such as questions, into account. 
 Wendler focuses on differences between parties in discussing EU issues. 
However, he is also more concerned with qualitative aspects of the debate, such as 
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whether the focus of the debates is on ‘domestic’ or ‘supranational’ aspects of Europe 
(Wendler, 2011, p. 488) and how processes and events at the European level are 
justified (Wendler, 2012, p. 4). Wendler finds that cross-national differences in the 
intensity of debating EU affairs are difficult to identify given the different formats in 
which EU affairs are debated (Wendler, 2013a, p.11). He argues that ‘it appears 
questionable how much simple quantitative counts of the amount of time, words or 
parliamentary procedure can actually tell us about how, and how importantly, the EU is 
dealt with in domestic parliaments’ (p.11). However, arguably we can expect that 
underlying political factors will lead to different levels of activity in the forums which 
happen to be most frequently used in the respective countries. Moreover, given the 
content analysis employed in Paper 1 (see below), differences between different forums 
(e.g. parliamentary questions, regular debates, etc.) are not of relevance. In the present 
thesis, it is not individual debates that are compared with each other, but the monthly 
shares of keywords. Moreover, in contrast to Wendler’s claims, quantification is 
arguably the best way to assess the extent of debate, which is the purpose of the present 
thesis which aims to analyse the difference between formal rights and activity in EU 
affairs. The keyword-based approach of this thesis is thus a possible way to overcome 
this limitation of Wendler’s study, since the share of keywords is compared across 
different modes of debate. It is thus an appropriate approach of measuring activity.   
Preliminary analyses of parliamentary questions have been undertaken by 
Brourard and Navarro (2012) with regard to France and Chaques and Palau (2012) with 
regard to Spain. Even though these studies are highly interesting, the focus of only one 
country means that they cannot analyse the effect of institutional variations. The 
existing studies on the communication function of national parliaments in EU affairs 
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thus have important shortcomings, which the present study seeks to overcome. The 
single country study of the German Bundestag by Rauh (2015), who employs a 
dictionary based content analysis approach similar to the one used in Paper 1 of this 
thesis, is also limited by its narrow focus on only one country.  
 Focusing on scrutiny practice, Sprungk (2003, 2007, 2011) has shown that 
formally strong parliaments are not necessarily more active in actual scrutiny activity 
than weak parliaments. Spungk has observed a ‘convergence’ of scrutiny practices 
between the cases of Germany and France, even though the German Parliament has 
stronger formal scrutiny powers than the French (Sprungk, 2007, p. 155). Her findings 
are highly interesting and inform the puzzle and research question of this project. 
However, Spungk has not solved the puzzle why some parliaments are more active than 
others. In contrast to this study, Sprungk argues that variation in legislative organisation 
(i.e. involvement of sectoral committees or not, rights of the opposition) is the most 
important aspect determining scrutiny activity (Sprungk, 2010, p. 16). Arguably, the 
importance of this factor is rather limited compared to the influence of party political 
factors, which themselves influence how actors make use of the opportunities given in 
the framework of legislative organisation.  
 An analysis of different activities (with regard to resolutions and time spent 
discussing in the plenary) has been undertaken by Auel, Rozenberg and Tacea (2015). 
They also relate the activity of national parliaments to the formal powers they establish 
in their own ranking. They find that formal powers of national parliaments have an 
impact on their activity in the form of resolutions and to a lesser extent on the length of 
parliamentary debates on Europe (p. 294). The present thesis thus partly contradicts the 
findings of these studies. Nevertheless, they also find an effect of public Euroscepticism 
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on the number of resolutions and of party Euroscepticism on the length of debates (p. 
296). However, it has to be kept in mind that their analysis only covers the time period 
from 2010 to 2012, which makes the analysis in the present thesis more comprehensive. 
More recently some studies have focused in-depth of particular sub-policies of EU 
affairs, such as foreign policy (Edwards, Huff and Smith, 2012), Justice and Home 
Affairs (Tacea, 2012) or Economic and Monetary Policy (Auel and Hoeing, 2015), 
substantially deepening our knowledge on how parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs 
works in practice in this areas.  
Concentrating on the importance of issue salience, Miklin has argued that the 
differences between formal rights and actual activity can be explained by the level of 
politicisation of legal acts (2012). In the case of more highly politicised legal acts, such 
as the Services Directive, parliaments would always make full use of their formal 
scrutiny powers (ibid.). The problem with this argument is that Miklin cannot explain 
why there is still variation between countries with regard to the extent to which formal 
powers and practices diverge even for legal acts which are equally politicised in the 
respective countries.  
The only other works which have explicitly addressed the gap between formal 
powers and practice are Hegeland and Neuhold with regard to Austria, Finland and 
Sweden (2002, p. 13), Pollack and Smolinski with regard to Austria (2003, 2012), 
Knutelská (2011a, 2011b, p. 21), and Bartiovic and Král (2011) with regard to the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia. However, none of these studies explicitly tries to explain 
why formal rules and practice diverge, but just acknowledge that there is such a 
difference.  
    
36 
 
A final strand of the literature on scrutiny practice looks at the attitudes of MPs 
on their role in parliamentary scrutiny. Thus, Wessels (2005) found in a large-scale, 
quantitative survey that MPs in some countries (for example Germany) have more trust 
in the European Parliament and see scrutiny in European affairs basically as the task of 
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) (Wessels, 2005, p. 455). Others, for 
example French MPs, see the role of the national parliament as more important (ibid.). 
These different views have an important impact on how MPs envisage the future 
institutional architecture of the European Union (p. 463). Arguably, the attitude of MPs 
might also have an impact on how scrutiny practices are carried out, and on whether 
formal rights and actual activity diverge.  
 
 
The Crucial Role of Issue Entrepreneurs  
 
As explained in the sections above, the current literature on the role of national 
parliaments in the European Union mostly focuses on the role of formal powers and 
claims that these powers are the most important determinants of actual activity. When 
the impact of public Euroscepticism or Eurosceptic parties is acknowledged, the exact 
impact of these factors is not clearly explained; the same is true for internal dissent of 
parties on EU affairs. By contrast, this thesis argues that the presence of issue 
entrepreneurs (parties which differ significantly from all other parties in a political 
system on the topic of Europe), the extent to which (mainstream) parties are divided on 
Europe and public Euroscepticism are the most important factors in explaining 
parliamentary activity in EU affairs. Formal rights do not seem to have a strong impact 
on actual activity, which explains why formal powers and actual activity diverge. 
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This thesis focuses explicitly on the agency of parties, and in particular on issue 
entrepreneurs and on how mainstream parties react to them, in bringing about 
parliamentary activity in EU affairs. This aspect was previously neglected by existing 
studies which concentrate mostly on structural factors relating to the formal powers of 
national parliaments. In this context, the thesis analyses both the incentives for and the 
constraints on parties when emphasizing EU issues in debates in the plenary and in 
committees as well as in the form of resolutions..  
 The concept of ‘issue entrepreneurship’ in the EU context was first defined by 
Hobolt and De Vries (2015, p. 3). It is defined as ‘a political strategy with which parties 
mobilise new policy issues that have been largely ignored by the political mainstream 
and adopt a position on the issue that is substantially different from the current position 
of the mainstream’ (ibid.). Issue entrepreneur parties thus have a larger ‘framing 
distance’ on the issue in question, in this case the EU, than the mainstream parties have 
amongst each other (Van der Wardt, 2015, p. 841). Whether a party can be classified as 
an issue entrepreneur thus depends on its position vis-à-vis other parties in the political 
system. The concept of issue entrepreneurs in the study of Hobolt and De Vries builds 
on earlier work by Camines and Stimson (1986, 1989, 1993) and Riker (1982, 1986, 
1996). Carmines and Stimson found that parties which lose out in the political system 
usually are the ones which introduce new issues (1993). The concept does not as such 
relate to EU affairs and has been developed in the US literature to conceptualise the 
political mobilisation on previously dormant issues such as race (Carmines and 
Stimson, 1986). In contemporary Europe, parties could become issue entrepreneurs on a 
number of issues on which mainstream parties do not wish to mobilise or which cut 
across the left-right axis, such as immigration (Hobolt and De Vries, 2015, p. 20). In the 
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context of the present thesis, however, the term will be used exclusively with reference 
to EU affairs. Issue entrepreneurs are thus defined in contrast to mainstream parties, 
which do not mobilise on the issue of EU affairs and for which Europe is a cross-cutting 
topic.   
The concept of issue entrepreneurs thus differs from related concepts such as 
‘niche parties’ or ‘challenger parties’. Wagner defines niche parties as ‘parties that de-
emphasize economic concerns and stress a small range of non-economic issues’ (2011, 
p. 2). A similar definition is used by Meguid, who adds that issues addressed by niche 
parties cut across existing party lines (2008). While these definitions fit many issue 
entrepreneurs, neglecting the socio-economic dimension is not a necessary requirement 
for a party to be classified as an issue entrepreneur. The focus on a rather narrow set of 
issues – Wagner mentions European integration explicitly (2011, p. 3) – is certainly also 
the characteristic of many issue entrepreneurs. What is crucial for a party to be an issue 
entrepreneur is that it differs significantly in its stance on the issue of European 
integration from other parties represented in parliament, both in terms of the direction 
(Euroscepticism) and strength (salience) of its preferences. The importance it attaches to 
the socio-economic dimension or the number of other policy areas it focuses on is not 
relevant in this context. Likewise, the concept of ‘challenger parties’ is not always 
congruent with issue entrepreneurs. While many issue entrepreneurs have never been in 
government, others occasionally have been part of the government under particular 
circumstances and usually prompting government instability, such as in Austria from 
2000 to 2007. Similarly, the size of a party is also not relevant: While many issue 
entrepreneurs are small, others such as the Freedom Party (FPO) in Austria regularly 
gain a large share of seats and votes. Some authors focus on particular party types or 
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families, such as ‘New Politics Parties’ encompassing Green parties, extreme 
left/Marxist parties, the radical right and others (Hino, 2012, p. 14). Again, while issue 
entrepreneurs are clearly concentrated in some of these party families, such as the 
extreme left and right, others, such as Green parties, do not usually act as issue 
entrepreneurs according to the definition used in this thesis.  
There are a number of factors which provide incentives and disincentives for 
parties to become active in EU affairs (Auel, 2009; Auel and Benz, 2005). While 
carrying out scrutiny, MPs will avoid taking actions that will hamper their chances for 
re-election (Auel, 2009, p. 16). Firstly, parties have an incentive to present a coherent 
position to the voters (Proksch and Slapin, 2012, p. 522). Thus, if parties are divided 
they do not favour public scrutiny on the issue in question (Auel, 2007, p. 492). This is 
the case for government as well as opposition parties (Van der Wardt, De Vries and 
Hobolt, 2014, p. 989-990). The way a party is perceived with regard to its stance on 
Europe is important since a party’s position on EU affairs is likely to influence voting 
decisions, as De Vries and Tillman have shown (2011, p. 10). Parties which foster an 
issue on the agenda can be expected to be coherent on the issue in question (Hobolt and 
De Vries, 2015, p. 19). By contrast, mainstream parties are often divided on the topic of 
Europe (Gabel and Scheve, 2007, p. 38). Dissent on Europe has increased over the last 
two decades (Hooghe and Marks, 2006, p. 249). Being perceived as divided on an issue 
is generally considered to hurt the electoral prospects of a party (Kam, 2009, p. 134). 
Parties can thus be considered to be less active under these circumstances (Auel, 2007, 
p. 492). Hence, issue entrepreneurs will adopt a strategy by which they hope to expose 
the divisiveness of their competitors – they use Europe as a ‘wedge issue’ (Van de 
Wardt, De Vries and Hobolt, 2014, p. 997).  
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Secondly, the distance between parties and the voters on the issues of EU affairs 
provides important incentives and constraints. The parties EU affairs strategies are thus 
influenced and modulated by public opinion on European integration. In most European 
countries, political elites are more pro-European than citizens (Hooghe, 2003, p. 296). 
Eurosceptic Parties have an incentive to be active in the form of debating EU affairs in 
the plenary and initiating resolutions on the topic when public Euroscepticism is high, 
since they want to show voters that they are more in line with them on the issue of 
Europe than other parties. By contrast, mainstream parties that are more pro-European 
than their voters might want to hide this fact from the electorate and become less active 
when public Euroscepticism is higher since they could potentially face high costs for 
diverging from their voters (Auel and Raunio, 2014b, p. 16). 
Parties are thus becoming active in EU affairs when the incentives of being 
perceived as active outweigh the cost of appearing divided. At a certain level of 
divisiveness on Europe, higher levels of public Euroscepticism might lead to diminished 
activity, given that it is more likely that voters for which Europe is salient are likely to 
perceive divisiveness on EU affairs very negatively. Strong public Euroscepticism thus 
amplifies the benefits of being active in EU affairs, but also increases the costs of the 
party being regarded as divided by the voters, especially for mainstream parties. This 
dimension of the incentives and disincentives of parties to become actively involved in 
EU affairs has been previously largely neglected by studies of parliamentary 
involvement in EU affairs. The relationship between the salience of EU affairs, internal 
divisiveness on Europe and public Euroscepticism for both government and mainstream 
parties is depicted in Table 2 below.  
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Table 2: Incentives for issue entrepreneurs and mainstream parties to become active in 
EU affairs 
 Issue Entrepreneurs Mainstream Parties 
Salience of EU affairs High Usually Low 
Internal divisiveness on 
EU affairs 
Low High 
Distance to voters on EU 
affairs 
Low High 
Incentive to become 
active in EU affairs when 
public Euroscepticism 
increases 
Increases Decreases 
 
 
Most issue entrepreneurs can be found on the extreme right and the extreme left 
of the political system. It is very rare for mainstream parties to mobilise on a new issue 
since these issues often cut across the left/right dimension, the main line of conflict for 
mainstream parties (Meguid, 2008, p. 4). While extreme left parties tend to criticize the 
EU on economic grounds, parties on the extreme right often focus on a loss of national 
sovereignty (De Vries and Edwards, 2009, p. 22). Moreover, parties which are not 
represented in parliament but have a strong impact on the public perception of an issue 
can be considered issue entrepreneurs, such as in the case of United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP).  
By fostering an issue in the parliamentary realm, parties try to establish 
ownership of an issue (Dahlberg and Martinsson, 2015, p. 826). This might help them to 
increase their visibility in the media by being associated with the issue (Van der Brug 
and Berghoeut, 2015, p. 882). This in turn might also influence their electoral prospects 
since they gain more attention in campaigns (Lefevre, Tresch and Walgrave, 2015b, p. 
901). Hence, issue entrepreneur parties can be expected to be especially active in EU 
affairs in the form of resolutions and debates.  
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 The success of issue entrepreneurs in establishing the ownership of an issue is 
however heavily dependent on the behaviour of mainstream parties themselves, which 
is a very important factor in itself (Meguid, 2008, p. 30). The behaviour of the spatially 
non-neighbouring party, for example the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social 
Union (CDU/CSU) in the German case of Die Linke, determines the success of the issue 
entrepreneurs (p. 32). According to Meguid, the chances for success of an issue 
entrepreneur are best (in a spatial model with three parties) when one mainstream party 
dismisses the actions of the issue entrepreneur while the other is adversarial (p. 33). 
However, mainstream parties are restricted in their choice of how to react to an 
issue entrepreneur. They cannot accommodate positions which are diametrically 
opposed to their own (Meguid, 2008, p. 35). For example, it would be very difficult for 
the pro-integrationist CDU in Germany to accommodate a Eurosceptic party. Moreover, 
parties cannot take a policy position that is fundamentally at odds with its previous 
position on the topic (ibid.). In addition, the reaction of the mainstream party has to be 
timely to be effective (p. 37). Mainstream parties thus face a number of constraints not 
only with regard to the extent to which they can engage with the issue of EU affairs, but 
also with regard to the opportunities they have to react to issue entrepreneurs which are 
highly active on the topic.  
According to saliency-based theory, parties which are closely associated with a 
topical issue benefit from it being discussed (Budge, 2015, p. 767). Therefore, we can 
expect that mainstream parties might also want to engage more with an issue which was 
introduced by issue entrepreneurs by engaging in a process of ‘issue convergence’ 
(Walgrave, Tresch and Lefevre, 2015, p. 779). This will make it difficult for the issue 
entrepreneurs to establish ownership of the issue and to benefit from it electorally 
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(Dahlberg and Martinsson, 2015, p. 829). The presence of issue entrepreneurs can thus 
lead to more overall activity on the topic of Europe. 
 All these factors influence parliamentary activity independently from formal 
powers of national parliaments in EU affairs. Hence an increase in formal powers will 
not lead to more activity if the underlying political factors do not change. In the same 
way, parliaments with weak formal powers and political factors conducive to strong 
scrutiny will be more active irrespective of the formal powers. This can explain the 
divergence between formal powers and actual activity in EU affairs. In the following 
section, the different functions of national parliaments in EU affairs and the different 
venues for activity are examined. 
 
 
Challenges to the Definitions of Issue Entrepreneurship and Euroscepticism 
 
When applying the issue entrepreneur framwork, important conceptual choices 
had to be made. A first important choice is which parties to include in the definition of 
issuee entrepreneurs. Theoretically, the key criterion for deeming a party an issue 
entrepreneur is its relative distance from the other parties in the party system on the 
issue of Europe and the salience they attribute to the issue (Hobolt and De Vries, 2015, 
p. 1163). Conceptually, issue entrepreneurship has thus two impartants components: a) 
the distance to the mean party position in parliament on the question of Europe and b) 
the salience of EU affairs for the party (p. 1168). The exact absolute stance of issue 
entrepreneurs on European integration can thus vary substantially depending on the 
respective political system. Hence, clearly Eurosceptic parties such as the Front 
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National in France are classified as issue entrepreneurs, while Die Linke in Germany 
could only be regarded as Eurosceptic relative to the other German parties and its 
positions might not be regarded as Eurosceptic in other party systems and countries.  
The conceptualisation of issue entrepreneurs is thus closely related to the 
definition of Euroscepiticsm. For this thesis, Euroscepticism plays and important role 
both at the party level and at the individual level (‘popular Euroscepticism’). At the 
party level, a distinction can be made between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Eurosceptic parties 
(Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002, p. 7). While ‘hard’ Euroscepticism at the party level is 
characterized by fundamental opposition of membership to the European Union, ‘soft’ 
Eurosceptic parties might confine critism to particular aspects or policies of the EU or 
opposes further integration (ibid). However, what is critical for the definition of issue 
entrepreneurs as illustrated by the case of Die Linke, is that the distance of these parties 
to all other parties on their position on Europe is larger than the distance of all other 
parties from each other. Issue entrepreneurs thus have a larger ‘framing’ distance on the 
issue of Europe (Van der Wardt, 2015, p. 841). Moreover, their electorate is relatively 
more Eurosceptic than that of the other parties
1
. Thus, Die Linke, as a ‘soft’ Eurosceptic 
party, even though not necessarily very anti-European in a cross country comparison, 
fulfills the function of an issue entrepreneur in the German political system by 
articulating public Euroscepticism in the plenary and  in Committees and by challanging 
the position of mainstream  parties.   
At the popular level, Euroscepitcism can be defined as an ‘encompassing a range 
of critical positions on European integration, as well as outright opposition’ (Hooghe 
                                                     
1
 The Eurosceptic Altenative fuer Deutschland (AfD) was not represented in the German Bundestag in the 
time period studies here.  
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and Marks, 2007, p. 43). Thus, individuals who would describe themselves as 
‘Eurosceptic’  fall on ‘one side of a continuum that ranges from very positive to very 
negative dispositions towards European integration, its policies, its institutions, or its 
principles’ (ibid.). For the purpose of this thesis, popular Euroscepticism is thus 
conceptualised as the preferences of the electorate with regard to European integration 
in the sense that the membership of the country to the European Union is overall 
evaluated in a negative light. This definition is rather broad and it is acknowledged that 
popular Euroscepticism can encompass a variety of different critical positions on 
Europe. Therefore, this definition also mirrors the conceptualisation at the party level, 
allwowing for ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ Euroscepticism, as explained above. More specifically, 
popular Euroscepticism is conceptualized as the share of the respondents in the 
Eurobarometer survey who think membership of the European Union is a ‘bad thing’ 
for their country minus those who think that it is a ‘good thing’ (Eurobarometer, 2012a). 
The measure is thus negative if the public is pro-European and positive if it is 
Eurosceptic.  
Crucially, it is assumed that the preference of the voters on European  
integration are relevant for the strategic choices of political parties. This assumption is 
well supported by research (Spoon, 2012; Williams and Spoon, 2015). Parties seem to 
be responsive to the electorate’s preferences in EU affairs (Steenbergen, Edwards and 
De Vries, 2007; Arnold, Sapir and De Vries, 2012). For example, parties respond to 
public Euroscepticism by increasing the number of Eurosceptic statement in their 
manifestos (Williams and Spoon, 2015, p. 185). The interaction of both public and party 
Euroscepticsim is thus at the core of the argument of this thesis. 
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Euroscepticism is however not the only relevant element which makes a party an 
issue entrepreneur, as mentioned above. Parties which are categorized as issue 
entrepreneurs might also attribute different degrees of salience to the issue of Europe. 
Arguably, opposition to EU membership only plays a minor role in the overall 
programme of  some Euroscepitc parties, such as the Democratic Unionist Party in 
Northern Ireland (DUP) (even though the party supported the campaign to leave the 
European Union in the runup to the 2016 referndum on membership in the UK). 
However, when the issue of Europe becomes salient, such as in an referendum 
campaign, all Eurosceptic parties will clearly emphasize the issue and exploit their 
distance theuir mainstream parties – even though their overall focus or ‘core’ issue is a 
different one, in the case of the DUP sectarian politics. Empricially, these differences 
are taken into account in the the construction of issue entrepreneurship as a continuous 
variable combining both the distance to the mean party position of  all parties in 
parliament on the EU and the salience of EU affairs for the respective party. Since the 
two compnents are multiplied, a party like the FN would have a higher issue 
entrepnreurship score than the DUP, which is Eurosceptic but for which Europe is not 
necessarily salient. The DUP in turn has a higher score than Die Linke, which has a 
moderately large framing distance to all other parties but low salience (see the methods 
sections in Papers 1 and 2).  
A disadvantage of this operationalization is that parties which are not 
represented in parliament, not least the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), 
remain outside the framework of analysis. This is certainly debatable yet it seems a 
necessary choice to only include actors which are represented in parliament since the 
thesis is concerned with the parliamentary actity in EU affairs as a consequence of the 
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presence of issue entrepreneurs and public Euroscepticism. Therefore, only the activity 
of parties represented in parliament are available. However, clearly ‘extra parliamentary 
issue entrepreneurs’ such as UKIP, had an impact on the beahaviour of mainstream 
parties represented in parliament. In future work such parties could be included in the 
analysis. Paper 3, which qualitatively analyses parliamentary activity in EU affairs in 
the case of the Fiscal Compact Treaty, explicity takes the activity of extra–
parliaemntary issue entrepreneurs such as UKIP and the mechanisms through which 
they influence the behaviour of mainstream parties into account.  
For the present thesis, issue entrepreneurs are only defined as electorally 
independent parties. The definition thus excludes party factions, such as the Eurosceptic 
faction in the UK Conservative Party, or the Christian Social Union (CSU), the arguably 
Euroscepitc sister party of the German Christian Democractic Union (CDU). In the case 
of the Conservative Party, the Eurosceptic faction mobilizes on the issue of Europe 
against the wishes of the (mainstream) party leadership. Indeed, when a party is deeply 
divided and a substantive faction of the party holds views which differ substantially not 
only from the other mainstream parties but also from the mainstream of its own party, 
this faction can fullfill functions similar to that of an ‘issue entrepreneur, and might 
have a simiar impact on parliamentary activity in EU affairs. This would only be the 
case if the faction represents a sufficiently large share of the party and the framing 
distance (Van de Wardt, 2015, p. 841) between the faction and the mainstream of the 
party is larger than the framing distance between the mainstream of the party and other 
parties in parliament. However, the key difference is that party factions do not represent 
a viable electoral alternative for voters, unless and Eurosceptic faction splits from the 
party. Moreover, even the most Eurosceptic party rebels will at time  ave to take tactical 
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considerations of the leadership into account and thus do not act as completely 
independent actors. Furthermore, the situation of the UK Conservative Party in the 
2010s might be rather exceptional in the Europe-wide comparison. Other parties are 
arguably not that publicly divided. It would thus be a stretch of the concept of issue 
entrepreneurship to include parliamentary factions of mainstream parties. Empricially, a 
problem for the operationalisation of the concept of issue entrepreneurship in Papers 1 
and 2 would be that no quantitative data on party positions exist, so that the distance of 
the Eurosceptic faction of the party would be impossible to operationalise. To some 
extent, factionalisation is captured by the variable on internal prty dissent on Europe. 
Moreover, the qualitative analysis in Paper 3 focuses in depth on the activities of party 
factions in EU affairs and the impact their behaviour has on the activity of the 
respective party leadership and parliament as a whole. While the definitions of ‘issue 
entrepreneurs’ and, related to it, Euroscepticism, which are employed in this thesis are 
certainly contestable, they have been made after careful consideration of the theoretical 
and empirical implications of these conceptual choices.  
 
Different Forms of Activity and Parliamentary Functions 
 
  Parliamentary activity is defined in a twofold way in this thesis. The first form 
of activity is the extent to which Members of Parliament (MPs) debate EU affairs in the 
plenary (Paper 1). This form of activity can be related to the deliberation and 
communication function of parliament – directed at the citizens. The second form of 
activity is defined as the frequency with which parliamentary committees issue 
resolutions on European affairs and the extent to which these resolutions are ‘critical’ 
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(Paper 2). This form of activity is an expression of the actual scrutiny function of 
parliament of controlling and holding the government to account. The exact mechanism 
by which parliament and parties use these avenues of activity is examined in a case 
study on the Fiscal Compact (in Paper 3).  
These activities correspond to the two broad categories of functions of 
parliaments: the citizen-related function of communication and the function of 
controlling the government (Norton, 1993). Based on the work of Packenham (1973), 
Norton divided the functions of parliament as broadly citizen- and government-related 
(1993). Raunio adopted those functions to the specific role of national parliaments in 
EU affairs (2011, p. 307). The citizen-related functions include ‘acting as a safety valve 
and achieving redress for grievance’ (in the case of EU affairs, providing a forum for 
conflict over European integration), ‘mobilising and educating citizens’ (educating and 
informing on European integration) and ‘interest articulation’ (expressing the 
preferences of interest groups and voters in EU affairs) (ibid.). All of these functions 
can be undertaken in the form of plenary debates or parliamentary questions and are 
captured by the first measure of activity in this thesis.  
The government-related functions include ‘government oversight’ (the actual 
scrutiny of EU legal acts), ‘law making’ (which takes place only indirectly in EU affairs 
via control of the government), ‘latent legitimating’ (providing legitimacy for the 
European Union by regular parliamentary involvement) and ‘manifest legitimating’ (by 
formally approving EU legal acts) (p. 307). Of these functions, only ‘government 
oversight’ is explicitly measured as activity in this thesis, since it is arguably the most 
important government-related function of national parliaments in EU affairs from which 
the other functions are derived. Moreover, ‘government oversight’ is the only function, 
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which can relatively straightforwardly be measured and compared in the form of 
resolutions. However, the mere number of resolutions does not tell us anything about 
the extent to which these documents actually critically engage with government 
positions. Therefore, the extent to which the resolutions are critical or supportive of the 
government is also analysed in Paper 2.  
In the academic literature, both citizen- and government-related types of activity 
are frequently referred to as ‘scrutiny.’ However, as Raunio points out, it might be 
misleading to classify parliamentary debates simply as ‘scrutiny.’ In contrast to 
traditional control functions such as scrutiny in EACs and other committees, the 
interaction with the government (or the opposition) is secondary to the interaction with 
the voters and citizens, who are arguably the actual addressees of the debates (Raunio, 
2011, p. 306). As this thesis shows, this is particularly true for issue entrepreneurs, who 
mention Europe more frequently in debates than mainstream parties (Paper 1) and 
specifically use debates to appeal to their Eurosceptic voters, as Paper 3 on the Fiscal 
Compact Treaty demonstrates. Moreover, deliberations in committees are often not 
available to the public in full, further underlining that this form of activity is directed at 
the government and not primarily the citizens (ibid.). It is thus more useful to refer 
solely to the government-related functions analysed in Paper 2 as ‘scrutiny,’ while the 
citizen-related function measured in Paper 1 can be referred to as communication and 
deliberation. 
Nevertheless, both are important forms of parliamentary activity in EU affairs ( 
Auel, 2007; Raunio, 2011). The communication function is important because 
parliaments as ‘strong publics’ and forums for deliberation can contribute to the 
emergence of ‘public spheres’ in Europe, which can be seen as a ‘necessary, but not 
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sufficient condition for democracy’ (Eriksen and Fossum, 2002, p. 402). Arguably, 
national parliaments are still better suited to fulfil this role than the European Parliament 
(Wendler, 2014, p. 4). Parliamentary debate on Europe could then lead to an increased 
interest and level of information on EU issues amongst citizens (Auel and Runio, 2014, 
p. 2). This, in turn, could then lead to ‘a more democratic Union’ from a deliberative 
point of view (De Wilde, 2009 in Auel and Runio, 2014, p. 2). The actual scrutiny 
function is also of tremendous importance since (relating to the classical argument on 
the democratic deficit of the European Union) they might help to partly compensate for 
their loss of power resulting from European integration (Hix and Raunio, 2000, p. 142). 
Particularly, parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs might help the governing majority to 
get involved in policy making in EU-affairs (Winzen, 2012, p. 299). This involvement 
strengthens and extends the parliamentary delegation chain to the European level (p. 
298). Both forms of activity are thus very important for deliberative and 
representational aspects of democracy in the European Union respectively. 
A further parliamentary function relates to the so-called ‘networking function’ of 
cooperation with other parliaments (Raunio, 2011, p. 307). The recent increase in the 
interest in these aspects of parliamentary scrutiny can be explained by entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty, which not only gives the Conference of European Affairs 
Committees (COSAC) legal status for the first time, but also introduced the Early 
Warning Mechanism for Subsidiarity Control (Abels and Eppler, 2011, p. 17). The 
latter allows national parliaments to submit a ‘reasoned opinion’ when they believe that 
the principle of subsidiarity is likely to be violated by an EU legal act. When a third of 
national parliaments submit a reasoned opinion until eight weeks after the publication of 
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the draft in all official languages of the EU, the Commission has to review the 
respective legal act (Neuhold, 2011, p. 6).  
Even though the Early Warning System of Subsidiarity Control (EWS) was only 
established very recently, there is already a wealth of literature on its constitutional 
nature and possible implications. Much of this literature takes a constructivist 
perspective. Cooper argues that the EWS will lead to stronger cooperation between 
national parliaments and will transform them eventually in a ‘Virtual Third Chamber’ of 
the European Union (Cooper, 2006, p. 283). Rather optimistically, Cooper predicts that 
‘the EWS will alleviate the “democratic deficit” in so far as it will lead to increased 
parliamentary, and thereby public, scrutiny of the EU’s legislative process’ (p. 282). 
Taking a similar constructivist view and focusing on the collective influence of 
parliaments, Crum and Fossum argue that the EU by now represents a ‘multilevel 
parliamentary field’ (Crum and Fossum, 2009, p. 249). They claim that two 
representative channels exist in the EU, one via the EP and the other via national 
parliaments (p. 252).  
In contrast, preliminary empirical evidence regarding the impact of inter-
parliamentary cooperation, especially in the context of the EWS, paints a rather bleak 
picture. Both Neuhold (2011) as well as Buzogany and Stuchlik (2011) find that even 
though some parliaments seem to participate actively, the overall effect is rather weak. 
An important reason for this is that the threshold of two thirds of all national 
parliaments is very high, and has never been reached until now (Buzogany and Stuchlik, 
2011 p. 28). Moreover, national parliaments tend to get involved too late in the 
legislative process (p. 20). Kiiver argues that the EWS should not be seen as device for 
national parliaments to exercise direct power, but as a means to make the governments 
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and EU institutions explain and justify what they are doing (2012, p. 17). Knutelska 
sees some progress regarding the cooperation of national parliaments via their collective 
database, the Inter-Parliamentary EU Information Exchange (IPEX) (Knutelska, 2011a, 
p. 342). Thus, there seems to be an imbalance between the attention paid to the EWS in 
the theoretical literature and its usefulness in practice. From the perspective of the 
argument of this thesis, this comes as no surprise. If an increase in formal rights has no 
effect on scrutiny practice at the domestic level, we cannot expect it to have a strong 
effect on inter-parliamentary coordination. To facilitate cooperation between 
parliaments, the institutional incentive structure would have to be changed in order for 
MPs to get actively involved. For this reason, the EWS and related activity are not the 
main focus of this thesis. Arguably, scrutinising their own government and 
communication to domestic publics remain the most important tasks of national 
parliaments in EU affairs. 
Any discussion of parliamentary activity must acknowledge the mechanisms of 
effective scrutiny to justify why we should study effectiveness as a precondition to 
activity in the first place. Here it is necessary to differentiate between the effectiveness 
of parliament as a whole and effectiveness of the actions of particular parties. The two 
forms of effectiveness are likely to be in opposition to each other. This is the case when 
issue entrepreneurs increase parliamentary activity through politicization, so that the 
actual impact of parliament on substantive questions might diminish. There is thus no 
connection between formal powers and activity, but equally no definitive link between 
activity and effectiveness, which is in turn also not influenced by formal powers. The 
extent of parliamentary involvement in EU affairs is thus dependent on the extent to 
which issue entrepreneurs are present and the degree to which they manage to politicize 
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EU affairs. Government parties, mainstream opposition parties and issue entrepreneurs 
have different aims of effective scrutiny.  
One aspect of observable effectiveness would be that parliament formulates a 
resolution which differs from the initial position of the government (Auel, 2007, p. 
491). Effective scrutiny would thus mean the ‘ability of parliament to induce the 
government to change its negotiation position in a way it would not have done without 
parliamentary interference, namely through the drafting of more or less binding 
resolutions’ (ibid.). However especially in ex-post scrutiny the ability to do so is 
admittedly limited (Sprugk, 2010, p.8). A critical resolution would thus be the 
precondition for observable effective scrutiny under this definition, since it expresses 
dissent which the government could or could not take into account. Therefore, the 
extent to which a resolution is critical or supportive of the government is analysed in 
Paper 2. However, there are several situations in which scrutiny effectiveness might be 
unobservable. The government might anticipate preferences of the parliamentary 
majority, so that the parliamentary preferences are taken into account without any 
activity taking place (Papadopuolos, 2007, p. 469 in Auel, 2007, p. 502). Parliamentary 
influence might thus take place in private or via informal channels (Auel, 2007, p. 503). 
At the party level, parliamentary activity can be effective in securing ‘side payments’ in 
other related areas. Side payments for the opposition are common in negotiating 
international agreements and can, in some cases, improve the overall bargaining 
outcome (Rector, 2011). They can also be used to secure agreement from smaller 
coalition partners (Lindvall, 2010).  
Whether a parliament was effective with regard to its government control 
function can thus be established in two ways. The first criterion, established in Paper 2, 
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is whether the parliamentary resolutions are critical of the government. The more 
critical they are, the more likely it is that they will have an actual impact on government 
policy, since MPs already took the risky step of criticizing their own government in 
public (Auel, 2007, p. 492). Since resolutions are the parliamentary tool which is most 
directly related to government control, they were chosen as the most appropriate 
operationalization of this aspect of effectiveness. The second factor can only be 
established in the case study in Paper 3 and relates to the extent to which the 
government actually changes its position after parliamentary intervention or provides 
side payments to particular parties. To some extent, the anticipation of parliamentary 
preferences by the government could be uncovered in the case study. The anticipation of 
parliamentary preferences by the government thus pre-structures the treatment of legal 
acts by national parliaments. 
The second feature of effectiveness is that the parliament communicates EU 
issues to the citizens and educates and informs them about European issues via 
parliamentary questions and debates, as analysed in Paper 1 (Auel, 2007, p. 498; 
Sprungk, 2011, p. 16). In this sense, parliament already fulfils its function as an agent of 
keeping the electorate or the public at large informed when it displays strong activity in 
this regard. At the level of Parliament as a whole, strong media attention to debates 
would thus be a sign of effective scrutiny. At the level of individual parties, effective 
involvement in this sense can also mean that certain parties manage to distinguish 
themselves and appeal successfully to their particular group of constituents. In Paper 3 
it becomes clear the issue entrepreneurs are especially good at appealing to their 
particular constituents on European issues. Their arguments are reported by the media to 
a disproportionate extent. This confirms the findings of De Wilde that Eurosceptic 
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parties generally benefit more from media coverage (De Wilde, 2009, p. 14). A 
parliament which frequently and extensively discusses EU matters has thus the 
necessary precondition to be effective in this regard. Effectiveness could be proven by 
analysing the extent to which this activity is taken up by the media (for the case of 
parliament as a whole as well as for individual party groups) (De Wilde, 2014). 
However, it would be difficult to trace whether this actually reaches the citizens, and the 
extent to which their knowledge of an EU issue is due to parliamentary activity. Thus, 
as far as the effectiveness of the communication function is concerned, parliamentary 
activity, plus media coverage as established in the case study are the only feasible 
benchmarks. 
As mentioned above, activity and effectiveness can at times run in opposite 
directions. As becomes clear in all papers, issue entrepreneurs are especially active in 
debating EU affairs and issuing resolutions on the topic. They also entice mainstream 
parties to become more active with regard to EU affairs. However, as Paper 2 shows, 
issue entrepreneurs issue a large number of resolutions, but these resolutions are mostly 
concerned with general political points about the EU and not with the particular legal 
act at hand. This is empirically measured by the small ratio of the long preambles of the 
resolutions which contain many political points and the short operational parts which 
contain little technical detail. The strong activity of issue entrepreneurs might thus not 
lead to more overall parliamentary effectiveness. It might even be detrimental to 
effectiveness by binding up resources for politicised discussion which turns out to be 
only ‘smoke and mirrors’. The strategies of issue entrepreneurs to focus their strong 
activity on political issues often unrelated to the actual matter at hand can be confirmed 
in the qualitative case study of the Fiscal Compact in Paper 3 and also mirrors the 
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findings of Streklov who argues that national parliaments often prefer to concentrate on 
subsidiarity than on EU Policy (2015, p. 368). Issue entrepreneurs were very active in 
discussing the Fiscal Compact and issued many resolutions on the topic. However, 
qualitatively they were relating the Treaty to general questions on European integration 
and did not engage constructively with it. This also challenged mainstream parties to 
become more active, but might have prevented a more effective treatment of the matter 
in some parliaments.  
It thus follows that the activity driven by issue entrepreneurs makes national 
parliaments much better in fulfilling their communication function than their 
government control function in EU affairs. Issue entrepreneurs force the topic of Europe 
on the agenda and incite mainstream parties to react to the issue of Europe. This makes 
parliaments as a whole responsible for the changes in public opinion on EU affairs. 
With regard to the government control function, the presence of issue entrepreneurs also 
leads to more activity, but the scrutiny of these parties is does usually not engage in-
depth with the legal act at hand. Simultaneously, the scrutiny activity of government 
parties just blindly supports the government. Overall, the effectiveness of the 
government control function of national parliaments in EU affairs is thus diminished. 
Indeed, parliaments might be effective in communicating EU issues to the public when 
issue entrepreneurs are present. However, issue entrepreneurs themselves focus on 
rather narrow sections of the public in their communication strategy, as becomes clear 
in Paper 3. The positive impact they can have on the communication function of 
parliament as a whole is thus rather indirect in that they force mainstream parties to 
react to them and thus stimulate debate overall.  
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Methodological Approaches and Plan of the Thesis  
 
The methodological approach pursued here combines qualitative and 
quantitative methods and can thus be characterised as a mixed-methods approach. 
Mixed-method research designs are not appropriate for all research questions, since 
qualitative and quantitative methods can sometimes lead to divergent results and thus 
make the study ambiguous (Hancké, 2009, p. 41). In the present case, the research 
question lends itself to be answered with both qualitative and quantitative methods - 
indeed; it can be answered more thoroughly when using methodological triangulation: 
the quantitative studies in Paper 1 (Debates) and Paper 2 (Resolutions) provide a big 
picture of how scrutiny activity differs, and which variables account for these 
differences. By contrasting the role played by formal rights with the significance of 
party political variables, the analysis will show why divergence between formal rights 
and actual activity exists. The qualitative analysis investigates the mechanisms through 
which these variables affect scrutiny activity of one particular act, the Fiscal Compact 
for a subset of member states (Paper 3). This approach follows the ‘nested analysis’ 
approach suggest by Liebermann (2005). For the present study, combining quantitative 
and qualitative studies is thus essential for answering the research questions in a 
comprehensive manner.   
The first paper, which analyses the scrutiny activity of national parliaments in 
the form of debates, employs a dictionary-based computer-assisted content analysis 
approach. For this purpose, more than 3084 transcripts of debates were downloaded 
from the parliaments’ websites. For reasons of feasibility, only two months per year 
were analysed, March and October. These two months were chosen because a high 
number of plenary days took place during these months in all countries covered here. 
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This, of course restricts, the analysis and a number of important events will arguably 
take place outside of these two months. However, given the long time period analysed 
(1992-2012), these effects are likely to cancel out over time and among countries. The 
beginning of the analysis in 1992 was chosen since the Maastricht Treaty was arguably 
an important starting point for politicisation in the European Union. All parliamentary 
proceedings in these months, including oral questions, were then analysed using a 
content analysis approach. In the second part of the analysis of Paper 1, the speech 
segments for the time period from 2010-2012 were divided manually for each party, so 
that that the dictionary could be applied separately for each party. The results of the 
analysis at the party level confirmed the results of the parliamentary level – issue 
entrepreneurs emerge as the most important factors for parliamentary activity in EU 
affairs.  
A classical content analysis is defined here as ‘the tradition of examining word 
frequencies, creating concordances and building content dictionaries in order to 
operationalise substantively interesting aspects of document meaning’ (Lowe, 2006, 
p.1). Neuendorf has defined content analysis as ‘the systematic, objective, quantitative 
analysis of message characteristics’ (2002, p. 1). Four concepts are particularly 
important when carrying out a content analysis: Reliability (the extent which the results 
are reproducible), validity (the extent to which the concept one wants to analyse is 
actually measured), accuracy as well as precision (the degree of distinction between 
different measurement categories) (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 113). When carrying out 
computer-assisted content analysis, reliability is always perfect, in contrast to hand 
coding (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 258). In contrast, validity can potentially be problematic 
for computer-assisted content analysis (p.266). 
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Two dictionaries where then constructed to measure the extent to which Europe 
is mentioned in the plenary. First, an “EU dictionary” which includes EU related 
keywords (see Appendix 1 for the list of keywords). The keywords were derived from 
manually reading a number of German and British parliamentary debates on EU related 
topics from each year. The list of keywords was then translated into French and Spanish 
to compile the other dictionaries by experts familiar with the countries. The experts 
were asked to translate the keywords in a way appropriate for the particular political 
context and not literally. Secondly, a general keywords dictionary was constructed 
based on the categories of the comparative agendas project (see for example 
Baumgartner, Green-Pedersen and Wilkerson, 2006; Brouard, Costa and König, 2012). 
The validity of the dictionaries was then checked using a keywords-in-context approach. 
Moreover, two expert coders were asked to re-code the keywords as to make sure that 
the EU keywords could be categorised as such. The corresponding Krippendorff’s 
Alpha scores were calculated. The share of EU keywords of all words was then 
analysed for each month using the programme WordStat, an add-on the to the content 
analysis programme QDA Miner.
2
  
The relatively dictionary-based approach was chosen over more complex text-
analysis methods since the main aim of Paper 1 on debates is to analysis the salience of 
EU related issues in parliamentary debates in the plenary over time. Similar approaches 
have been used for a long time in the literature to extract the salience of an issue from 
political texts and are generally regarded as reliable (see Budge, 2015, for an overview). 
They have also more recently been applied by other authors to similar research question 
(Rauh, 2015). More complex methods such as WordScore and Worfish are more 
                                                     
2
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appropriate to insulate the valence of political text, an approach which might be applied 
to the current dataset in later work.  
Arguably, the advantage of this approach is that it focuses not only on debates 
which are designated as EU debates, but can also detect mentions of EU related 
keywords in other debates. This might be a way to overcome the problem that 
‘”isolating” the EU dimension is very challenging’ (Auel and Raunio, 2011, p. 23). The 
content analysis approach chosen here is thus an appropriate methodological approach 
to analyse the extent to which Europe is debated by national parliaments in the plenary 
collectively and, as a second step, to analyse to what extent different party groups differ 
in the extent to which they talk about Europe. The first paper thus sheds light on the 
activity of national parliaments with regard to their communication function.  
Paper 2 focuses on government oversight in the form of resolutions. For this 
purpose, a novel dataset was constructed consisting of 3244 resolutions issued by the 
parliaments of five countries in the time period from the mid/late 1990s until the 
present. These resolutions were downloaded from the parliaments’ websites and then 
analysed quantitatively. Since resolutions and their function are not identical in the 
different parliaments, a choice of legal instruments to be included had to be made. For 
the purpose of this thesis, all written statements by parliaments or party groups which 
express an opinion on the government’s treatment of an EU legal act were included. A 
distinction was made in the analysis between successful ‘resolutions’ and unsuccessful 
‘motions’. In Appendix 4, a list with the different documents which were included for 
the respective countries can be found.  
In a first step, the quantity of resolutions issued by party group per month were 
analysed using a count model. A negative binominal distribution was chosen given the 
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over-dispersed distribution of data (Hilbe, 2011, p. 239). It emerged that issue 
entrepreneurs issued the most motions, whereas government parties were responsible 
for the majority of successful resolutions. In a second step all resolutions were hand-
coded based on the extent to which they are critical or supportive of the government on 
a Lickert-type scale from -2 (very critical) to 2 (very supportive). The exact coding 
scheme can be found in Appendix 5. To ensure inter-coder reliability, a subset of 
resolutions was re-coded by two expert coders. It is important to analyse the valence of 
resolutions to see whether the activity can actually be seen as serious scrutiny. The 
resolutions of issue entrepreneurs emerged to be most critical and the ones of 
government parties as most supportive. In a final step of the analysis, the ratio of the 
preamble of the resolutions to their operational part was analysed. The rationale here 
was that a longer preamble and a shorter operational part indicate more ‘politicised’ and 
less technical scrutiny related to the actual legal acts. This is based on the assumption 
that the preamble contains more general provisions and overreaching considerations 
while the actual technical details of the legal acts are discussed in the operational part. 
This approach was inspired by the work of Huber and Shipan on bureaucratic 
autonomy. The authors find that shorter texts are indicative of more freedom for the 
implementing bureaucracy (Huber and Shipan, 2002, p. 73). In the analysis, it emerged 
that issue entrepreneurs generally issue resolutions with longer preambles and shorter 
operational parts. Examples of the structure of resolutions from different party groups 
and countries can be found in Appendix 6. 
The three steps of the analysis are appropriate to establish the quantity, quality 
and impact of parliamentary activity in the form of resolutions by different party 
groups. It became clear that, as in the case of debates, issue entrepreneurs are very 
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active and issue many resolutions, which are also very critical. In the case of debates, 
formal powers do not seem to play an important role. However, it became clear that the 
resolutions of issue entrepreneurs generally have long preambles and short operational 
parts, indicating that they are more concerned with ‘smoke and mirrors’ and abstract 
discussion instead of actual scrutiny which could have a genuine impact.  
In contrast to the first two papers, Paper 3 takes a qualitative approach. It 
analyses the treatment of the Fiscal Compact in four parliaments in depth. The Fiscal 
Compact as a history-making decision (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999) was chosen since 
it is an ideal opportunity to observe parliamentary behaviour in a situation of extremely 
high salience. For the purpose of the case study, fourteen semi-structured interviews 
were carried out with MPs and party workers. A full list of interviewees can be found in 
Appendix 9. A qualitative approach was chosen for the last paper to make it possible to 
uncover the exact mechanisms through which issue entrepreneurs are active and how 
mainstream parties react to issue entrepreneurs. The qualitative analysis could thus 
undercover the exact mechanisms for the relationships discovered in the quantitative 
work of the first two papers. Besides interviews, a content analysis of parliamentary 
speeches and other documents and of press commentary was undertaken. 
The results of the qualitative analysis in Paper 3 confirm the findings of the two 
quantitative papers. Issue entrepreneurs are indeed most active both in debates and 
resolutions. However, as expected, they mostly mention a general criticism of the EU in 
the debates and focus on these points in their resolutions. Mainstream parties are thus 
forced to engage with issue entrepreneurs on these matters so that stronger possibilities 
of parliamentary influence might be forgone. Mainstream opposition parties are in a 
particularly difficult situation, since they have to differentiate themselves from the 
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government but cannot attack it in the same way as issue entrepreneurs since they share 
the government’s pro-European consensus. However, they can sometimes secure 
concessions from the government in the form of ‘side payments’ (Rector, 2011). 
‘Rebel’ government MPs can often have an impact on the government with threats of 
defection. In general, issue entrepreneurs are overrepresented in the media and used a 
number of extra-parliamentary venues of influence such as legal action or 
demonstrations. While the paper focuses specifically on the Fiscal Compact, the 
interviews made clear that these trends can also be observed in the case of ‘normal’ 
legal acts. The methodological approach of Paper 3 thus deepens and complements the 
findings of Papers 1 and 2.  
As to the selection of country cases, overall six countries are covered in this 
thesis but not all of them are included in each paper for a variety of reasons. Austria, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom are covered in this thesis. The 
eleven ‘new’ member states which joined the EU in 2004, 2007 and 2013 were 
excluded given the historical perspective of the study. Since the timeframe of the study 
from 1992 to 2012, the short length of membership of the new member states would 
make a meaningful comparison across time impossible. Moreover, the formal systems 
and practices of the new member states are much more in flux than those of the ‘old’ 
member states, so the differences between formal rights and actual activity, which are 
the main focus of this paper, are much less clear at this stage. The countries were chosen 
since they represent a diverse range of formal scrutiny powers (see Table 1 on p. 28 
above). Austria and Germany have strong scrutiny powers, France and the UK are 
classified on an intermediate level, and Ireland and Spain are classified as weak. The six 
countries were chosen since they offer significant variation on key independent 
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variables such as: the presence of Eurosceptic parties or issue entrepreneurs (very strong 
in Austria with the Alliance for the Future of Austria [BZO] and FPO, but absent in 
Spain and Germany); public Euroscepticism (strong in the UK and Austria but weak in 
Germany, Ireland and Spain) and general other factors such as the party system, 
electoral system and political economy in the context of the Euro crisis. The selection of 
cases thus followed a diverse selection (Gerring, 2000, p. 97). The selected countries 
thus represent a good spread over the different independent variables. However, the 
generalisability is of course still limited and it would be desirable to include additional 
countries in the analysis in the future.  
For Paper 1, all six countries were included in the analysis – the six cases also 
represent an optimal spread with regard to a distinction of ‘working parliaments’ (e.g. 
the German Bundestag) and ‘debating parliaments’ (such as the House of Commons) 
(Arter, 1999, p. 211; Loewenberg and Patterson, 1979.) and regarding speaking rights in 
the plenary. For Paper 2 on resolutions, Ireland is excluded from the analysis since the 
scrutiny system does not have resolutions that can be attributed to particular party 
groups. However, the five countries analysed (Austria, France, Germany, Spain and the 
UK) represent and excellent spread with regard to centralised scrutiny systems (Austria, 
Spain, UK) and decentralised scrutiny systems in which sectoral committees are 
involved (France and Germany). For Paper 3, the analysis was limited to four countries 
(Austria, France, Germany and the UK) for reasons of feasibility. These four countries 
also allow interesting variation with regard to the case study, the Fiscal Compact Treaty. 
Whereas Germany and to a lesser extent Austria can be considered ‘donor countries’ 
Ireland was a recipient of bail-outs and the United Kingdom was (and the Czech 
Republic) were the only countries which decided not to ratify the Treaty. The impact of 
    
66 
 
the macro-economic factors could thus also be observed. Given that only lower 
chambers can be clearly positioned in chain of delegation and accountability and given 
the extremely heterogeneous nature of upper chambers even among the six countries 
here, the analysis of Papers 1 and 2 is confined to lower chambers. However, in the case 
study in Paper 3, the activity of upper chambers is also touched upon.  
 
 
Concluding Remarks  
 
This thesis contributes to the existing literature by focusing on the divergence 
between formal powers and actual activity of national parliaments in EU affairs. In 
contrast to previous studies, it focuses on a larger number of countries and a more 
extensive time period. Moreover, it analyses the communication and the government 
control functions of parliament and employs both qualitative and quantitative research 
methods. By focusing on the role of political parties in general and issue entrepreneurs 
in particular, this thesis follows a more actor-centred approach than most studies in the 
field. The main argument of the thesis is that the presence of issue entrepreneurs and 
internal party cohesion are the most important determinants of actual scrutiny activity, 
not formal powers. By contrast, formal powers of parliaments in EU affairs do not seem 
to have a strong impact on activity in the form of resolutions or debates. The impact a 
further empowerment of national parliaments might have on democratic accountability 
might thus be overstated, and a further strengthening of the powers of the European 
Parliament might be the better alternative.   
In the following three papers this argument is tested. The first paper focuses on 
the activity in the form of debates, applying a computer-assisted-content analysis 
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approach and presenting a novel dataset of parliamentary debates in EU affairs. The 
second paper quantitatively analyses the extent to which different parties try to control 
the government by issuing resolutions in EU affairs. It does so by focusing on the 
number, valence (the extent to which they are critical or supportive of the government) 
as well as the extent to which the resolutions are politicised or technical in focus using 
the ration of the preamble and the operational part as a proxy. The third paper takes the 
format of a qualitative case study of the Fiscal Compact, drawing on 14 in-depth 
interviews and document analysis. The paper illustrates the strategies employed by issue 
entrepreneurs and mainstream parties, their interaction with public opinion and the 
effectiveness of parliamentary scrutiny. The conclusion synthesizes the findings of the 
three empirical papers and elaborates on the implications of their findings for 
democratic accountability in the European Union. Moreover, limitations of the study 
and potential avenues for future research are briefly discussed. Finally, it proposes some 
potential ways forward for how national parliaments, together with the European 
Parliament, could help to alleviate the democratic deficit of the European Union.  
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Paper 1: The Determinants of Debate on EU Affairs in National 
Parliaments: The Role of Party Politics and Party Cohesion 
 
 
Abstract  
 
This paper analyses the activity of national parliaments with regard to parliamentary 
debates on European Union affairs in their plenary sessions. For this purpose, a 
computer-assisted content analysis was carried out on the share of EU keywords in 
parliamentary plenary debates. The findings show that popular Euroscepticism appears 
to be important in determining scrutiny activity, producing a different effect depending 
on the nature of the national party system. An important factor in this respect is the 
presence or absence of issue entrepreneurs on Europe. If parties are collectively in 
favour of European integration, they want to avoid or minimise debate over Europe 
when confronted with Eurosceptic voters. Moreover, when parties are internally divided 
on the EU, popular Euroscepticism incentivises less parliamentary debate. The presence 
of issue entrepreneurs and internal party cohesion in combination with public 
Euroscepticism are thus the most important factors determining variation in the extent 
to which Europe is debated in the plenary among countries and between parties. By 
contrast, formal powers of national parliaments in EU affairs do not have an effect on 
the extent to which Europe is debated in the plenary. Hopes that a further increase of 
formal powers of national parliaments would make them more active in debating EU 
affairs and thereby bring the EU closer to the citizens and helping to alleviate the 
democratic deficit are likely to be unfounded. Nevertheless, when issue entrepreneurs 
are present, parliament is reactive to public opinion on EU affairs and thus fulfils its 
communication function adequately.  
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Introduction 
 
In the European Union (EU), citizens can provide democratic input via two 
channels.  First, they can directly elect the members of the European Parliaments (EP). 
Second, citizens can make their voices heard via an indirect route of democratic control 
which runs from the citizens to their national parliaments and from the national 
parliaments to the national governments. The national governments are in turn 
represented in the Council of Ministers. It has frequently been claimed that the 
European Parliament is at the moment still unable to fulfil the legitimating function of a 
parliament adequately (Chryssochou, 1998; Kiiver 2012; Schmitter, 2000; Siedentrop, 
2001). National parliaments arguably have been weakened by the process of European 
integration by what has been called ‘de-parliamentarisation’ (Holzhacker, 2002; Maurer 
and Wessels, 2001; Moravcsik, 1994). This dual lack of legitimacy – the loss of power 
of national parliaments combined with a European Parliament which still cannot 
compensate fully for the latter - is said to constitute what is called the ‘democratic 
deficit’ of the European Union.  
 This paper focuses on the ‘communication function’ of national parliaments 
(Norton, 1993) with regard to the extent to which they debate European affairs and 
bring them closer to the citizens. The findings of this paper suggest that there are 
differences between countries in terms of the proportionate frequency of EU keywords 
arising in parliamentary debates as well as between different types of parties in the 
plenary. This indicates variation in the extent to which they use debates as a form of 
parliamentary scrutiny in EU affairs. Thus, parliaments differ in the emphasis they put 
on the communication function with regard to EU affairs. Moreover, parliaments seem 
to be reactive to major events at the EU level with regard to the fulfilment of the 
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communications function, indicating a degree of responsiveness. For some countries, 
the frequency and extent of debate on the EU appears to peak around treaty reforms. 
This finding seems to contribute to a rather positive picture of the involvement of 
national parliaments with regard to their communication function. Parliaments do 
indeed talk more about Europe when the topic is important to its voters. However, this 
only happens when Eurosceptic issue entrepreneurs are there to trigger the debates. 
Populist issue entrepreneurs might thus a positive role in this regard by helping to bring 
Europe to the agenda, forcing mainstream parties to talk about the topic and thus 
ensuring the parliaments fulfil their communication function adequately.  
Moreover, parliaments as a whole also seem to be reactive to preference of the 
voters with regard to EU affairs: Popular Euroscepticism is an important factor in 
determining scrutiny activity in the plenary. However, different types of parties vary in 
their reaction to the preferences of the voters on Europe. If parties are collectively in 
favour of European integration or do not care deeply about it, they would tend to avoid 
debate over Europe when confronted with a Eurosceptic electorate. If parties are present 
which are Eurosceptic and for which Europe is a salient plank of their platform (‘issue 
entrepreneurs’), these parties arguably force debate over Europe and popular 
Euroscepticism leads to an increase in debate on Europe. The presence of issue 
entrepreneurs does thus seem to have a positive impact on the role of national 
parliaments in fostering democratic accountability in the EU as far as the 
communication function is concerned.  
Another important factor determining activity is the extent to which parties’ 
preferences are on Europe are in line with the electorate and the degree to which the 
parties themselves are divided or united on Europe. When parties are internally divided 
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over Europe, popular Euroscepticism actually leads to less debate on EU affairs, since 
MPs want to avoid publicising their divisions. However, when parties have a coherent 
position on the EU, popular Euroscepticism leads to more scrutiny in the form of 
parliamentary debates. The negative effect of popular Euroscepticism increases as 
internal dissent gets stronger. In other words, the more divided a party is on the EU, the 
less it will talk about it in the plenary if the voters are Eurosceptic.  
These findings imply that the presence of issue entrepreneurs on Europe and 
internal dissent on the topic within parties and the interaction with the factors and public 
Euroscepticism can explain most of the variation regarding parliamentary activity in the 
form of debates on EU affairs between countries. Formal scrutiny powers do not seem 
to have a strong impact in the form of debates. Parliaments with strong formal powers 
will thus not necessarily fulfil their communication function better. Hopes that an 
increase in formal scrutiny powers would make parliaments more active in EU affairs, 
and that they consequently might help to bring Europe closer to the citizen by debating 
it more frequently, thus helping to overcome the democratic deficit, might be 
unfounded.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The second section presents 
the theoretical approach and the hypotheses. The third section describes the paper’s 
chosen method and independent variables. It also explains the rationale for the selection 
of country cases. The fourth section contains the model specification and analysis. The 
fifth section discusses the results.  
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Theory and Hypotheses  
 
 The study of the role of national parliaments in the European Union (EU) has 
experienced recurrent growth in recent years. Academics have increasingly applied 
rigorous methods in studying the determinants of variation in parliamentary oversight 
capacity (Winzen, 2012; 2013) and have moved on to study the actual practice of 
parliamentary scrutiny (Auel, Rozenberg and Tacea, 2015; Sprungk, 2010), two 
approaches that until recently have been missing in the literature (Auel, 2011, p. 67, 
Raunio, 2009, p. 318). Moreover, scholars have started to analyse parliamentary debates 
and questions, another hitherto under-researched field of parliamentary activity, 
especially with regard to EU affairs (e.g. Auel and Raunio, 2014a, 2014b; Brourard and 
Navarro, 2014; De Wilde, 2014; Garcia Lupato, 2014; Rauh, 2015; Wendler 2011, 
2013a, 2014b). 
 Parliamentary debates can be considered a very important aspect of 
parliamentary activity in EU affairs because they fulfil a crucial ‘communication 
function’ vis-à-vis the citizens (Auel and Raunio, 2014a, p. 2; Norton, 1993). 
Legislative debates are generally a useful resource for researchers, since they are 
publicly available and Members of Parliament (MPs) use them for a variety of purposes 
(Proksch and Slapin, 2010, p. 335). Debates thus present an excellent opportunity to 
observe different preferences and emphases given to the EU in different countries and in 
different political contexts. The present paper thus tries to answer the following 
questions: ‘Under which conditions are EU affairs debated in national parliaments?’ 
and ‘Which factors explain the differences in debating EU affairs between countries and 
parties?’ 
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 The extent to which and the way in which Europe is discussed in the plenaries is 
also a very good indicator for the politicization of EU affairs. De Wilde defines 
politicization in the present context as ‘an increase in polarization of opinions, interests 
or values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards the process of 
policy formulation within the EU’ (De Wilde, 2011, p. 560). Hooghe and Marks argue 
that the ‘permissive consensus’ which is said to have characterized European integration 
for many decades has given rise to a ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2009, 
p. 13). Europe has become a contested issue which is intertwined with domestic politics, 
even though most mainstream parties do not openly compete on the issue (Hooghe and 
Marks, 2009, p. 10). The issue is usually exploited by extreme parties at the left and 
right (De Vries, 2007, p. 267; Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008). These parties seek to 
bring an issue on the parliamentary agenda which has not been extensively discussed 
previously and have thus been termed ‘issue entrepreneurs’ (Hobolt and De Vries, 2015, 
p. 3). Issue entrepreneurs distinguish themselves from mainstream parties in that they 
take a position on a particular issue which differs more from the mainstream parties than 
the mainstream parties positions’ among each other – there is a larger ‘framing distance’ 
(Van der Wardt, 2015, p. 841). Issue entrepreneurs can be expected to be active on an 
issue, in these case European Union affairs, in a number of forms: By mentioning the 
issue frequently in plenary debates, asking many oral and written questions and by 
issuing a large number of resolutions on the topic. Activity in the form of parliamentary 
debates can be considered especially important for issue entrepreneurs. Mentioning EU 
affairs frequently in (publicly available) parliamentary debates helps them to establish 
‘ownership’ of the issue (Dahlberg and Martinsson, 2015, p. 826). Debates have a 
higher level of visibility compared to other parliamentary instruments (Auel and 
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Raunio, 2014a, p. 4). This makes it more likely that the issue entrepreneurs are also 
associated with the respective issue in the press (Van der Brug and Berghout, 2015, p. 
882). Consequently, they also might gain more attention in electoral campaigns 
(Lefrvre, Tresch and Walgrave 2015b, p. 901). Moreover, parliamentary debates are 
parliamentary instruments with relatively low costs in terms of resources (Caulier and 
Dumont, 2010, p.48). Other instruments, such as resolutions require more resources for 
drafting and research, which issue entrepreneurs as (generally) smaller and less well 
funded parties usually lack. 
 If parties act a strategy as issue entrepreneurs, they are usually coherent on the 
issue in question (Hobolt and De Vries, 2015, p. 19). These parties can thus be expected 
to be less willing to discuss the issue of Europe extensively. Issue entrepreneurs 
frequently try to exploit the internal dividedness of mainstream parties by using 
European integration as a ‘wedge issue’ (Van der Wardt, De Vries and Hobolt, 2014, p. 
986). The presence of issue entrepreneurs in a party system is thus likely to have a 
profound impact on mainstream parties regarding the extent to which they debate EU 
affairs. The behaviour of mainstream parties is indeed very important in determine the 
chances of success for new challenger parties such as issue entrepreneurs (Meguid, 
2008, p. 300). If issue entrepreneurs are the only parties which talk about an issue, they 
might soon be regarded as most competent on the issue by a voter which increases their 
chances of electoral success, especially if the issue happens to be topical (Budge, 2015, 
p. 767). Mainstream parties might thus as well want to engage in an issue which is 
championed and popularized by issue entrepreneurs – ‘issue convergence’ occurs 
(Walgrave, Tresch and Lefevre, 2015, p. 779). In the present context, we might thus 
expect mainstream parties to talk more about Europe as well when issue entrepreneurs 
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on Europe are present – we are likely to see an increase in the extent parties collectively 
talk about Europe in an aggregate analysis at the parliamentary level. To engage more 
with the topic championed by issue entrepreneurs might help mainstream parties to 
contain the success of issue entrepreneurs by making it more difficult for them to claim 
ownership over the issue (Walgrave, Tresch and Lefevre, 2015, p. 779). 
 However, being an issue entrepreneur on Europe only pays off when the issue is 
salient with the electorate and – since most issue entrepreneurs are Eurosceptic – if the 
electorate is critical of the EU. The underlying rationale is that parliaments in countries 
with a Eurosceptic electorate might be more inclined to be active in scrutinising the 
government. Eurosceptic publics expect MPs to be more assertive in EU affairs. In 
contrast, where there is a permissive consensus in favour of the EU, MPs might have 
fewer incentives to invest their time and resources in scrutiny (Bergman, 1997, p. 379). 
Arguably, this might also hold true for parliamentary debates, prompting the following 
hypothesis: 
 
 H1: Parliamentary debate on Europe increases with the strength of 
 Euroscepticism in the electorate. 
 
 Since issue entrepreneurs benefit from talking about Europe and mainstream 
parties have to react to them as described above, we can thus assume that if issue 
entrepreneurs feature strongly in the party system, more Euroscepticism would lead to 
more debate on Europe in general when measured collectively at the parliamentary, 
aggregate level. However, issue entrepreneurs themselves can be expected to be 
particularly active. For them, there would be higher benefits from scrutiny activity 
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relative to costs. If parties do not care deeply about Europe or are generally 
accommodating of it, but are faced with a Eurosceptic electorate, MPs might want to 
avoid extended debate over Europe unless they a forced to do so by issue entrepreneurs 
(Auel and Raunio, 2014b, p. 16). They face potentially high costs by debating an issue 
on which they diverge from their voters and have to balance this risk with the need to 
engage with the attacks of the issue entrepreneurs. It is thus hypothesized that parties 
which are issue entrepreneurs talk more about Europe in the plenary:  
 
 H2a: There is more debate on Europe in parliament as a whole if issue 
 entrepreneurs are represented in a party system. 
 
 H2b: Issue entrepreneurs talk more about Europe when faced with public 
 Euroscepticism, while mainstream parties talk less about the topic when the 
 public is Eurosceptic.  
 
 It is in the interest of parties, or more precisely, the party leadership, to present a 
coherent position to the electorate (Proksch and Slapin, 2012, p. 522). When parties are 
divided on a significant issue such as European integration, they are likely not to favour 
public scrutiny, for example in the form of debate, on the issue (Auel, 2007, p. 492). 
This holds true for both government and mainstream opposition parties (Van der Wardt, 
De Vries and Hobolt, 2014, p. 989-990). This is especially the case since issue 
entrepreneurs might use the topic as a wedge issue to expose division in the other 
parties (Van der Wardt, De Vries and Hobolt, 2014, p. 986; Kam, 2009, p. 134). Parties 
might want to prevent these divisions from becoming apparent, since their position on 
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the EU has a significant effect on the propensity of voters to vote for them, as De Vries 
and Tillman have shown (2011, p. 10). Whether to be active in scrutiny then becomes a 
question of when the rewards of being perceived as active outweigh the costs of 
presenting an incoherent party image. From a certain level of internal divisiveness 
onwards, higher levels of Euroscepticism might actually lead to less public activity, 
given that the stakes are higher: voters who feel strongly about Europe would tend to 
perceive disunity on EU affairs more negatively. High levels of Euroscepticism thus 
increase the benefits of being perceived as active in EU affairs, but also increase the 
costs of the party being perceived as divided on the issue. At the party level, it is thus 
suspected that parties which are internally divided talk less about Europe than parties 
which are internally cohesive. Thus: 
 
 H3a: There is less debate on Europe in the plenary when parties are 
 internally divided on Europe.  
 
 H3b: The effect of Euroscepticism is positive when parties are cohesive on 
 Europe and negative when parties are divided on Europe.  
 
 The literature on national parliaments has recognized that formal scrutiny 
powers do not necessarily mirror their actual activity in EU affairs (Auel and Benz, 
2005; Pollack and Smolinski, 2003; Sprungk, 2007). Formal scrutiny powers mostly 
concern the extent to which parliament receives information on EU affairs and the 
extent to which it can issue binding mandates to the government (Winzen, 2012, p. 
660). An alternative analysis argues that parliaments with weaker formal powers might 
    
78 
 
be more induced to use softer forms of activity, such as parliamentary debates, since 
this approach makes more sense for them than investing resources in trying to influence 
the government directly with their limited means (Auel, 2009, p. 21). However, this 
paper holds that formal rights do not have a strong impact on the extent to which 
parliaments use the plenary as a forum for activity in EU affairs. The role of formal 
rights will thus be included as a control variable in the analysis. Moreover, the extent to 
which Europe is topical in a particular country at a given point in time might have an 
impact on the extent to which Europe is debated in the plenary. This might for example 
be the case when a country currently holds the EU Council Presidency, which is 
included as a control variable. Furthermore, institutional constraints, such as the extent 
to which the government can control the agenda in the plenary might have an impact on 
the ability of issue-entrepreneurs to drive debate on Europe. Plenary agenda control is 
thus also included as a control variable. In the second part of the analysis, it is analysed 
whether the findings on the aggregate level of parliaments can be confirmed at the level 
of parties. For this purpose, a subset of debates was coded by party group, as explained 
below. Two of the hypotheses were then also tested at the party level: whether a party’s 
status as an issue entrepreneur and its internal cohesiveness influence the extent to 
which MPs of the party speak about Europe (Hypotheses 2a and 3a). The size of a party 
as its share of all parliamentary seats is included as a proxy for the resources available 
to a party (Caulier and Dumont, 2010, p. 48). 
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Method and Data 
 
 The current paper takes a somewhat different methodological approach than 
previous studies on parliamentary debates. Firstly, it quantitatively analyses a set of 
countries over an extended period of time. This makes it possible to analyse how 
parliamentary activity in the form of debates differs between countries and over time, 
and which factors influence the extent of such activity. This paper focuses not only on 
EU debates which have been identified as such by the national parliaments themselves 
on their websites, but analyses debates using a computer-assisted content analysis 
approach. It also provides insight to the extent to which formal EU-oversight powers of 
national parliaments relate to the use of an alternative instrument of parliamentary 
activity in EU affairs – parliamentary debates. Secondly, the time-series approach at the 
level of parliaments is accompanied by a quantitative analysis of difference between 
parties in debating EU affairs for a subset of debates. This allows assessing the extent to 
which party political difference drive different patterns of activity in the parliamentary 
scrutiny of EU affairs.  
 To assess how the independent variables impact the extent to which EU affairs 
are debated in the plenary , a content analysis was undertaken (Neuendorf, 2000). 
Instead of focusing on individual debates which are flagged as EU debates by the 
parliaments themselves, the analysis is aimed at the level of individual words. The 
advantage of this approach that it captures mentions of Europe in all debates. The 
rationale here is that if more EU keywords come up in debates, this indicates that the 
parliament attributes more attention to Europe. Similar approaches have frequently been 
used to analyse the salience of and attention given to an issue (Budge, 2015). This  
approach not only focuses on debates which are designated as EU debates, but can also 
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detect mentions of EU related keywords in other debates. The texts include not only 
parliamentary speeches, but also oral questions and adjournment debates, i.e. the totality 
of debates as they took place in the chamber and were recorded in the minutes. Written 
question and answers, as well as appendixes, were excluded. In order to improve 
comparability across countries and parliaments in which debates take place with 
different frequencies and have different lengths (possibly for linguistic reasons), the 
proportion of EU keywords in all debates in a certain month was calculated, instead of 
the proportion of EU keywords in individual debates. For reasons of feasibility, two 
months per year were analysed: March and October. These months are characterised by 
strong parliamentary activity in all countries under analysis, and usually no breaks take 
place in these months The timeframe of the analysis at the level of parliaments is 1992 
(ratification of the Maastricht Treaty) until 2012. This timeframe was chosen since the 
Maastricht Treaty has frequently been described as the starting point for significant 
politicization and stronger European integration (Boerzel and Risse 2009; Marks, 
Hooghe and Blank, 1996).    
 Two dictionaries were constructed for the present analysis: one dictionary 
containing EU keywords and one dictionary containing general keywords from a variety 
of policy areas (foreign affairs, taxes, etc.). This ‘general’ dictionary is based on the 
categories of the Comparative Agendas Project (see for example Baumgartner, Green-
Pedersen and Wilkerson, 2006; Brouard, Costa and König, 2012). The dictionaries were 
then applied to the documents for each country/month using the programme 
QDAMiner/WordStat.
3
 Examples of the keywords can be found in Appendix 1. The 
proportion of EU keywords relative to all keywords in the general dictionary was then 
                                                     
1. Http://provalisresearch.com/ 
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calculated.
4
 Using this dictionary based approach; it is possible to infer the relative 
difference in attention to the EU in the different parliaments, as well as changes over 
time. The first part of the analysis thus focuses exclusively at the level of parliament as 
a whole over a relatively long time period. In contrast the second part of the analysis 
does not analyse the debates as one piece of text, but instead divides the texts by party 
so that the share of EU keywords of all words spoken by members of each party can be 
analysed. The speech segments had to be coded by hand using the programme 
QDAMiner. The independent variables to test the hypotheses are operationalized as 
follows: Euroscepticism is operationalized as the share of respondents in Eurobarometer 
surveys who hold that the membership of their country is ‘a bad thing’ minus the share 
of those who think it is ‘a good thing’, following (2012a). The variable is constructed is 
such a way that higher values indicate more public Euroscepticism. The reported values 
before the selected month of March and October were used, so that when the survey was 
conducted in February and then again in November, then February values were used for 
both the March and October observations. 
 The dissent within the parties regarding European integration was calculated 
based on a question on this issue in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey dataset (CHES, 
2012). In the 1984-1999 surveys, dissent is indicated by the experts on a 1 to 5 scale, 
with 1 being complete agreement and 5 being complete dissent. In the surveys after 
                                                     
2. In order to ensure that the EU keywords were rightfully classified as such, a spreadsheet consisting of 
15% of the EU and general keywords respectively was given to a second expert coder who was asked 
to identify the keywords which can be classified as EU-related. Based on the agreement between the 
keywords which were identified as EU-related by the second coder and those which were originally 
classified as such, Krippendorff’s Alpha was calculated, a common coefficient of inter-coder 
reliability (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 221). It expresses how much better the agreement between the two 
coders is then what could be expected by chance (p.222). The index was calculated for the English 
and German dictionaries, and took the value of 0.768 and 0.923 respectively, which is equivalent to 
94.5% and 98.3% of agreement respectively. The value for both dictionaries is thus clearly above the 
commonly accepted minimum threshold of 0.667 (p. 242), indicating that inter-coder reliability is 
satisfactory. For the third coder, Krippendorff’s Alpha was 0.825 for the English and 0.715 for the 
German dictionary, which is equivalent to 95.9% and 93% of agreement respectively. 
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1999, dissent is indicated on a 1 -10 scale, so the values were rescaled to 1 – 5 to ensure 
comparability. The mean dissent for all parties represented in parliament in a given 
electoral cycle was then calculated. Missing values were filled in using linear 
interpolation. For the analysis at the party level, the respective mean internal dissent 
scores for the parties were used. The left-right score of a party for the analysis at the 
party level is also based on CHES. The information on the composition of parliament 
and government and opposition status was taken from the ParlGov database (Döring 
and Manow, 2012).  
 The presence of an issue entrepreneur is undertaken following the approach of 
De Vries and Hobolt (2012). The issue entrepreneur score is generated by multiplying 
the salience score for each party in parliament with the sum of the mean party position 
of all parties in parliament on the EU minus the party position of the party (De Vries 
and Hobolt, 2012, p. 256). The salience score and the party position on European 
integration are both included in the CHES survey. They are measured on a 1 to 5 and a 
1 to 7 score scale respectively, with higher values indicating higher salience and a more 
positive position on European integration respectively. The distance between the 
position of a party on the EU and the mean party position is thus negative when the 
party is more pro-European than the mean of all parties and positive if it is more 
Eurosceptic (De Vries and Hobolt, 2012, p. 256). For the analysis at the level of 
parliament, the sum of the issue entrepreneur values for all parties in parliament was 
calculated for each year the survey took place and an ’issue entrepreneurship score’ was 
generated. The issue entrepreneurship score used here is thus an aggregate measure and 
a continuous variable. A parliament with one highly Eurosceptic party might thus have 
the same issue entrepreneurship score as a parliament with several moderately 
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Eurosceptic parties. For the analysis at the party level, the issue entrepreneur scores for 
the respective parties were used. Missing values were filled in using linear interpolation. 
Furthermore, two interaction terms have been included in the analysis for popular 
Euroscepticism and the dissent within parties, and for Euroscepticism and the presence 
of issue entrepreneurs.  
 A possible criticism of this operationalisation might be that the measurement of 
issue entrepreneurs is endogenous to activity, i.e. that the experts who code the parties 
for the CHES survey code these parties as seeing the EU as salient because they display 
active behaviour in the plenary in the first place. However, the results at the party level 
remained significant when only using the EU position without the salience score. This is 
arguably less problematic since the EU position as such is unrelated to the parties’ 
activity in the form of debates. Moreover, additional robustness checks on the party 
level were conducted which showed significant results for an operationalisation of issue 
entrepreneurs as party families as well as when using an operationalisation based on the 
Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) (Table 11, Appendix 3). These two 
operationalisations cannot be regarded as endogenous. While a classification of party 
family is not connected to particular stance in the EU the CMP data are based on the 
analysis of parties’ manifestos and are thus not related to their activity in the plenary 
(CMP, 2015). These robustness checks thus show the observed effect of issue 
entrepreneurs is not endogenous to their activity in the first place.   
 The variable concerning the formal rights of national parliaments is based on the 
results of a recent paper by Winzen (2012, p. 663). Winzen focuses on information 
rights, the involvement of EACs and sectoral committees, as well as on mandating 
rights. Information rights comprise the extent to which MPs have access to EU 
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documents and whether or not the government provides accompanying explanatory 
memoranda (Winzen, 2012, p. 661). Explanatory memoranda are assigned double the 
weight of mere information rights, since they help to save the parliament from 
information overload (Winzen, 2012, p. 662). All other indicators are equally weighed 
(ibid.). Processing refers to whether the parliament involves EU-specialised committees 
and has a scrutiny reserve (ibid.). Finally, Winzen takes into account whether the 
parliament has mandating rights or not (ibid). For each of these dimensions, a 
parliament can score from 0 to 1 (ibid.). He aggregates the powers of parliaments in this 
regard on a scale from 0 to 3, with 3 being the highest value. The control variable for 
agenda control is based on the parliamentary agenda control index by Doering (1995, p. 
225). The index was adopted to include only the countries studies here, with a score of 0 
indicating complete control of the agenda by the government (as in Ireland and the UK), 
1 standing for a presidents’ conference in which the government has a seat share higher 
than its share in the chamber as a whole (as it is the case in France) and 2 indicating a 
consensual agreement by party groups in the presidents’ conference, which however can 
be overturned by the majority (observed in Austria, Germany and Spain) (ibid.). 
 The following countries were chosen as country cases for both analyses: Austria, 
Germany, France, Spain, Ireland and the UK. The ten ‘new’ member states which 
joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 were excluded because of the historical perspective of 
the study. Given the timeframe of the study from 1992 to 2012, the short length of 
membership of the new member states would make a meaningful comparison across 
time impossible. Moreover, the countries were chosen because they represent an 
excellent institutional spread and the highest possible variation regarding the 
independent variables of the study. The aim was thus to select a diverse set of cases 
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(Gerring, 2000, p. 97). Thus, the analysis includes countries with a very Eurosceptic 
electorate, such as Austria and the UK, as well as countries with generally more pro-
European voters such as Ireland. Moreover, countries with strong formal scrutiny 
powers, such as Austria, and those with rather weak formal scrutiny powers, such as 
Ireland, are included. There is also strong variation regarding the average dissent within 
parties on European integration, with Austria and Germany showing very low values 
and the UK with very high values. The same holds true for the presence of 
Euroscepticism in the party system and the salience of the EU, as expressed by the issue 
entrepreneurship score. The present cases thus present a good spread of the independent 
variables and inference will be possible beyond these particular cases.. However, the 
extent to which the results can be generalised is of course is still limited and in future 
research more countries should be included. As a robustness check, the analysis was 
also run excluding each of the countries in turn to make sure that the overall results are 
not driven by individual country cases as a selection effect (see Table 10, Appendix 3). 
The results remain substantially similar. 
 
 
Analysis and Results  
 
The Parliamentary Level 
 
The dataset at the parliamentary level contains data on the share of EU keywords 
for the first chambers of Austria, France, Germany, Ireland, Spain and the UK for the 
time period from March 1992 until October 2012. There are however, some gaps in the 
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dataset, either because no debates took place in the respective month (or only a very 
small number), because the debates could not be downloaded from the parliament’s 
websites for technical reasons or because of missing independent variables. For some 
countries, the quality of PDF files available was so poor that they could not be 
adequately analysed using Optical Character Recognition (OCR). This was for example 
the case for the French Parliament before 1995. All in all, the dataset contains 252 
observations. However, depending on the model used only 172 observations are 
available. The proportion of missing values is 0.16. The descriptive statistics can be 
found in Appendix 2. 
When analysing the development of the share of EU keywords over time, it 
becomes apparent that only in Germany is there a strong trend towards increasing talk 
about Europe. In the other countries, the level remains more or less constant. Certain 
spikes occur in relation to landmarks in European integration, such as treaty ratification. 
For example, the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty, which took place in October 
1998, is reflected in the higher scrutiny activity displayed in many countries. The 
Eurozone crisis seemingly also lead to an increase in the share of EU keywords and thus 
of debate on Europe (see Figure 1). This finding could be expected, since the Eurozone 
crisis arguably increased the salience of EU affairs significantly (Risse, 2014, p. 142). 
However, it becomes obvious that the impact of the crisis on parliamentary debates was 
rather uneven, and was especially pronounces in creditor countries, most notably 
Germany, and debator countries, particularly Ireland. In the Irish case, the referendum 
on the Fiscal Compact is likely to have played and important role as well. Thus, the 
impact of the Eurozone crisis in the form of deabtes in the plenary seems to have 
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affected national parliaments assymetrically and has increased differences between 
them – a result which underlines the findings of Auel and Hoeing  (2014, p. 1192).  
Figure 1: Change of the percentage of EU keywords relative to all keywords in the 
general dictionary over time, by country.
 
 
 For the statistical analysis at the level of parliaments, a two-level random-
intercept model was applied. A multilevel model was chosen given the highly structured 
nature of the data, with two monthly observations clustered in each country for each 
year. Arguably, multilevel models have an advantage over alternative methods when the 
number of observations is small (Ban, 2009). Multilevel or hierarchical models make it 
possible to model the particular country-level context of the debates. Level 1 represents 
the individual observations over time, whereas level 2 represents the country level. The 
random-intercept model allows this paper’s analysis to account for the intra-class 
correlation of the observations within countries and heteroskedasticity (Raudenbusch 
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and Bryk, 2002). A lagged dependent variable was included in the model to account for 
temporal autocorrelation, as recommended by Becks and Katz (1995). Since the 
dependent variable (the share of EU keywords out of all keywords) is a proportion and 
highly skewed towards zero, a logarithm transformation was undertaken.  
 The results of the statistical analysis at the parliamentary level show that the 
fixed-effects coefficients for, internal party dissent, the issue entrepreneur score as well 
as the interaction term of Euroscepticism and party dissent are statistically significant at 
the 0.01 level. As for the main effects, the coefficients for Euroscepticism, the presence 
of issue entrepreneurs and the interaction term between the two are significant at the 
0.01 level. The coefficient for Euroscepticism is positive (2.68), as suggested by 
Hypothesis 1. The effect is also substantially significant. A 5% increase in public 
Euroscepticism would lead to a 13.4% increase of the share of EU keywords of all 
words in a given month. The presence of issue entrepreneurs seems to lead to more 
debate about European issues, as indicated by the positive coefficient (0.08), and as 
suggested by Hypothesis 2a (see Table 2). For example, if a stauchly Eurosceptic issue 
entrepreneur party such as UKIP entered parliament for the first time and would 
increase the collective issue entrepreneurship score by 5, the share of EU keywords 
would increase by 40%. Auel, Rozernberg and Tacea have similar findings when 
measuring the impact of these factors on the duration of parliamentary debates on 
Europe (2015, p. 297). The coefficient for the internal party dissent is negative (-1.06), 
indicating that more internal party dissent leads to less talk about Europe in the plenary, 
seemingly confirming Hypothesis 3a. The intra-class correlation ρ is 0.71, thus 71% of 
the total variance is at the cluster (country) level. The LR Test shows clearly that a 
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random-coefficient model is warranted. The explained variance is around 5%.
5
No 
statistically significant effects for the formal powers of parliament in EU affairs, the 
Council Presidency or government agenda control could be observed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
5
 The usefulness of  and choice of pseudo-R
2 
statistics for multilevel models is debated in the literature 
(Gelman and Pardoe, 2006; La Huis et al., 2014). The simple measure used here is the following: 
1 −
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑦 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙
. 
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Table 3: Effects of the independent variables on the share of EU keywords of all words 
at the parliamentary level 
 
 Coef. SE 
Lagged Dependent 
Variable 
-0.09 *** (0.03) 
Euroscepticism 2.68 *** 
 
(0.44) 
Formal Rights -0.11  
 
(0.13) 
Issue Entrepreneur  0.08 *** 
 
(0.02) 
Internal Dissent -1.06 *** 
 
(0.10)  
Presidency  0.05  
 
(0.12) 
Agenda Control  0.46  
 
(0.39) 
 
Interaction Euroscepticism 
x Issue Entrepreneur 
 0.15 *** 
 
(0.05) 
Interaction Euroscepticism 
x Internal Dissent 
-1.66 *** 
 
(0.13) 
Constant  -2.29  
 
(0.93) 
Random effect parameters   
     Sd (Observation)  0.73  
 
(0.13) 
     Sd Country  0.46  
 
(0.11) 
Variance (constant) 0.55 0.20 
Variance (residual) 0.22 0.11  
Variance explained 5%  
Intra-class correlation 0.71  
AIC  283.4613  
BIC 321.5071  
Observations  185  
 
Standard errors clustered at the country level. *=significant at the 0.1 level, 
**=significant at the 0.05 level, ***= significant at the 0.01 level. 
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For the interpretation of the marginal effects, the interaction effects between 
popular Euroscepticism and internal party dissent as well as the issue entrepreneur score 
of a party system have to be taken into account. As shown in Figure 2, in the absence of 
issue entrepreneurs, i.e. when the parties are pro-European and/or indifferent about 
Europe as to its salience, there will be less debate about Europe in the case of a 
Eurosceptic electorate. In this case, MPs might want to avoid highlighting possible 
points of conflicting opinions with voters In other words, if parties are pro-European or 
do not care deeply about the EU, they will avoid debate over Europe the more 
Eurosceptic the voters are. This might change, however, when there are one or more 
‘issue entrepreneurs’ in the system which initiate debate over Europe. In this situation, 
there is alignment between the preferences of the voters and the party leadership for 
more activity on EU affairs by MPs, causing activity in the form of debate to be 
especially strong. Hypothesis 2b could thus be confirmed. At the lowest level of the 
issue entrepreneur score, the substantive effect of a one per cent increase in 
Euroscepticism is equal to a 1.64% decrease in the share of EU keywords of all 
keywords. At the highest issue entrepreneur score, the marginal effect is equal to a 
0.32% increase (see Figure 3). The strength of the effect of popular Euroscepticsim thus 
increases with the issue entrepreneurship score of the party system. However, the 
interaction effect is only significant at the 0.1 level from an issue entrepreneurship score 
of -0.82 onward, so only a negative effect for low issue entrepreneurship scores can be 
shown to be significant here. Whether a party holds the Council Presidency does not 
seem to influence its activity in the form of debates. The same holds true for agenda 
control and speaking rights in the plenary, further indicating that the impact of 
institutional rules and provisions on actual activity is limited.  
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Figure 2: Marginal effect of Euroscepticism on the share of EU keywords at different 
values of the issue entrepreneur score 
 
 
The y-axis shows the marginal effect of Euroscepticism on the share of EU keywords 
out of general dictionary keywords given the issue entrepreneurship score of the party 
system. On the x-axis, higher values indicate a higher issue entrepreneurship score of 
the party system.  
 
 The interaction effect of public Euroscepticism and internal dissent is also very 
significant for the evaluation of differences between countries with regard to the extent 
to which Europe is debated in the plenary. The direction of the effect of popular 
Euroscepticism seems to be negative for high values of internal party dissent and 
positive for low values of internal party dissent and (see Figure 3). In other words, when 
parties are internally divided over Europe, they will avoid discussing this issue in 
public, and the more so when the electorate is more Eurosceptic. An explanation for this 
might be that a Eurosceptic electorate expects more scrutiny activity on behalf of the 
MPs. However, to do so only makes sense when parties are internally coherent 
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regarding their position on the EU. In this context, MPs want to demonstrate that they 
are active scrutinisers in EU affairs, since it promises electoral benefits. However, when 
parties are divided over Europe, this division might become apparent to the Eurosceptic 
voters, which might be harmful for future electoral prospects of the agent, so MPs avoid 
debate over Europe, as stated by Hypothesis 3b. The party leadership might thus want to 
suppress debate, since it is connected to potential electoral costs. Substantially, the 
effect of Euroscepticism on the share of EU keywords of all keywords words remains 
small, however, ranging from a 0.87% increase at the lowest level of party dissent to a 
2.91% decrease in the share of EU keywords of all keywords for the highest level of 
party dissent. The strength of the effect of Euroscepticism thus increases as the internal 
party dissent increases. However, as Figure 3 shows, a statisticaly significant positive 
effect only exists for very low levels of internal dissent. Additional robustness checks 
can be found in the Appendix 3. 
 It thus seems that in the absence of issue entrepreneurs and when European 
integration remains a depoliticized issue as a consequence, EU issues are not debated in 
the plenary. This confirms the findings of Hooghe and Marks that only Eurosceptic 
fringe parties on the extreme left and right will politicize European integration (Hooghe 
and Marks, 2009, p. 21; De Vries, 2007, p. 267; Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008). The 
government parties have clearly no incentive to speak frequently on EU affairs if they 
are divided on the issues (Van der Wardt et al., 2014, p. 989). However, mainstream 
opposition parties are also reluctant to debate EU affairs since they can anticipate being 
in a coalition with the current government party in the future (Van der Wardt et al., 
2014, p. 995). In contrast, parties which have not been in government and do not have 
the perspective of forming a coalition can benefit from mobilisation on the issue by 
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exposing the divisions in the other parties (Van der Wardt et al., 2014, p. 995). 
Therefore, parliaments with strong issue entrepreneurs are more likely to be active 
scrutinizers, at least as far as debates are concerned.  
 
Figure 3: Marginal effect of Euroscepticism on the share of EU keywords at different 
levels of internal dissent 
 
 
 
The y-axis shows the marginal effect of Euroscepticism on the share of EU keywords 
out of general dictionary keywords given the level of internal dissent within parties. On 
the x-axis, higher values indicate more internal dissent within parties.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-4
-2
0
2
E
ff
e
c
t 
o
f 
E
u
ro
s
c
e
p
ti
c
is
m
 o
n
 t
h
e
 s
h
a
re
 o
f 
E
U
 k
e
y
w
o
rd
s
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
Internal dissent in the party system
    
95 
 
The Party Level  
 
 At the party level, the analysis includes 31 parties in the 6 countries, and overall 
118 observations for the time period from 2010 until 2012 (taking into account missing 
values when a party did not speak about Europe at all in a given month). A multilevel 
analysis with random intercepts at the country and party level and standard errors 
clustered at the party level was undertaken. Descriptive statistics for the party level can 
be found in Appendix 2, additional robustness checks in Appendix 3. 
 As the aggregate party means show, issue entrepreneurs show very high shares 
of EU keywords, notably in Austria where the Eurosceptic Freedom Party (FPO) and 
the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZO) (18% and 17% of all keywords 
respectively) score highest, in Ireland where the score of Sinn Fein is particularly high 
and in the UK where the Eurosceptic Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) (8.4%) scores 
very high, as do the Conservatives (8.2%). In France, the Eurosceptic Front National 
shows very high values (11% respectively). In Germany, Die Linke (16%), the most 
anti-European party in the Bundestag shows a high share of EU keyword 
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Table 4: Results of the analysis at the party level  
 
 
 
Multilevel model with random intercepts at the country and party level, standard errors 
clustered at the country level. *=significant at the 0.1 level, ** significant at the 0.05 
level, ***=significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
  
 Coef. SE 
Internal Dissent 0.08 **  (0.03) 
Issue Entrepreneur 0.02 *** (0.00) 
Left-Right position 0.00 (0.01) 
Government 
Participation 
0.04  (0.07) 
Seat Share -0.06 (0.35) 
Euroscepticism -0.70 ** (0.41) 
Lagged Dep Var 0.05 (0.05) 
Constant -2.78 *** (0.18) 
Variance   
     Country level 0.15  (0.08) 
     Party level 1.20e-23     (2.09e-22) 
     Residual 0.17 (0.05) 
Variance Explaiend 47%  
Inter-class correlation   
     Country level 0.47 (0.13) 
     Party level 0.00 (0.00) 
AIC 165.1155  
BIC 195.593  
Observations  118  
Parties 31  
Countries 6  
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 The statistical analysis at the party level shows that parties which are issue 
entrepreneurs mention European issues frequently, confirming Hypothesis 2a at the 
party level (Table 4). The coefficient for the issue entrepreneur score is 0.027 and 
significant at the 0.01 level. The score for internal dissent is also significant at the 0.05 
level. Surprisingly, the coefficient is positive (0.08), indicating that higher levels of 
dissent lead to more debate, contrary to Hypothesis 3a. No evidence could be found for 
differences based on the left/right position of a party. Moreover, the effect for 
Euroscepticism is rather large -0.70 and significant at the 0.1 level. Since no effect for 
the seat share of a party could be found, so the often small size of issue entrepreneur 
party does not affect the validity of the findings.  
The results at the party level thus do seem to confirm that issue entrepreneurs 
play an important role in determining the extent to which Europe is an important issue 
debated in the plenaries of national parliaments, and hence also the extent to which 
national parliaments are active in EU affairs. The presence of issue entrepreneurs in the 
party system appears to be a driving force behind parliamentary scrutiny activity in EU 
affairs as well as a precondition for politicization of EU matters. An unexpected finding 
is that the sign of the coefficient for internal dissent is not significant in the analysis at 
the party level. This implies that under the current specification, more internal party 
division actually seems to lead to more debate, not less. This seems to confirm the 
findings of Steenbergen and Scott who showed, based on expert surveys, that Europe is 
salient for parties with low levels of internal division, less salient for those with a 
medium level of internal division on the issue and very salient for highly divided parties 
(2004, p. 186). Spoon confirmed these findings for an analysis of party manifestos 
(2012, p. 10). At the height of the Euro crisis, when Europe is extremely contested the 
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party leadership of parties with very high levels of internal dissent might not be able to 
suppress it anymore, so that Eurosceptic members of these parties are actually very 
active in discussing EU affairs. 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 This paper has suggested a novel approach to analysing the extent to which 
national parliaments are active in EU affairs in the form of debates, by carrying out a 
content analysis focusing on the share of EU keywords out of all debates per month. 
The paper has also presented a new argument with regard to the role of parties in 
determining parliamentary scrutiny in EU affairs. In so doing, it has provided an 
origical new dataset on the extent to which seven West European parliaments debated 
Europe in the period from 1992 to 2012. This analysis at the parliamentary level was 
accompanied by an analysis of differences among parties in debating EU affairs for the 
time period from 2010 to 2012. The advantage of this approach is that it does not only 
focus on debates which have been explicitly labeled as EU debates and that it allows to 
cover an extended time period and a relatively large number of countries. Such a 
detailed analysis over an extended period of time has not previously been undertaken in 
the literature and provides a new and clearer pictures on the activity of national 
parliaments with regard to their communication function as well the relationship 
between the activity of parliaments in debating EU affairs and their formal powers. 
Future research will be able to build on these findings and the methodological approach 
and will be able to develop it further.  
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The paper has shown that countries differ markedly regarding the extent to 
which EU affairs are debated in the plenary and thus regarding their actual scrutiny 
activity.The extent to which Europe is debated seems to increase over time for some 
parliaments, and tends to peak during major events such as treaty reforms. The formal 
rights of parliaments do not seem to have an impact on the extent to which EU matters 
are debated in the plenary. An effect for the Council Presidency or the institutional 
constraints relating to agenda control could also not be found.  
Instead, popular Eurosepticism seems to be an important factor in explaining 
variation of parliamentary scrutiny activity in the plenary. Another intersting finding is 
its interaction effect with party cohesion and the issue entrepreneuship score of a 
parliament. When parties are cohesive regarding Europe, more Euroscepticism leads to 
more debate on Europe. The effect of Euroscepticism increases the more divided parties 
are. When issue entrepreneurs are present, they might trigger debate on Europe, leading 
to more activity in the face of Eurosceptic public opinion. This finding is also 
interesting with regard to the debate on the politicization of EU affairs. If parties are 
pro-European and/or do not percieve European integration as salient, Euroscepticism 
will lead to less debate. MPs are likely to want to signal to their voters that they are 
active in scrutiniszing their own agent, the government in EU affairs. If parties are 
devided on Europe, an increase in Euroscepticism leads to less debate. MPs might want 
to hide this internal dissent, which could be interpreted as insufficient representation 
from their voters. The presence of issue entrepreneurs and internal party cohesion is 
thus the most important determinnat of parliaemntary activity in EU affairs in the form 
of debates.  
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 While the effect of interal dissent is not in the expected direction at the party 
level, possibly due to particularities of the subset of debates which was analysed, the 
effect for issue entrepreneurs can clearly be found at the party level. Eurosceptic parties 
seem to be the main drivers of scrutiny activity in the form of debates since they try to 
politicize European issues. The findings of this paper futher higlight the importance of 
the role of political parties when studying the scrutiny practice of parliaments in general 
and parliamentary debates on Europe Union affairs in particular. The most important 
determinants in the form of debate are puplic Euroscepticism and party-political 
dynamics.  
The wider implications of the findings are that an increase in formal powers of 
national parliaments will not necessarily make them more active in EU affairs in the 
form of debates. An increase in formal powers will not lead to more activity if the party 
political factors are not conducive to such activity. In this context, we can not expect 
formal powers of national parliament alone to aleviate the perceived  democratic deficit 
of the European Union. However, at the same time it is encouraging to see that 
parliaments do indeed seem to fulfill their communication function with regard to EU 
affairs and are both reactive to current events such as treaty vhanges as well as to the 
voters’ preference on Europe. Nevertheless, this is only the case if issue entrepreneurs 
are present to trigger debates and to force mainstream parties to enagege with European 
affairs. Mainstream parties are more relucatnt to talk about Europe and to react to 
changes in the voters preferences on the topic. In this sense, issue entrepreneurs play an 
important role in forcing other parties to talk about Europe, enabling parliaemnts to 
fulfill their communication function in EU affairs 
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Appendix 1: Examples of EU and General Keywords 
 
Table 5: List of keywords used for the content analysis  
The following keywords refer to EU 
institutions and policies (see the CAP project). 
Examples: 
Moreover, a ‘general’ keywords 
dictionary was constructed (also 
based on the CAP categories). 
Examples: 
 European Union/EU 
 European Community/EC 
 European Economic Community/EEC 
 Common Market 
 Single Market 
 European Market 
 European Coal and Steel 
Community/ECSC 
 European Atomic Energy 
Community/EAEC 
 European Monetary Union/EMU 
 European Monetary System/EMS 
 Directive 
 Regulation 
 Community law 
 European law 
 Common Agricultural Policy/CAP 
 Common Fisheries Policy 
 Cohesion Policy 
 Structural Funds 
 Regional Policy 
 Common Foreign and Defence Policy 
 Euro/Eurozone 
 Stability and Growth Pact 
 Transport Policy 
 European Social Policy 
  ... 
 
 austerity 
 business cycle 
 revenue 
 production 
 profits 
 foreign exchange reserves 
 currency 
 discount rate 
 public finance 
 transfer payments 
 duties 
 privacy laws 
 same-sex marriage 
 public order 
 racism 
 race 
 anti-racism 
 anti-racist 
 ethnic 
 ethnicity 
 immigrants 
 asylum seekers 
 ethnic groups 
 ethnic minorities 
 ethnic relations 
 race relations 
 immigration 
 immigrant 
 … 
Note: keywords used by the Comparative Agendas Project to search for EU influence. 
Source: Brourard, Costa and König, 2012 and own elaboration. 
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Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistcs 
 
Table 6: The proportion of EU keywords relative to all keywords in the general 
keywords dictionary 
Country Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Austria 27 .10 .05 .05 .22 
France 27 .09 .06 .06 .14 
Germany 34 .13 .04 .04 .24 
Ireland 33 .10 .06 .06 .18 
Spain 37 .05 .02 .02 .08 
UK 40 .07 .04 .04 .15 
 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for the Independent Variables (country level) 
 
   Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for the party level  
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
EU Keywords 215 -2.54 0.75 -5.04 -1.17 
Euroscepticism 270 -0.28 0.24 -0.59 .11 
Issue 
Entrepremeur 
212 -0.56 3.35 -5.24 9.12 
Internal 
Dissent 
212 2.80 1.17 0.83 5.44 
Left/Right 212 4.62 2.20 1.11 9.88 
Seat Share 193 0.17 0.17 0 0.54 
 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Euroscepticism 224 -0.35 0.21 -0.8 0.11 
Issue 
Entrepremeur 
227 1.92 0.41 0.91 3.31 
Internal 
Dissent 
227 -1.39 2.05 -6.82 5.67 
Formal Powers 257 1.45 0.47 0.33 2.16 
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Appendix 3: Robustness Checks  
 
Table 9: Robustness checks for the analysis at the conutry level. All models are 
mixed-effects multilevel mode with random intercepts an clustered standard errors at 
the country level. The model also shows the explained variance/pseudo R
2
 and the inter-
class correlation. Model 1: Issueent as dummy, 1=issueent score .>1. Model 2: CHES 
EU position.; Model 3: CMP EU Position (positive minus negative mentions, per108-
per110, sum of all parties). *=significant at 0.1 level, **=significant at 0.05 level, ***-
significant at 0.01 level. Standard errors in parentheses below. Random effects 
parameters omitted. As Table 9 below shows, the findings at the country level remain 
robust when the the issue entrepreneur score is used as a dummy and for the interaction 
effect with Euroscepticism when the CHES EU Position is used instead of the issue 
entrepreneurship score. The findings are not significant for operationalisations using 
CMP data on Europe and the CHES EU position. 
Table 10: Robustness checks for the analysis at the conutry level. All models are 
mixed-effects multilevel mode with random intercepts an clustered standard errors at 
the country level. The model also shows the explained variance/pseudo R2 and the 
inter-class correlation. Model 1: Excluding Austria. Model 2: Excluding France. Model 
3: Excluding Germany. Model 4: Excluding Ireland. Model 5: Excluding Spain. Model 
6: Excluding United Kingdon. 
Table 11: Robustness checks at the party level. Model 1:Linear OLS Regression 
with robust standard errors at the country level. All other models are mixed-effect 
multilevel models with random intercepts at the country and party level.  Model  2: 
Issue entrepreneur score as dummy > 1. Model 3: CHES EU Position. Model 4: CMP 
EU Position (positive minus negative mentions of the EU, per 108-per 110) and CMP 
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Left/Right Position (rile). Model 5: CMP Party dummies. *=significant at .1 level, 
**=significant at .05 level, ***-significant at .01 level. Standard errors  in parentheses 
below. Random effects parameters omitted.. auelAs Table 10 below shows, the analysis 
of debates at the party level remains significant the results remain the same when using 
OLS with standard errors clustered at the country level instead of a multilevel model 
(Model 1). The model also remains significant when issue is operationalized as a 
dummy with parties with an issue s entrepreneurship core >0 classified as issue 
entrepreneurs (Model 2).  It also remains significant when using the CHES EU positon 
as an operationalisation for parliamentary Euroscepticism instead of the issue 
entrepreneurship score (Model 3). When using the differences of positive and negative 
sentences in the CMP database, thus ruling out endogeneity problems due to CHES 
expert judgements the model is also stable (Model 4). An analysis with dummies of 
party families yields significant results for Communist, Green and Special Interest party 
– arguable parties which can be classified as issue entrepreneurs- when compared to the 
baseline category, Social Democratic parties (Model 5).   
 
    
 
 
1
0
5 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 
Internal Dissent -1.146*** -0.624** -0.756*** 
 (0.178) (0.296) (0.222) 
Issuent Score > 1 0.616***   
 (0.065)   
Euroscepticism 2.420*** -3.698 1.141 
 (0.787) (4.642) (0.785) 
Formal Rights -0.074 -0.035 -0.090 
 (0.096) (0.126) (0.110) 
Euroscepticism x Internal Dissent -1.780*** -0.877* -1.136*** 
 (0.299) (0.521) (0.398) 
Euroscpeticism x Issueent Score > 1 1.591***   
 (0.466)   
Presidency 0.074 0.053 0.039 
 (0.109) (0.126) (0.137) 
Plenary Agenda 0.500 0.552* 0.471 
 (0.398) (0.324) (0.360) 
CHES EU Position  0.054  
  (0.115)  
Euroscepticism x CHES EU Position  0.876  
  (0.841)  
CMP EU Position   0.007 
   (0.006) 
Euroscepticism x CMP EU Position   0.028 
   (0.020) 
    
Table 9: 
Robustness 
checks for 
the analysis 
of debates 
at the 
county level. 
Multilevel 
models with 
random 
intercepts at 
the country 
and party 
level.  
Model 1: 
Issue 
entrepreneu
r score > 1 
(dummy) 
Model 2: 
CHES EU 
position 
Model 3: 
CMP EU 
position. 
Standard 
errors 
clustered at 
    
 
 
1
0
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Constant -1.867*** -3.083** -2.413*** 
 (0.711) (1.455) (0.800) 
Variance (constant) 0.60 0.37 0.47 
 (0.22) (0.18) (0.19) 
Variance (residual) 0.22 0.22 0.23 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) 
Variance explained 8% 4% 3% 
Inter-class correlation 0.73 0.62 0.67 
Observations 176 176 169 
AIC 278.5883 283.2911 276.8686 
BIC 316.6341 321.3369 314.4274 
Countries 6 6 6 
    
 
 
1
0
7 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 
Internal Dissent -1.063*** -1.045*** -0.881*** -0.944*** -1.023*** -1.025*** 
 (0.191) (0.123) (0.0831) (0.188) (0.173) (0.0979) 
Issue Entrepreneur Score 0.0867*** 0.0823*** 0.0609*** 0.0752*** 0.104*** 0.120*** 
 (0.0210) (0.0221) (0.0225) (0.0112) (0.0172) (0.0210) 
Euroscepticism 2.789*** 2.551*** 2.368*** 2.533 1.747** 3.144*** 
Formal Rights -0.143** -0.00228 0.270 -0.150 -0.224** 0.0143 
 (0.0659) (0.147) (0.444) (0.130) (0.110) (0.184) 
Interaction Euroscepticism  
x Internal Dissent 
-1.656*** -1.603*** -1.435*** -1.508** -1.502*** -1.630*** 
 (0.294) (0.199) (0.143) (0.725) (0.435) (0.161) 
Interaction Euroscepticism  
x Issue Entrepreneur 
0.168*** 0.173*** 0.145** 0.0956*** 0.192** 0.230*** 
 (0.0582) (0.0509) (0.0642) (0.0272) (0.0851) (0.0614) 
Presidency 0.0442 0.0834 -0.0220 0.0310 0.0335 0.155 
 (0.147) (0.145) (0.110) (0.144) (0.158) (0.100) 
Plenary  0.373 0.513 0.473 0.787** 0.818*** -0.0413 
 (0.448) (0.397) (0.441) (0.362) (0.273) (0.287) 
Constant -1.554* -2.128*** -2.538** -2.273** -1.910*** -0.723 
 (0.903) (0.787) (1.180) (0.924) (0.554) (0.530) 
 
 
 
Table 10: 
Robustness checks 
for the analysis of 
debates at the 
county level 
excluding individual 
countries 
Models 2-5: 
Multilevel models 
with random 
intercepts at the 
country and party 
level. 
Model 1: Excluding 
Austira; Model 2: 
Excluding France; 
Model 3: Excluding 
Germany; Model 4: 
Excluding Ireland; 
Model 5: Excluding 
Spain; Model 6: 
Excluding UK 
 
    
 
 
1
0
8 
Variance (constant) 0.639 0.491 0.648 0.476 0.234 0.195 
 (0.214)   (0.188) (0.209) (0.269) (0.191) (0.234)   
Variance (residual) 0.236 0.252 0.108 0.251 0.224 0.251 
 (0.126)   (0.127) (0.029)   (0.128) (0.139) (0.142) 
Variance explained 3% 3% 20% 5% 8% 2% 
Inter-class correlation 0.73 0.66 0.85   0.65 0.51126    0.437 
AIC 263.367 261.7582 136.4402 260.8245 235.3923   241.7836 
BIC 299.9653 297.8055 171.9101 296.8719 271.1131 276.9973 
Observations 156 149 142 149 145 139 
Number of groups 5 5 5 5 5 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
1
0
9 
 
 
 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 
ECO     0.371*** 
     (0.120) 
COM     0.349* 
     (0.192) 
LIB     -0.050 
     (0.210) 
CHR     -0.058 
     (0.195) 
CON     -0.211 
     (0.162) 
NAT     0.239 
     (0.352) 
ETH     -0.056 
     (0.164) 
SIP     0.667*** 
     (0.193) 
Internal Dissnet 0.128** 0.090** 0.109** 0.097** 0.107*** 
 (0.039) (0.035) (0.043) (0.045) (0.027) 
Govt 0.033 0.017 0.023 0.066 0.131 
 (0.080) (0.069) (0.074) (0.120) (0.146) 
Left/Right (CHES) 0.020 0.014 0.017  0.058 
 (0.021) (0.010) (0.014)  (0.055) 
Euroscepticism -0.277 -0.650 -0.723* -0.637 -0.569 
 (0.463) (0.433) (0.400) (0.444) (0.437) 
Table 11: Robustness checks 
for the analysis of debates at 
the party level. 
Model 1: OLS Regression 
Model 2: Issue entrepreneur 
score > 1 (dummy) 
Model 3: CHES EU position 
Model 4: CMP EU position. 
Model 5: Dummies for party 
family (CMP) 
Models 2-5: Multilevel models 
with random intercepts at the 
country and party level.  
Standard errors clustered at 
the country level. *=significant 
at the 0.1 level, ** significant 
at the 0.05 level, 
***=significant at the 0.01 
level. 
    
 
 
1
1
0 
Seatshare -0.541 -0.051 -0.169 -0.070 0.060 
 (0.284) (0.343) (0.367) (0.281) (0.441) 
Issue Entrepreneur  0.018*     
 (0.009)     
Issuee Entrepreneur > 1  0.158***    
  (0.045)    
EU Position CHES   -0.166***   
   (0.049)   
EU Position CMP    -0.022*  
    (0.013)  
Left/Right Position CMP    -0.003  
    (0.005)  
Constant -2.716*** -2.479*** -2.835*** -3.286*** -1.676*** 
 (0.304) (0.147) (0.193) (0.256) (0.333) 
Country:Variance (constant)  0.15 0.14 0.16 0.11 
  (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Country: Varinace (residual)  2.37e-23 4.07e-23 5.19e-24 3.95e-26 
  (4.80e-21) (6.55e-21) (5.40e-23)   (9.79e-24) 
Party: Variance (residual)  0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.04) 
Variance explained  47% 47% 46% 50% 
R-square 0.373     
Inter-class correlation (country)  0.47 0.47 0.48 0.42 
Inter-class correlation (party)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AIC 177.2682 166.4222 166.329 167.8134 171.8981 
BIC 191.1217 196.8998 196.8065 198.291 221.7704 
Observations 118 118 118 118 118 
Number of groups 6 6 6 6 6 
  111 
Paper 2: The Determinants of Resolutions of National Parliaments in 
EU Affairs 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Can national parliaments solve the accountability deficit in the European Union? 
Parliamentary resolutions can be regarded as the clearest embodiment of the control of 
government in EU affairs. This paper analyses the activity of national parliaments in EU 
affairs in the form of resolutions across five countries and the time period from the mid-
1990s until the present. Formal scrutiny powers in EU affairs do not seem to have an 
impact on the frequency with which resolutions are issued. The activity of national 
parliaments in the form of resolutions is mostly driven by ‘issue entrepreneurs’, parties 
which portray the European Union in a negative light and which see it as a salient issue. 
Resolutions initiated by issue entrepreneurs are very critical of the government’s policy 
and of the European Union. Moreover, resolutions by issue entrepreneurs tend to have a 
longer preamble and a shorter operational part compared to resolutions by mainstream 
opposition and government parties, arguably indicating a more politicized stance and 
less focus on technical detail. By contrast, resolutions initiated by parliamentarians 
belonging to government parties are usually very supportive of the government and 
strengthen the latter’s position uncritically. The parliamentary activity brought about by 
government parties and issue entrepreneurs are thus both unlikely to lead to an increase 
in actual democratic control and accountability in EU affairs. While the former just 
uncritically support the government’s position, the latter frequently do not engage with 
the actual topic of the legal act at hand.  
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Introduction 
 
 Can national parliaments solve the accountability deficit in the European Union? 
Parliamentary resolutions can be regarded as the clearest embodiment of the control of 
government in EU affairs. Complemented by the communication function in the form of 
debates, fulfilling the government control or scrutiny function (Norton, 1993) in the 
form of resolutions is the most important form of activity by which national parliaments 
could potentially help to increase democratic accountability in the European Union. In 
order to provide an accurate assessment of the extent to which national parliaments 
actually fulfil this function in practice, this paper analyses the determinants of activity 
of national parliaments in EU affairs in the form of resolutions. Resolutions can be seen 
as the most important expression of the government-related scrutiny function of national 
parliaments in EU affairs as they contain direct instructions for the government and 
evaluations of EU legal acts as well as the government’s treatment thereof. Analysing 
the factors driving parliamentary activity in the form of resolutions on EU affairs is thus 
an important step in the evaluation of the overall activity and effectiveness of national 
parliamentary scrutiny in the European Union. 
 An interesting puzzle in this context is why the variation of activity in the form 
of resolutions does not seem to be related to the formal powers of national parliaments 
in EU Affairs. This raises the question as to how we can explain this variation. The 
paper seeks to analyse which factors influence the activity of national parliaments in EU 
affairs if not formal powers. The main ambition of this paper is thus to explain 
differences between parties and consequently parliaments in issuing resolutions in 
European Union affairs. Its argument is that the presence of issue entrepreneurs on 
Europe and their activity triggered by Eurosceptic public opinion are the most important 
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factors determining the activity of national parliaments in EU affairs. Formal powers are 
of secondary importance. This can explain the divergence between formal powers and 
actual activity. The assumption that an increase in these powers will make national 
parliaments more active in EU affairs and thus more effective in helping to increase 
democratic accountability in the European Union is thus highly questionable.  
Previous studies on the role of national parliaments in European Union affairs 
have overwhelmingly focused on a ranking of the formal powers of national parliaments 
and their determinants (Karlas, 2011; Winzen, 2012, 2013). Very few studies have 
analysed resolutions among other forms of scrutiny activity (Auel, Rozenberg and 
Tacea, 2015). This paper focuses explicitly on parliamentary activity in the form of 
resolutions and draws upon a novel dataset in order to provide an original analysis at the 
disaggregate level of individual parties. Besides an analysis of the quantity of 
resolutions, the valence of the resolutions was evaluated. Thus, the paper seeks to find 
out whether the resolutions are critical or supportive of the government’s position. For 
this purpose, resolutions for five countries (Austria, France, Germany, Spain and the 
United Kingdom) covering the time period from the late 1990s until the present were 
hand coded and then analysed quantitatively.  
The analysis of this paper shows that there are marked between different types 
of resolutions. Governments are responsible for the majority of resolutions which are 
adopted by parliament. The resolutions of these parties are generally very supportive of 
the government’s position and can thus not be regarded as critical scrutiny. By contrast 
issue entrepreneurs (Eurosceptic parties for which Europe is salient) are a driving force 
with regard to the activity of national parliaments in the form of motions, i.e. resolutions 
which were not agreed upon by parliaments. In particular, more motions are issued by 
issue entrepreneurs if the public is Eurosceptic. In other words, a more Eurosceptic 
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electorate empowers and enables the issue entrepreneurs to initiate more resolutions in 
EU affairs. The formal powers of parliaments only have a limited impact on the activity 
in the form of resolutions. This paper shows that motions initiated by issue 
entrepreneurs generally have longer preambles and shorter operational parts – arguably 
indicating that these parties pay more attention to general political points instead of 
technical scrutiny. This might indicate that a trade-off exists between activity, 
assertiveness and effectiveness with regard to the government control function of 
parliament in EU affairs. 
 The next section provides a definition of resolutions in parliamentary scrutiny of 
EU affairs and explains how resolutions are issued in the different scrutiny systems. The 
third section describes the chosen method and case selection. The fourth section 
presents the theoretical framework and the hypotheses tested in this paper. In the fifth 
section, the data and statistical models employed are described, while the sixth section 
contains the analysis. The final section discusses the results of the analysis and the 
implications for democratic accountability in the European Union.   
 
 
Parliamentary Control of the Government and Resolutions as a Focus of Analysis 
 
 In contrast to other parliamentary activities such as parliamentary questions or 
plenary debates, defining what constitutes a ‘resolution’ is not straightforward. There is 
considerable variation regarding this form of activity between parliaments with different 
parliamentary traditions and different scrutiny systems for European affairs. Black’s 
Law Dictionary defines a resolution as ‘The determination or decision, in regard to its 
opinion or intention, of a deliberative or legislative body (…)’ (Black’s Law Dictionary, 
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2014). Therefore, on the most basic level, a resolution is the formal expression of the 
opinion of parliament on a particular matter. For the present purpose, proposals for 
resolutions suggested by particular party groups will also be counted, even though they 
might not finally be agreed on by the committee or parliament as a whole: ‘[A 
resolutions is] [a]lso a motion or formal proposition offered for adoption by such a 
body’ (ibid.). Resolutions can be binding or non-binding in character (ibid). Generally, 
resolutions are thus defined for the present purpose as relatively short written statements 
in which parliament, a committee or a party group expresses its opinion on an EU legal 
act (which may be both primary and secondary law, binding and non-binding) and/or 
the government’s treatment thereof as well as suggestions for future treatment of the 
legal act.   
 The exact form a resolution takes (in terms of its length, level of detail, 
technicality, structure and the extent to which they are binding) differs significantly 
between parliaments. The extent to which they can be compared is therefore admittedly 
limited. However, despite these differences, resolutions in EU affairs are arguably 
functionally equivalent in the five countries analysed in this paper. They are the most 
direct and formal way in which parliament or a party group (or even a group of MPs) 
can express their opinion on an EU legal act and/or the government’s treatment of and 
position on the latter. This form of activity can be contrasted with the less formal 
avenue of expression in parliamentary debates in the plenary, which is arguably first and 
foremost addressed to the citizens (Raunio, 2011, 306). Hence, parliamentary debates 
are the most important venue for parliaments to fulfil their communication function in 
EU affairs (p. 306). Resolutions are thus especially well-suited to analyse the extent of 
activity of national parliaments in EU affairs with regard to the scrutiny function as well 
as the extent to which parliaments generally support the government or are critical of its 
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actions. A comparison between different countries and parties can thus be useful to 
uncover different actors accounting for activity in issuing resolutions. 
 Resolutions on EU affairs can fulfil different functions and take on different 
formats depending on the formal scrutiny system of a parliament. A basic distinction 
has been made between so-called document-based and procedural models of national 
parliamentary scrutiny in EU affairs (COSAC, 2007). In practice, most parliaments 
employ a mix of both approaches to scrutiny (ibid.). In document-based systems, the 
appropriate committee(s) examines legislative proposals from European institutions and 
report their opinion to the chamber as a whole and to the government (COSAC, 2007, p. 
8). Many of these systems have a ‘scrutiny reserve’, which means that the government 
cannot vote in the Council unless the parliament has agreed beforehand (ibid.). The 
extent to which the opinions of parliament are binding for the government varies (ibid.). 
The UK, France Germany and Spain are examples of these document-based systems 
(ibid.)  
 In procedural systems, the European Affairs Committee can in principle give a 
binding mandate to the government for negotiations in the Council (COSAC, 2007, p. 
9). Of the countries analysed here, only Austria falls, in theory, in this category (p. 14). 
Other examples include famously the Danish Folketinget and the Finish Parliament 
(ibid.). However, arguably the distinction between these two categories is not crucial for 
the present purpose. Resolutions that vary in the extent to which they bind the 
government are issued in both types of systems. The quantity of resolutions as well as 
the extent to which they are critical of the government is also equally important in both 
types of systems. In both document based and procedural systems, only critical 
resolutions can induce the government to change its position.  
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 A further distinction has to be made between centralized and decentralized 
scrutiny systems. In some countries, parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs is 
concentrated in a European Affairs Committee (Austria, France, Spain and the United 
Kingdom in the present study). In other countries (Germany among the countries 
studied here) the sectoral committees in which a proposal falls are responsible for 
scrutiny, with the European Affairs Committee focusing on ‘horizontal’ and 
institutional questions. Indeed, an increasing number of countries seem to follow this 
approach, a phenomenon some authors have termed the ‘mainstreaming’ of EU affairs 
(Gattermann, Hoegenauer and Huff, 2013, p. 5). Arguably, this is the consequence of 
the increased breadth of competences and complexity of the EU and changes introduced 
in the Treaty of Lisbon (p. 10). There are thus some parliaments in which EU matters 
and centralized in the EAC, whereas in others they are decentralized in sectoral 
committees (Raunio and Wiberg, 2010, p. 79).  
 These institutional differences make comparisons between parliaments with 
different systems difficult. Thus, while in centralized systems only the activities of the 
EAC have to be collected, in decentralized systems also the EU-related activities of 
other committees have to be analysed. A potential difficulty would be to distinguish 
between the EU related and non-EU-related activities of these committees (Raunio and 
Wiberg, 2010, p. 87). However, the search functions and committee websites of the 
parliaments analysed here allow collecting the EU-related resolutions of the sectoral 
committees.  
Which documents are counted as resolutions is an important decisions which has to 
be the result of careful consideration. For the present purpose, only instruments which 
are potential binding were included – for example motions on the floor of the House in 
the case of the House of Commons or ‘Antrag auf Stellungnahme’ in the German 
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Bundestag. Reports or similar but essentially non-binding documents, which can 
nevertheless express the opinion of a chamber of committee, such as various kinds of 
reports, were not included since their primary purpose is arguably not to support or 
expose the position of the government but rather to inform the public. Moreover, these 
types of instruments were not drafted by MPs, but often by the parliamentary research 
services and thus do not show a clear political perspective. Therefore, they relate a 
priori more the communication function than to the government control function of 
parliament and were thus excluded from the analysis. In addition, only such instruments 
which were voted on by the plenary were included, since only in these instances the 
whole impact of the political composition of the chamber and of internal dissent can be 
estimated. For example, in the case of the United Kingdom, only Motions on the Floor 
of the House are included, but not Early Day Motions or Scrutiny Reports by the 
European Affairs Committee. The different instruments classified as resolutions are 
summarized in Appendix 4.  
 
 
Method and Case Selection 
 
 Three properties of parliamentary resolutions in EU affairs are analysed in this 
paper. As a first step, the quantity of resolutions is examined i.e. the number of 
resolutions according to the above definition in a given month. This number allows 
comparisons of the overall activity of the parliament in EU affairs in the form of 
resolutions, changes over time and differences between different party groups 
(especially between issue entrepreneurs and mainstream parties) in issuing resolutions.  
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As a second step, the content or ‘quality’ of resolutions is analysed. More 
specifically, the extent to which the resolutions are critical or supportive of the 
government is investigated. A critical resolution by the opposition or even a government 
party can be more appropriately considered as ‘real’ scrutiny or government control, 
whereas resolutions which just support or endorse the position of the government might 
not justifiably qualify as such. The analysis of the valence of resolutions can thus give a 
valuable assessment of the extent to which the results of the assessment of the sheer 
number of resolutions are a realistic indicator of parliament fulfilling its role with regard 
to the scrutiny function in EU affairs. Resolutions were coded on a Lickert-type scale 
from -2 (very critical) to 2 (critical). The full coding scheme can be found in Appendix 
5. To safeguard the reliability of the findings, a subset of resolutions was recoded for 
their valence by a second coder.
6
 Since the resolutions are generally short (often around 
250 words) and use a rather formal language, using automated procedures such as 
Wordscores or Wordfish would be difficult (Klemmensen et al., 2007, p. 750, Hjorth, 
Klemmensen, Hobolt, et al. 2015, p. 1). Moreover, the relevant dimension (support or 
criticism) would not be clear enough to use automated methods (Proksch and Slapin, 
2014, p. 132). The application of automated text analysis to parliamentary oversights is 
thus rather difficult (Proksch and Slapin, 2014, p. 134). The use of a traditional 
sentiment analysis dictionary would also be questionable for linguistic reasons – 
comparable content sentiment dictionaries for all languages covered in this project are 
not available.  
                                                     
6
 A subset of 150 resolutions – around a third of the total of resolutions used in the valence analysis – 
were re-coded by a second coder who is an expert in EU politics. Krippendorff’s Alpha was the 
calculated, a coefficient of inter-coder reliability (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 221). It expresses how much 
better the agreement between the two coders is then what could be expected by chance (p. 222).  When a 
five category Lickert-type scale from, -2 to 2 is used, the Kripendorff’s Alpha is  0.687, which is above 
the required threshold of 0.667 (p. 242). When the scale is collapsed to three categories from -1 to 1, 
Kirppendorff’s Alpha reaches 0.910. 
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As a third step, and following an approach by Huber and Shipan, the length of a 
document is used as a proxy for how detailed the mandate is for the government is 
(2002, p. 73). Huber and Shipan use the length of a law as a proxy for its complexity 
and for the discretion it grants to the bureaucracy (Ehrlich, 2011, p. 170). They 
distinguish between parts that contain procedural or general language and policy words 
(Huber and Shipan, 2002, p. 69). The general assumption is that longer laws contain 
more detail which can limit and constrains the room for interpretation of the 
bureaucratic agent (Ehrlich, 2011, p. 170.). In EU affairs, the difference between the 
length of the preamble of a resolution and its operational or ‘policy’ part is important. In 
general, a preamble can be defined as ‘The introductory part of a statute or deed, stating 
its purpose, aims, and justification’ (Oxford Dictionary, 2015). Preambles are often 
filled with ‘general’ language.  
In EU affairs, preambles often relate to general points parties would like to make 
about the importance of the legal act for European integration or the European Unions 
as such. Especially motions initiated by issue entrepreneurs tend to have longer 
preambles and shorter operational parts since they do not focus on technical scrutiny but 
rather on simple messages which are related to general points on European integration. 
Comparing the ratio of the preamble to the operational part of the resolutions thus 
allows to assess the extent to which the resolutions by the different party groups are 
detailed and can thus be considered ‘effective’ or ‘serious’ scrutiny, much in the same 
way that Huber and Shipan use the length of a legal act and the share of procedural 
language as a measure for bureaucratic constrain (Huber and Shipan, 2002, p. 73). 
Resolutions and statues are quite similar in that they are both instruments in which a 
legislature stipulates suggestions for actions by an agent (the bureaucracy in the case of 
statutes and the government in the case of resolutions. It thus seems reasonable to use 
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and approach that compares general language in the preamble with the policy language 
in the operational part as a proxy for the technicality of targeted ‘depth’ of a resolution. 
The fact that Huber and Shipan also analyse a number of European legislatures (for 
example Finland, Italy and Germany) suggest that their approach can also be adapted to 
parliamentary systems (p. 27). Example of the structure of resolutions of issue 
entrepreneurs and mainstream parties can be found in Appendix 6. 
 Natural languges  diffier from each other in many aspects, not least in their 
efficiency  (Hawkins, 2014). For example, an if an English text is translated to Spanish 
or German, the translated text is around 40% and 30% longer reprectiveley than the 
original (The Economist, 2012). Moreover, national legal traditions are characterised by 
different degrees of verbosity (Lundmark, 2001). To compare the absolute length of 
texts in different languages, Huber and Shipan use a ‘verbosity multiplier’ to account 
for these inherent differences (Huber and Shipan, 2002, p. 178). They compare the 
length of an EU legal act across different languages and use the relative length of the 
different versions to determine the ‘efficiency’ of a language, based on the number of 
characters used (ibid.). This approach is necessary for the work of Huber and Shipan as 
they compare the absolulte length of the preambles of legal acts as a proxy for 
bureaucratic discretion. However, the present theis uses the relative length of the 
preamble and the perational part as a proxy for politicization for theoretical reasons – 
the relative length of the two parts arguable sheds light on the aspect the party group 
aims to emphsasize in their resolutins. Given that the ratio of the preamble and the 
operational part of the resolution is used as a proxy for politicization, and thus the 
relative length (not the absolute length), the use of a verbosity multiplier is not 
necessary here. There relative length should take the verbosity or efficiency of the 
languages into account and makes comparions possible.  
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 The following countries were chosen as country cases for the analysis: Austria, 
Germany, France, Spain and the UK. The ten ‘new’ member states which joined the EU 
in 2004 and 2007 were excluded because of the historical perspective of the study. 
Given the timeframe of the study from the mid/late 1990s to the present, the short 
length of membership of the new member states would make a meaningful comparison 
across time impossible. Moreover, the countries were chosen because they represent an 
excellent institutional spread and the highest possible variation regarding the
†
 
independent variables of the study. The aim was thus to select a diverse set of cases 
(Gerring, 2000, p. 97). As a consequence, the analysis includes countries with a very 
Eurosceptic electorate, such as Austria and the UK, as well as countries with generally 
more pro-European voters such as Germany. Moreover, countries with strong formal 
scrutiny powers, such as Austria, and those with rather weak formal scrutiny powers, 
such as Spain are included. There is also strong variation regarding the average dissent 
within parties on European integration, with Austria and Germany showing very low 
values and the UK showing very high values. The same holds true for the presence of 
Euroscepticism in the party system and the salience of the EU, as expressed by the issue 
entrepreneurship score. 
 
 
Theory and Hypotheses  
 
 Previous studies have often seen the formal powers of national parliaments in 
EU affairs in the form of resolutions as important determinants of their activity (Auel, 
Rozenberg and Tacea, 2015, p. 296). The general expectation is thus that stronger 
formal powers will lead to more activity of national parliaments in EU affairs. This was 
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also the hope of politicians across the EU who pushed to increase the formal powers of 
national parliaments at both at the national and the European level (e.g. Herzog and 
Gerken, 2007; House of Lords, 2014). However, this paper argues that formal powers 
are not the most important determinants of parliamentary activity in the form of 
resolutions. Instead, the presence of issue entrepreneurs –parties for which Europe is 
salient and which are critical of it- and their interaction with public Euroscepticism are 
the most important factors. This fact can also explain why we observe divergence 
between formal powers in EU affairs and actual activity in the form of resolutions- there 
are ‘strong’ parliaments which are not very active and ‘weak’ parliaments which are 
very active in issuing resolutions. Parliaments with a strong presence of issue 
entrepreneurs tend to be very active, irrespective of their formal powers.  
 Issue entrepreneurship is defined as ‘a political strategy with which parties 
mobilize new policy issues that have been largely ignored by the political mainstream 
and adopt a position on the issue that is substantially different from the current position 
of the mainstream’ (Hobolt and De Vries, 2015, p. 3). Issue entrepreneurs have thus a 
larger ‘framing distance’ towards all other parties compared to mainstream parties (Van 
der Wardt, 2015, p. 841). Parties at the losing end of the political process are likely to 
introduce and champion new issues to change the dynamics of competition in the 
political system (Carmines and Stimson, 1993). Generally, elites tend to be more pro-
European than citizens (Hooghe, 2003, p. 296). Parties that adopt a strategy as issue 
entrepreneurs tend to be coherent on the issue on which they mobilize (Hobolt and De 
Vries, 2015, p. 19). Arguably, issue entrepreneur parties have a strong interest in being 
perceived as active on Europe (Auel and Raunio, 2014b, p. 16; De Vries and Edwards, 
2009). They are likely to use all parliamentary instruments at their disposal - debates, 
parliamentary questions and resolutions - to draw attention to their activity in European 
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Union affairs. In the case of resolutions, the chances of their proposals being accepted 
by parliament are very low since they are opposition parties without a realistic prospect 
of joining the government in the overwhelming majority of cases (Hobolt and De Vries, 
2015, p. 3). Therefore, the objective of their resolutions is arguably not to influence the 
government’s position and thus indirectly policy at the European level. Rather, issue 
entrepreneurs aim to draw attention to their particular position on a topic related to 
European Affairs and to expose – from their perspective – controversial or unpopular 
positions of the government on the matter. As a consequence, they are likely to use 
Europe as a ‘wedge issue’ (Van de Wardt, De Vries and Hobolt, 2014, p, 986). If issue 
entrepreneurs are more active on the issue of Europe, voters might come to regard them 
as more competent on the issue (Budge, 2015, p. 767). Their resolutions are thus likely 
to be numerous, but lacking technical detail and focus. The activities of issue 
entrepreneurs can thus not be regarded as substantive scrutiny, but rather as an effort to 
gain public support in ideological debates over Europe.  
 Parties which adopt an issue entrepreneur strategy have a lot of electoral benefit 
from being perceived as active in EU affairs but face very little cost, as explained 
above. For them, there would be higher benefits from scrutiny activity relative to costs. 
If parties do not care deeply about Europe or are generally accommodating of it, but are 
faced with a Eurosceptic electorate, MPs might not want to be perceived as active in EU 
affairs by issuing resolutions. This is because they face potentially high costs by 
investing time and resources in an issue on which they diverge from their voters. It is 
thus hypothesized that parties which are issue entrepreneurs initiate more 
motions/resolutions on Europe. However, given that they are opposition parties, these 
motions are likely to be mostly unsuccessful. Given their negative position on the EU, 
their resolutions are also likely to be very critical. By contrast, government and parties 
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for which Europe is not salient are likely to have relatively little to gain from investing 
time and resources in European affairs with regard to electoral benefits. When they do 
issue resolutions, their main purpose might be to show support for the government and 
to strengthen its negotiation position at the European level. However, these resolutions 
are generally likely to be approved by parliament. Again, the main purpose of their 
resolutions might not be scrutiny in the classical sense of the term, but rather strategic 
support for the government. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
 
 H1a: Parties which are issue entrepreneurs issue more resolutions on Europe 
 than mainstream parties.  
 
 H1b: The resolutions initiated by issue entrepreneurs are on average more 
 critical than the resolutions of mainstream parties.  
 
 Arguably, the fact that parties for which Europe is salient and which have a 
negative opinion on it –issue entrepreneurs- are the drivers of activity in European 
Union affairs might appear not surprising or even tautological. However, besides 
showing quantitatively that this is actually the case the contribution of this paper lies in 
analysing the particular interplay between public opinion and the presence of issue 
entrepreneur parties in bringing about activity. The presence of issue entrepreneurs is 
thus a necessary, but not a sufficient condition in bringing about activity in the form of 
resolutions in EU affairs. The presence of public Euroscepticism also plays an important 
role. The underlying rationale is that parliaments in countries with a Eurosceptic 
electorate might be more inclined to be active in scrutinising the government. 
Eurosceptic voters expect their agents to be more assertive on EU affairs. By contrast, 
  126 
when there is a permissive consensus in favour of the EU, MPs might have fewer 
incentives to invest their time and resources in scrutiny (Bergman, 1997). Arguably, this 
might also hold true for the number of resolutions issued per month. Moreover, it can be 
hypothesized the resolutions tend to be more critical if the public is Eurosceptic.  
Public Euroscepticism is likely to influence the activity of both issue 
entrepreneurs and government parties. Research has demonstrated that parties’ positions 
on EU affairs are relevant for the choices of voters – there is thus ‘issue voting’ with 
regard to EU affairs even though it is conditional on the salience of the topic and the 
structure of partisan conflict (De Vries, 2007, p. 379). Governments thus react to public 
opinion both in the form of promises and actions (Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2012, p. 
323). With respect to European integration, research has shown that parties are 
responsive to the electorate’s position on the EU, albeit in a way which is moderated by 
the institutional context (Steenbergen, Edwards and De Vries, 2007; Arnold, Sapir and 
De Vries, 2012). In particular, parties respond to public Euroscepticism by including 
more Eurosceptic statements in their party manifestos (Williams and Spoon, 2015, p. 
185). It is thus reasonable to expect that this effect can also be observed with regard to 
actual activity of parties in affairs in the form of resolutions. When public 
Euroscepticism is strong, issue entrepreneurs are likely to become more active in EU 
affairs and initiate motions more frequently in order to show the electorate that they are 
in line with their more Eurosceptic preferences. On the other hand, government and 
mainstream parties are likely to issue fewer resolutions when faced with public 
Euroscepticism, since they want to avoid the distance between them and their voters on 
European Affairs from becoming apparent. It is thus the interplay of the presence of 
issue entrepreneurs as a necessary condition and their interaction with Eurosceptic 
public opinion as the sufficient condition by bringing about parliamentary activity in 
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EU affairs in the form of resolutions. The presence of issue entrepreneurs in a political 
system represents a potential for activity in the parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs 
which has to be activated by Eurosceptic public opinion.  
 
 H2a: Parties issue more critical resolutions if the public is Eurosceptic. 
 
 H2b: Issue entrepreneurs initiate more resolutions on EU affairs if the public is 
 Eurosceptic while mainstream parties issue fewer resolutions.  
 
 All in all, government parties and issue entrepreneurs are thus likely to initiate 
resolutions for very different reasons and purposes. However, both have in common that 
they do not use resolutions for the purpose of actual scrutiny, i.e. to influence the 
government’s position on a European Union legislative proposal, but to criticize the 
government and the EU on a general level to gain votes and to support the government 
in negotiations at the European level respectively. Both forms of activity are thus not in 
line with what was arguably supposed to be the role of national parliaments in EU 
affairs and the rationale to strengthen their formal scrutiny powers. With regard to the 
content of resolutions, it can be argued that issue entrepreneurs will focus more on 
general criticism of the European Union instead of actual scrutiny in the form of 
detailed policy suggestions. This measure was inspired by the work of Huber and 
Shipan who use the relative length of legal documents as a proxy for the level of 
discretion a bureaucratic agent has in the implementation of legislation (Huber and 
Shipan, 2002, p. 73). As a proxy for the relationship between general statements and 
actual policy prescriptions, the ratio between the preamble and the operational part of 
resolutions is employed, as explained above. Thus, 
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 H3: Resolutions initiated by issue entrepreneurs will have a lower ratio of the 
 operational part to the preamble. 
 
 The literature on national parliaments has recognized that formal scrutiny 
powers do not necessarily mirror their actual activity in EU affairs (Auel and Benz, 
2005; Pollack and Smolinski, 2003; Sprungk, 2007). Formal scrutiny powers mostly 
concern the extent to which parliament receives information on EU affairs and the 
extent to which it can issue binding mandates to the government (Winzen, 2012, p.660). 
Formal rights will thus be included as a control variable in the analysis. Moreover, the 
extent to which Europe is topical in a particular country at a given point in time might 
have an impact on the extent to which motions and resolutions on Europe are issued. 
This might for example be the case when a country holds the Council Presidency, which 
is also included as a control variable. In addition, the left/right position of the parties is 
included as control variable, as well as the government/opposition status of individual 
parties. Finally, when MPs as agents of the voters and principals of the government 
have diverging preferences; intra-party dissent is the result of a conflict between the 
interests of the MPs principals, voters and the party leadership, according to Competing 
Principals Theory (CPT) (Carey, 2007, Sieberer, 2013). It is in the interest of parties, or 
more precisely, the party leadership, to present a coherent position to the electorate 
(Auel and Raunio, 2014b, p. 16). If parties are divided over Europe, the MPs are likely 
to be more reluctant to be active scrutinisers. Parties might want to prevent these 
divisions from becoming apparent, since their position on the EU has a significant effect 
on the propensity of voters to vote for them, as De Vries and Tillman have shown 
(2011, p. 10). Whether to be active then becomes a question of whether the rewards of 
being perceived as active outweigh the costs of presenting an incoherent party image. It 
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is thus expected that parties which are internally divided issue fewer resolutions on 
Europe per month and hence party cohesion is included as another control variable. 
 
 
Data and Model  
 
 All in all, 3466 resolutions were collected covering the time period from the 
mid/late 1990s until 2012, even though for Spain and the United Kingdom data for the 
entire time period are not available or could not be coded for reasons of feasibility (see 
Appendix 4 for an overview of the time periods covered for each country). For the 
analysis, the resolutions are aggregated by month. Descriptive statistics can be found in 
Appendix 7. Given the distribution of the number of resolutions which follows a 
negative binominal distribution, a multilevel count model was applied to assess the 
overall number of resolutions by month (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012, p. 696) 
(Models 1-3). A negative binominal model was chosen over a poisson model since the 
overall variance of the resolutions is significantly larger than their mean (Hilbe, 2011, p. 
239). In order to analyse the overall valence of the resolutions issued by a parliament in 
a given month, all resolutions were hand coded for their valence on a Likert-type scale 
from -2 to 2. The mean of the valence scores for all resolutions issued was used as the 
dependent variable for a multilevel linear regression (Model 4-6). In Model 7, the ratio 
of the length of the preamble of a resolution and its operational part is specified as the 
dependent variable for a multilevel linear regression. In this model, the individual 
resolutions serve as observations. To account for autocorrelation, a lagged dependent 
variable was included (Becks and Katz, 1995). All models include random intercepts for 
the different countries and party groups. 
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 As predictor variables, the issue entrepreneur score of the parliament was 
included, operationalized as the difference between the mean party position on Europe 
of all parties in parliament and the party position of each respective party, multiplied by 
the salience score of each party (Hobolt and De Vries, 2012, p. 256). This position and 
salience scores are taken from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES, 2014). Popular 
Euroscepticism is operationalized as the number of respondents stating that membership 
of their country to the European Union was a ‘good thing’ minus those stating that it 
was ‘a bad thing’ in the Eurobarometer survey (Eurobarometer, 2012a). As control 
variables, the mean left/right position for all parties represented in parliament was 
included, also based on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES, 2014). Moreover, the 
strength of formal scrutiny powers based on Winzen (2012) and whether a country held 
the Council presidency in a given month were included. Data on the composition of 
parliament and the seat share of the respective parties were derived from the ParlGov 
database (Doering and Manow, 2012). The seat share of a party was included as a proxy 
for the resources they can apply to drafting and issuing resolutions (Caulier and 
Dumont, 2010, p. 48). Missing values were filled in using linear interpolation. As a 
robustness check, the model was also run without interpolation, yielding very similar 
results. The results of the analysis are shown in Table 11 below. The robustness checks 
can be found in Appendix 8.  
 
 
 
  
 
1
3
1
 
 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model 7 
Issue Entrepreneur 0.086*** 0.022 0.103*** -0.060*** -0.013 -0.030*** -0.021* 
 (0.019) (0.063) (0.021) (0.018) (0.041) (0.011) (0.011) 
Internal Dissent 0.042 -0.108 0.008 -0.093** 0.012 -0.062* 0.000 
 (0.069) (0.141) (0.083) (0.040) (0.059) (0.034) (0.024) 
Left/Right Position  -0.023 0.033 -0.018 -0.008 0.003 -0.012 -0.037*** 
 (0.017) (0.040) (0.019) (0.023) (0.037) (0.013) (0.024) 
Formal Rights 0.294 0.542 0.086 0.333** 2.228*** 0.192 0.096 
 (0.335) (0.426) (0.382) (0.167) (0.369) (0.161) (0.089) 
Government  -0.301*** 1.093*** -1.408*** 1.362*** -0.032 0.523*** 0.000 
 (0.096) (0.185) (0.124) (0.142) (0.219) (0.130) (0.112) 
Presidency 0.078 -0.346 0.194 -0.191 1.195*** -0.067 0.136 
 (0.145) (0.261) (0.165) (0.162) (0.456) (0.111) (0.094) 
Euroscepticism -1.222*** -1.249 -0.212 0.325 0.209 0.100 0.119 
 (0.764) (1.469) (0.885) (0.348) (0.637) (0.270) (0.222) 
Euroscepticism x Issue Ent. 0.518*** 0.279 0.598***     
 (0.088) (0.255) (0.097)     
Euroscepticism x Int. Diss. 0.175 0.363 -0.286     
 (0.193) (0.357) (0.229)     
Seat Share  -0.808** 2.252** -0.899** 0.461 0.515 0.246 0.024 
 (0.356) (0.945) (0.428) (0.479) (0.507) (0.332) (0.182) 
Constant -3.951*** -8.851*** -3.559*** -0.813 -2.570*** -0.527 0.295 
 (0.687) (1.080) (0.787) (0.594) (0.985) (0.454) (0.357) 
Variance (Country) 3.282  36.78 6.75e-22 2.72e-18 6.11e-19 1.72e-09 
 (3.453)  (37.76) (1.57e-20) (3.08e-17) (1.83e-17) (1.69e-08 
Variance (Party Group) 3.790 1.057** 2.540 0.008 0.116 3.02e-19 0.08 
 (2.032) (0.451) (2.243) (0.013) (0.156) (3.99e-18) (0.051) 
Table 12: Results 
of the statistical 
analysis of 
resolutions 
Model 1: Al 
resolutions (count), 
Model 2: successful 
resolutions (count), 
Model 3: 
Unsuccessful 
resolutions (count), 
Model 4: All 
resolutions 
(valence), Model 5 
successful 
resolutions 
(valence),Model 6 
unsuccessful 
resolutions 
(valence), Model 7: 
Ratio unsuccessful 
resolutions 
 
  
 
1
3
2
 
 
 
                  
.. 
Variance (Residual)    0.644 0.256 0.253 0.724 
    (0.045) (0.033) (0.031) (0.017) 
Variance explained    46% 59% 60% 16% 
Inter-class correlation (country)    0.00 0.31 0.00 0.00 
Inter –class correlation (party 
family) 
   0.01 0.00 0.00 0.14 
AIC 5940.008 3101.564 3934.11 1044.56 234.3758 390.1563 1951.486 
BIC 6037.532 3192.993 4031.635 1101.191 274.735 439.2878 2018.293 
Observations 3,244 3,244 3,244 422 132 247 873 
Parties 25 26 25 20 15 15 16 
Countries 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 
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Analysis and Results 
 
  As the results of Model 1 show, issue entrepreneurs are indeed prone to more 
activity in the form of resolutions. The coefficient for the effect of issue 
entrepreneurship score on the number of resolutions is significant and in the expected 
direction (0.10), confirming Hypothesis 1a. As expected, stronger formal powers do not 
seem to have an effect on parliamentary activity in the form of resolutions. No 
significant effect for the impact of internal dissent on the overall number of resolutions 
could be found 
  An interesting interaction effect with the issue entrepreneurship score of a party 
and public Euroscepticism can be observed, confirming Hypothesis 2b. When the issue 
entrepreneurship score of a party is high, Euroscepticism seems to have an increasingly 
positive effect on the number of resolutions, i.e. the higher the issue entrepreneur score 
of a party, the more resolutions will be issued when the public is Eurosceptic. As shown 
in Figure 4, for parties with a low issue entrepreneurship score (i.e. parties which are 
pro-European and for which the EU is not a salient topic) an increase in public 
Euroscepticism leads to fewer motions on EU affairs being issued. For example , for a 
mainstream party such as the Austrian People’s Party (OVP), a two standard deviation 
increase in public Euroscepticism leads to about one resolutions less being issued per 
month. By contrast, for a party with a high issue entrepreneurship score, an increase in 
public Euroscepticism leads to more resolutions. Thus, the Eurosceptic Austrian 
Freedom Party (FPO) would initiate around one additional resolution for a two standard 
deviation increase in public Euroscepticism.  
 134 
 
  MPs might want to signal to their Eurosceptic voters that they take the task of 
scrutinising the government on EU affairs seriously. By contrast, parties with a low 
issue entrepreneurship score issue fewer resolutions when confronted with public 
Euroscepticism. Government participation seems to have a slight negative effect as does 
the seat share of a party. Figure 4 also shows that the negative effect for mainstream 
parties is much stronger than the positive effect (in the sense of more resolutions are 
issued) for issue entrepreneurs. As mentioned above, pro-European parties with a low 
issue-entrepreneurship score which display a negative effect here are mostly larger 
mainstream and government parties which are often larger in size than issue 
entrepreneurs. Previous research has found that government and mainstream parties are 
generally more sensitive to changes in public opinion than smaller and more specialised 
parties (Williams and Spoon, 2015, p. 185). This might explain why the negative effect 
for mainstream parties is stronger than the positive effect for issue entrepreneurs.   
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Figure 4: Effect of the issue entrepreneurship score of a party on the effect of popular 
Euroscepticism on the number of resolutions per month.  
 
The figure shows 95% confidence intervals (higher values indicate more 
Euroscepticism and more salience attributed to EU affairs). 
 
 
As explained above, it is important to distinguish between those resolutions 
which were actually agreed on by parliament and those which were initiated by a party 
group but not actually adopted (referred to as ‘motions’ here). Thus, Models 2 and 3 
analyse successful and unsuccessful resolutions respectively. When only analysing the 
resolutions which parliament agreed on, the issue entrepreneurship score of a party does 
not seem to have an effect (Model 2). By contrast, the government status of a party 
seems to have a significant and positive effect on the number of resolutions, as does 
their share of seats in the legislature. It thus becomes clear that for the number of 
resolutions which were actually agreed on by parliament, the government status of a 
party and its seat share in the legislature are the most important determinants. A very 
different picture emerges when only analysing the resolutions which were not 
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successful in the legislature (‘motions’). As Model 3 shows, the coefficient for the issue 
entrepreneurship score is significant (0.10) and positive at the 0.01 level. The effect for 
government participation and seat share is negative. Again, an interesting interaction 
effect with public Euroscepticism can be observed, confirming Hypothesis 2b. The 
analysis thus shows that the successful resolutions are overwhelmingly initiated by 
government parties, while unsuccessful motions are usually initiated by issue 
entrepreneurs.  
In Models 4-6 the valence of resolutions in EU affairs was analysed. As Model 4 
shows, the average monthly valence of all resolutions issued by a party in a given 
month decreases by -0.06 for a one-unit increase on the issue entrepreneurship score. 
Resolutions initiated by issue entrepreneurs are thus more critical than those initiated by 
pro-European parties, confirming Hypotheses 1b. Not surprisingly, government 
participation has the opposite effect. On average, the average monthly valence of all 
resolutions initiated by a governing party in a given month is by 1.38 higher than for an 
opposition party. If parties are divided, they issue more critical resolutions. There are 
however important differences between successful resolutions and unsuccessful 
motions. For successful resolutions (Model 5), no significant effect for the issue 
entrepreneurship score of a party could be found. Moreover, the formal powers of a 
parliament seem to play a role in influencing the valence of successful resolutions. 
Surprisingly, parties in national parliaments with stronger formal powers tend to issue 
resolutions which are more supportive of the government (a one unit increase on the 
scale of the formal powers of parliament leads to a 2.17 point increase in the average 
valence of resolutions). This indicates the parliaments with strong formal powers are on 
average less critical, not more. It is interesting to note that successful motions are 
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significantly more positive if a country has the Council Presidency. For unsuccessful 
resolutions (‘motions’), the issue entrepreneurship score of a party has a small but 
significant impact on the average monthly valence: a unit increase on the issue 
entrepreneurship score lowers the monthly average by 0.02 points. Even for 
unsuccessful motions, there is still a significant effect for government participation, but 
it is markedly smaller: the average monthly valence of all unsuccessful motions initiated 
by government parties is 0.4 higher than for opposition parties (Model 6). Public 
Euroscepticism does not have an impact on the valance of resolutions, disconfirming 
Hypothesis 2a.  
 Finally, it was analysed to what extent the ratio of the preamble to the main 
operational part of a resolution or motion differs between parties (Model 7). As 
explained in more detail above, issue entrepreneurs initiate resolutions with longer 
preambles and shorter operational parts – arguably as a sign that they bring up more 
general, politicized points which are usually placed in the preamble and care less about 
actual ‘technical’ scrutiny which takes place in the operational part. A one unit increase 
in the issue entrepreneurship score leads the ratio of preamble and operational part to be 
smaller by 2%. This result of the statistical analysis could also be confirmed when hand 
coding and reading the resolutions which contain both a preamble and an operational 
part. Examples of resolutions by mainstream parties and issue entrepreneurs can be 
found in Appendix 6. The fact that Eurosceptic parties are the drivers of parliamentary 
activity in the form of resolutions but simultaneously tend to focus on politicized points 
might make it questionable to what extent activity can actually be equated with 
effectiveness in this regard. 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 In affecting the levels of parliamentary control of the government on EU affairs, 
as measured by resolutions, this paper suggests that the presence of issue entrepreneurs 
and generally the position of parties on European integration play a very important role 
in determining parliamentary activity. However, there is a significant difference 
between resolutions which were agreed upon by parliament and those which were not. 
The successful resolutions are initiated by large government parties in the vast majority 
of cases. These resolutions generally support the position of the government and can 
thus not be regarded as scrutiny as such.  
In contrast, when separately analysing the resolutions which failed to reach a 
majority in parliament, it became clear that issue entrepreneur parties are 
overwhelmingly responsible for these motions. An observed increase in the activity of 
national parliaments in EU affairs might thus be the consequence of an increase in the 
strength of Eurosceptic tendencies Issue entrepreneurs generally very critical of the 
government’s position. Moreover, interaction effects between the presence of issue 
entrepreneurs and public Euroscepticism can be observed. When issue entrepreneurs are 
present, public Euroscepticism leads to more resolutions being issued by parliament as a 
whole. This implies that in addition to their presence in the plenary and in committees, 
public opinion in the form of Euroscepticism has an enabling effect on the activity of 
issue entrepreneurs in EU affairs. Their increased activity might be a consequence of 
issue entrepreneurs wanting to signal to their voters that they take their role as 
scrutinizers seriously, whereas pro-European parties do not want to antagonize their 
voters.   
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Arguably, this could be interpreted as mirroring an increase in Eurosceptic 
views on behalf of the electorate. In that sense, the presence of issue entrepreneurs 
contributes to Europe being put on the agenda. It can be argued that this has a 
normatively positive effect in terms of parliaments as a whole fulfilling its 
communication function with regard to EU affairs. However, an increase of public 
Euroscepticism does not lead to more critical resolutions, indicating that party political 
factors are more important than responsiveness with regard to resolutions, potentially 
because they are less publicly visible. Moreover, as both a quantitative and a qualitative 
analysis of the structure and content of the resolutions shows, motions initiated by issue 
entrepreneurs are mostly concerned with general, politicized Eurosceptic statements. 
The operational part of the motions and resolutions is generally short and contains little 
detail. Therefore, it might be argued that there is little substantive scrutiny, i.e. 
parliaments might fail to make an impact on the ‘bread and butter’ issues of EU politics 
on which they actually could have an impact. There is thus less positive evidence of 
national parliaments adequately fulfilling their government control function in EU 
affairs from a normative perspective.  
Interestingly, formal powers of national parliaments do not seem to have an 
impact on the quantity of resolutions issued. However, the formal powers of national 
parliaments do seem to have an impact on the valence of resolutions. When only 
analysing successful resolutions, formal rights seem to lead to more positive, i.e. less 
critical resolutions, arguably the opposite of what was intended by the introduction of 
stronger formal scrutiny powers. This impact of formal powers on democratic 
accountability can thus be seen critically from a normative point of view. Thus, formal 
powers might not necessarily lead to more activity, and activity might not lead to more 
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effectiveness if it is not concerned with actual scrutiny but uncritical and ‘blind’ support 
by government parties or political ‘smoke and mirrors’ on behalf of issue entrepreneurs. 
As a consequence, the hopes that national parliaments could help overcome the 
democratic deficit of the European Union might prove to be unfounded.  
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Appendix 4: Resolutions in the five countries 
 
Table 13: The committees covered, legal acts counted as resolutions and the time frame 
of the analysis for the different countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parliament Committee Resolution Time 
Period 
Austrian 
Nationalrat 
 Hauptausschuss 
 Unterausschuss 
in 
Angelegenheiten 
der EU 
 Stellungnahme 
 Antrag auf 
Stellungnahme 
1996-
2012  
 
German 
Bundestag 
 Decentralized 
 Ausschuss fuer 
Angelegenheiten 
der 
Europaeischen 
Union 
 Beschlussempfehlung 
und Bericht 
 Antrag 
1996-
2012 
French 
Assemblée 
Nationale 
 Commission des 
affaires 
européennes 
(from July 2008) 
 Délégation de 
l’Assemblée 
nationale pour 
l’Union 
européenne 
(until July 2008) 
 Résolutions adoptées 
 Propositions de 
résolution sur des projets 
de directives et divers 
textes européens 
 Propositions de 
résolution sur des projets 
de directives et divers 
textes européens 
déposées par les députés 
 Conclusions adoptées 
par la Commission des 
affaires européennes 
1998 – 
2012  
 
Spanish 
Congreso de 
los 
Diputados 
 Comisión Mixta 
para la Unión 
Europea 
 Proposiciones no de Ley 2008 -
2012 
UK House 
of 
Commons 
 Plenary  Motions  
 
2005 –
2012 
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Appendix 5: Coding Scheme for Resolutions  
 
 Type of Instrument: Which type of legislative instrument was chosen (e.g. motion for a 
resolution by individual MPs/party group or resolution by the whole committee, binding or 
non-binding) 
 Document: Document number given by the parliament 
 Committee: Which committee issued the resolution (e.g. European Affairs Committee or 
sectoral committee, main- or sub-committee) 
 Date: Date on which the resolution was issued (group by month/year for analysis) 
 Author: Who issued the document? (1=whole committee, 0=party group or individual MPs) 
 Sentiment: Was the resolution supportive or critical (-2= very critical, -1=somewhat critical, 
0=neutral, 1=somewhat supportive, 2=very supportive).  
- Very Critical: The resolution criticizes an EU proposal or the government’s position 
on the latter. It questions the general approach of the government with regard to its 
EU policy or challenges the legitimacy of the European Union or the country’s 
membership to it in general.  
- Somewhat critical: The resolution criticizes the approach of the government on 
specific points. It outlines negative consequence of the status quo and/or plans for 
the future. It suggests an alternative course of action and portrays it as superior.  
- Neutral: Technical details of the proposal or the government’s actions are 
elaborated on. No clear judgements in favour or against the proposed act are made. 
Also request for clarification. The resolution contains both positive and negative 
elements.  
- Somewhat supportive: The EU proposal or action of the government is generally 
portrayed in a positive light. However, possible danger and precautions are 
mentioned. Concerns about certain technical points may be expressed.  
- Very Supportive: The EU proposal, status quo or position of the government is 
supported throughout. Potential alternatives are portrayed in a negative way. No 
precautions or concerns are mentioned.  
 Result: Was the resolution adopted by the whole committee? (0=rejected, 1=supported, 
2=supported unanimously, 3 Spain: supported with amendments, 4=UK: debated in plenary) 
 Text: Text of the operational part of the resolution 
 Supporters: Was the resolution supported by party groups other than the initiator (0=no, 
1=supported by coalition, 2=supported by opposition) 
 Government: Was the initiator of the resolution in government? (0=opposition, 
1=government) 
 Length of the preamble/explanation 
 Length of the operational part of operational part of the resolution/motion 
 Proportion of the lengths of the two parts of the resolution/motion 
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Appendix 6: Examples of Resolutions by issue entrepreneurs and mainstream 
parties - Relative lengths of different parts of motions and resolutions 
 
Preamble of a motion initiated by the FPO (844 words): 
 
Folgender Antrag der FPÖ auf Stellungnahme wurde von SPÖ, ÖVP und Grünen mehrheitlich 
abgelehnt:  
Antrag auf Stellungnahme  
(gemäß Art. 23e B-VG)  
des Abgeordneten Dr. Hübner und weiterer Abgeordneter  
betreffend Ablehnung der „Strategie Europa 2020“  
Nach dürftigen Ergebnissen der so genannten „Lissabon-Strategie“, mit der die EU bis 2010 
zum dynamischsten und wettbewerbsfähigsten wissensbasierten Wirtschaftsraum der Welt 
werden sollte, hat die EU ihre Pläne überarbeitet. Statt Lissabon-Strategie heißt es nun „Europa 
2020“ bzw. „EU2020“. Die bisherige Strategie konnte nicht verhindern, dass die EU in ihrem 
Wachstum zu den Schlusslichtern der Welt gehört. Bleibt abzuwarten, wann der neue 
Papiertiger in den Schubladen der EU-Bürokratie verschwinden wird.  
Bei der letzten Strategie feierte man die „offene Methode der Koordinierung“, sie schien 
allerdings so offen zu sein, dass kaum Koordinierung stattfand. Kommunikationsmängel, kaum 
Einbindung der Bundesländer und Regionen sowie keine verpflichtenden Zielvorgaben sollen 
schuld daran sein, dass das Kalkül nicht aufgegangen ist. Was nun anders sein soll, ist rätselhaft. 
Der reformierte wirtschaftliche „Schlachtplan“ setzt auf Freiwilligkeit, bei der Nachzügler an 
den Pranger gestellt werden.  
Änderungen durch den Lissabon-Vertrag ermöglichen der EU-Kommission, Verwarnungen 
auszusprechen. Kommissionspräsident Barroso hat angekündigt, dass er dieses Instrument „voll 
ausnutzen“ wird. De facto kann er jedoch wenig machen, wenn die EU-Staaten nicht mitspielen.  
Deshalb gab es wohl im Vorfeld die Diskussion über eine mögliche Einbeziehung der 
Kohäsionspolitik. Barroso wollte strukturschwachen Regionen die Finanzhilfen entziehen, wenn 
die Mitgliedstaaten „notwendige Reformen“ verweigern. In der Praxis wären also Regionen und 
Bürger, die ja so gut wie keine Mitspracherechte haben, für Versäumnisse des Staates abgestraft 
worden. Und wie sich der „Reformdrang“ auswirkt, konnte Europa in der bisherigen 
Privatisierungs- und Liberalisierungswelle erleben.  
Mit Europa 2020 soll eine „nachhaltige, inklusive soziale Marktwirtschaft“ ermöglicht werden. 
Dabei wurden drei Prioritäten gesetzt:  
intelligentes Wachstum, d.h. Entwicklung einer auf Wissen und Innovation gründenden 
Wirtschaft,  
nachhaltiges Wachstum, d.h. Förderung einer emissionsarmen, ressourcenschonenden und 
wettbewerbsfähigen Wirtschaft und  
integratives Wachstum, d.h. Förderung einer Wirtschaft mit hohem Beschäftigungsniveau sowie 
sozialem und territorialem Zusammenhalt  
 
Allein die Fokussierung auf die „green economy“ wird nicht reichen, um die 
Wettbewerbsfähigkeit des Produktionsstandorts Europa zu sichern. Dazu braucht es nämlich 
nebst funktionierender Energieversorgung und Infrastruktur gut ausgebildete Fachkräfte und 
nicht eine Einwanderungswelle von Wirtschaftsflüchtlingen, die als Billigarbeiter die Märkte 
überschwemmen. Und wenn eine Flexibilisierung der nationalen Arbeitsmärkte gefordert wird, 
dann darf das nicht dazu führen, dass die Übergangsfristen für die neuen Mitgliedsstaaten über 
die Hintertür ausgehebelt werden. Gerade in Krisenzeiten, in denen immer mehr Menschen 
arbeitslos sind oder in Teilzeit- und Ein-Euro-Jobs ihr Dasein fristen, darf die EU dem 
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bestehenden Verdrängungswettbewerb am Arbeitsmarkt nicht neuen Vorschub leisten. 
Vielmehr muss die EU zu einem Bollwerk gegen die Globalisierung nach US-amerikanischem 
Vorbild werden. 
Wenn die EU-2020-Strategie Erfolg haben soll, müssen die Mitglieder ihre öffentlichen 
Finanzen unter Kontrolle bekommen, lautet der neueste Tenor. Und die Wunschliste scheint 
lang: die 2020-Strategie der EU müsse Hand in Hand gehen mit einer Sanierung der nationalen 
Budgets, der Strukturreformen im Bereich Pension, Gesundheitsleistungen, sozialer Sicherheit 
und dem Ausbildungssystem. Die Rede ist auch davon, dass bestehende Schwachstellen im 
europäischen Binnenmarkt eruiert werden sollen und die Dienstleistungsrichtlinie lückenlos 
umgesetzt wird. 
Insgesamt wird mehr oder weniger offen eine europäische Wirtschaftsregierung gefordert und 
festgehalten, dass Entwicklungen in einem Land Auswirkungen auf ein anderes haben können. 
Nun mag es im Falle Griechenlands einleuchtend klingen, wenn die Kommission ein Land 
verwarnt, dessen Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik für die ganze EU gefährlich wird. Spätestens 
bei Floskeln, wie die „Notwendigkeit, die Nachfrage in der EU auszugleichen“, sollten jedoch 
die Alarmglocken läuten. Wenn wirtschaftlich erfolgreiche Länder, wie beispielswiese die 
Exportnation Deutschland, die von der Nachfrage anderer Länder profitiert, leise kritisiert 
werden, spätestens dann sollte jedem klar sein, wohin die Reise geht. Da steht einmal mehr 
unter dem Deckmantel der „Solidarität“ ein Abbau nationaler Kompetenzen und Rechte im 
Raum. 
Diskutiert wurde auch ein Sachverständigenrat aus fünf Experten und einem Stab zur 
Bewertung der Ziele. Dieser Beirat würde wohl reine Augenauswischerei bleiben, weil absehbar 
ist, dass die anvisierten Ziele einmal mehr in der Schublade verschwinden werden. 
Auch wenn mittlerweile ein paar konkrete Zielvorgaben genannt wurden, bleibt deren Erfolg 
zweifelhaft. Die Mitgliedstaaten sind einfach zu unterschiedlich, als dass sie alle in einen Topf 
geworfen werden können. Die mittel- und europäischen EU-Länder haben eine andere 
Wirtschafts- und Finanzethik als die südeuropäischen. Und was passiert, wenn man diese 
Unterschiede bewusst negiert, sieht man an der gegenwärtigen Euro-Krise, die maßgebend 
durch Griechenland verursacht wurde. Ergo darf die Strategie Europa 2020 nicht zu einer 
Aushöhlung nationalstaatlicher Restsouveränität durch die Hintertüre führen, für die 
Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik müssen vorrangig die Mitgliedstaaten zuständig bleiben. 
Wenn künftig jeder Mitgliedstaat von Brüssel detaillierte wirtschaftspolitische Empfehlungen 
erhalten soll, dann ist das der falsche Weg. Denn die einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten können besser 
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als die Brüsseler Bürokraten entscheiden, welche Maßnahmen zu ergreifen sind. Anstatt den 
Zentralismus weiter auszubauen, sollte es endlich zu Renationalisierungen kommen, etwa im 
Bereich des Förderwesens. 
Sinnvoll kann nur eine europäische Wirtschaftsstrategie sein, die realistische Zielvorgaben 
beinhaltet. An einigen Stellen jedoch bewegt sich das Strategiepapier gefährlich nahe an 
planwirtschaftlichen Ansätzen. 
Bereits die Lissabon-2010-Strategie erlitt grandios Schiffbruch, womit sich die Frage stellt, 
warum die EU mit Zehnjahresplänen erfolgreich sein soll, wo doch schon die Sowjetunion mit 
ihren Fünfjahresplänen gescheitert ist.  
Daher stellen die unterzeichnenden Abgeordneten folgenden 
 
Operational Part of a motion initiated by the FPO (58 words)  Proportion= 0.068 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Antrag auf Stellungnahme  
gemäß Artikel 23e B-VG  
Der Hauptausschuss in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union wolle 
beschließen:  
„Die zuständigen Mitglieder der Bundesregierung werden aufgefordert, auf 
europäischer Ebene – insbesondere auf dem Europäischen Rat am 17. und 18. Juni 
2010 – die neue europäische Strategie für Beschäftigung und Wachstum „Europa 2020“ 
nicht anzunehmen, und gemeinsam mit den Repräsentanten der EU-Mitgliedsstaaten 
zum einen über Renationalisierungen von Wirtschafts- und Arbeitsmarktförderungen zu 
verhandeln, zum anderen Strategien für eine Hartwährungszone zu entwickeln.“ 
 146 
 
Preamble of a motion by the Austria Greens (816 words): 
Folgender Antrag der Grünen auf Stellungnahme wurde von den anderen Fraktionen 
mehrheitlich abgelehnt: 
ANTRAG AUF STELLUNGNAHME 
gemäß Art. 23e Abs. 2 B-VG 
der Abgeordneten Mag.a Christiane Brunner und Univ. Prof. Dr. Alexander Van der Bellen 
betreffend Schlussfolgerungen des Europäischen Rates am 29. und 30. Oktober 2009 
(20455/EU XXIV.GP) zum Klimawandel 
eingebracht im Zuge des EU-Hauptausschusses am 28. Oktober 2009 
Von 7.-18.Dezember 2009 findet in Kopenhagen die United Nations Climate Change 
Conference – die COP15 – statt. Bei dieser Konferenz werden die Weichen für die Zukunft 
der internationalen Klimaschutzpolitik gestellt. Die Europäische Union wird in Kopenhagen 
mit einer Stimme verhandeln. Die gemeinsame Verhandlungsposition soll beim kommenden 
Europäischen Rat (29./30. Oktober 2009) in Brüssel festgelegt werden. 
Wissenschaftsbasierte Reduktionsziele festlegen 
Inzwischen ist es international anerkannt, dass die Erwärmung der globalen 
Durchschnittstemperatur soweit wie möglich unter zwei Grad Celsius gegenüber dem 
vorindustriellen Zeitalter liegen muss. Beim G8-Gipfel im Juli 2009 in L’Aquila (Italien) wurde 
dies in Absprache mit den Schwellenländern wie China und Indien vereinbart. 
Die in der Klimarahmenkonvention auch von Österreich beschlossene Vorgabe, „die 
Stabilisierung der Treibhausgaskonzentrationen in der Atmosphäre auf einem Niveau zu 
erreichen, auf dem eine gefährliche anthropogene Störung des Klimasystems verhindert 
wird“, ist in Kopenhagen nach den neuesten Erkenntnissen der Klimawissenschaft, auch 
nach dem 4. Sachstandsbericht (AR 4) des Weltklimarats (IPCC), umzusetzen. Das bedeutet 
bei einer politischen Vorgabe einer Erwärmungsobergrenze von maximal 2°C, dass weltweit 
die Treibhausgasemissionen spätestens 2015 ihren Höhepunkt erreicht haben müssen und 
bis 2050 um mindestens 80% zu reduzieren sind. 
Die aktuellen Reduktionserfordernisse der IPCC bewegen sich für Industrienationen von - 
25% bis -40% bis 2020 und von -80% bis -95% bis 2050, global von -50% bis -80%. 
Die österreichische Bundesregierung sollte sich zu den höheren Reduktionszielen dieser 
Bandbreiten, - 40% bis 2020 und – 95% bis 2020 für die Industrienationen bzw. global -80% 
bis 2050 bekennen, um mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von über 66% unter einer maximalen 
Erwärmung von 2°C zu bleiben. 
 
Mindestziele für Erneuerbare Energien aufnehmen 
Analog zu den 20/20/20 Zielen der EU müssen auch auf globaler Ebene verbindliche 
Mindestziele für erneuerbare Energien weltweit festgelegt werden. Die internationale 
Klimakonferenz von Kopenhagen bietet dafür eine einmalige Möglichkeit. Der Anteil 
Erneuerbarer Energie am Weltprimärenergieverbrauch sollte bis 2020 mindestens 20% 
betragen und bis 2050 auf 60% ansteigen. Speziell für den Strombereich sind solche 
Ausbauziele notwendig um eine mögliche Atomrenaissance zu verhindern, denn die 
alleinige Bepreisung von CO2-Emissionen macht die Atomenergie rentabler. Daher sollte der 
Anteil erneuerbarer Energie im Strombereich verbindlich festgelegt global bis 2020 bei 30% 
und bis 2050 bei 80% liegen. 
Finanzierung von Klimaschutz und Anpassung in Entwicklungs- und 
Schwellenländern 
Die Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländer haben historisch weit geringere absolute und auch 
pro Kopf gerechnete Treibhausgasemissionen zu verantworten. Dennoch sind sie am 
stärksten von den Auswirkungen der globalen Erwärmung betroffen. In diesem Sinne 
bedeutet die „Common but differentiated responsibility“ (gemeinsame aber unterschiedliche 
Verantwortung) aller Vertragsstaaten der Klimarahmenkonvention, dass bei den 
Klimaschutzverhandlungen in Kopenhagen die Industriestaaten nicht nur höhere 
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Klimaschutzziele zu übernehmen haben, sondern gleichzeitig Transferzahlungen für 
Mitigation (Senkung der Treibhausgasemissionen), Adaption (Anpassung) und 
Kompensation (Entschädigung für Klimaschäden) an die Entwicklungsländer zu leisten 
haben. 
Die Bundesregierung muss sich für einen gerechten europäischen Beitrag für diese 
Finanzierung von 35 Mrd. Euro pro Jahr bis 2020 einsetzen. Ohne konkrete und 
ausreichende Finanzierungsangebote der EU in Kopenhagen wird es keine Einigung auf ein 
globales Klimaschutzabkommen geben. 
Klimaschutz muss im Inland stattfinden 
Der Rechnungshof (2008/11) verweist darauf, dass „der Kauf von Emissionszertifikaten 
keine Alternative zur Reduktion von Treibhausgasemissionen durch nationale Maßnahmen“ 
sei und auch international mehren sich wissenschaftlichen Studien, die belegen, dass die 
flexiblen Mechanismen (Emissionszertifikate-Handel, Clean Development Mechanisem und 
Joint Impelementation) des Kyoto-Protokolls netto gar keine Emissionsminderungen bringen. 
Wenn die Bundesregierung Energieautarkie ernst nimmt und die Vorteile von heimischem 
Klimaschutz nutzen will, dann muss sich Österreich zu 100% Klimaschutz im Inland 
bekennen. 
Die Bundesregierung sollte für ein Auslaufen der flexiblen Mechanismen Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) und JI (Joint Implementation) nach 2012 weltweit eintreten. Grüne 
Projekte und Politiken in den Entwicklungsländern, vor allem auch in den am wenigsten 
entwickelten Ländern, sollten aus dem Topf für Anpassung und Klimaschutz finanziert 
werden ohne dass weiterhin ein Transfer von CO2-Rechten von den Entwicklungsländern zu 
den Industrieländern möglich ist. 
Atomkraft und andere Risikotechnologien raus aus dem Klimaschutz 
In jüngster Zeit erlebt die Atomkraft eine Renaissance als so genannte saubere Energie, 
obwohl sich die damit verbundenen Risiken nicht verändert haben. Die Bundesregierung 
muss sich gegen jegliche direkte oder auch nur indirekte Unterstützung der Atomkraft 
aussprechen und für einen möglichst raschen globalen Ausstieg aus dieser 
Risikotechnologie einsetzen. Daher muss die Bundesregierung im Rahmen der EU dafür 
eintreten, dass Atomkraft in Kopenhagen aus den projektbezogenen flexiblen Mechanismen 
ausgeschlossen bleibt und auch nicht aus dem neuen Transfertopf für Adaption, Mitigation 
und Kompensation unterstützt wird.Das gleiche wie für die Atomenergie gilt für die neue 
Risikotechnologie der Abscheidung undEndlagerung von fossilem Kohlendioxid (CCS). 
Ungeklärte Haftungsfragen, permanente undplötzliche Leckagen von CO2, hoher 
Energieeinsatz und hohe Kosten im Vergleich zuerneuerbaren Energien und Energieeffizienz, 
sowie die zu erwartende sehr späte Einsatzmöglichkeit von fossilem CCS in 10-20 Jahren 
sprechen gegen diese teure Risikotechnologie. 
Operational part of a motion by the Austrian Greens (464 words)  proportion 0.56) 
Antrag auf Stellungnahme 
gemäß Art 23e Abs. 2 B-VG 
Der Ausschuss wolle beschließen: 
Die zuständigen Mitglieder der Bundesregierung, insbesondere der Bundeskanzler und der 
Bundesminister für Umwelt, werden dringend und mit Nachdruck aufgefordert, sich beim 
Europäischen Rat in Brüssel am 29. und 30. Oktober sowie bei weiteren EU-Verhandlungen 
zur Vorbereitung der UN-Klimakonferenz in Kopenhagen für die Aufnahme folgender Punkte 
in die Schlussfolgerungen einzusetzen: 
1. Reduktion der Treibhausgas-Emissionen bis 2020 und 2050 Auf Basis der aktuellen 
Reduktionsempfehlungen des Weltklimarats verpflichtet sich 
die Europäische Union in einem Kyoto-Nachfolgeregime zu einer kollektiven CO2- 
Reduktion von 40% bis 2020 und 95% bis 2050 verglichen mit 1990. Für die globalen 
Reduktionsziele fordert die EU minus 80% bis 2050 (Basisjahr 1990) 
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bzw. minus 95% für Industrienationen. 
Spätestens 2015 müssen die Treibhausgasemmissionen weltweit ihren Zenit erreicht 
haben und danach stetig sinken 
 
2. Mindestziele Erneuerbare Energien 
Die EU setzt sich für die Festschreibung stetig steigender, verbindlicher Mindestziele 
für erneuerbare Energien weltweit im Kyoto-Nachfolgeregime ein. 
Der Anteil Erneuerbarer Energie am Weltprimärenergieverbrauch sollte bis 2020 
mindestens 20% betragen und bis 2050 auf 60% ansteigen. 
Der Anteil erneuerbarer Energie im Strombereich sollte global bis 2020 bei 30% und 
bis 2050 bei 80% liegen. 
3. Finanzierung von Mitigation (Senkung der Treibhausgasemissionen), Adaption 
(Anpassung) und Kompensation (Entschädigung für Klimaschäden) 
Die Europäische Union verpflichtet sich zu einem europäischen Beitrag zur 
Finanzierung von Klimaschutzmaßnahmen, Anpassung und Entschädigung für 
Schäden durch den Klimawandel in den Entwicklungsländern von mindestens 5-7 
Mrd. Euro pro Jahr für die erste Periode bis 2013, dem Jahr des Inkrafttretens eines 
Nachfolgeregimes für das Kyoto Protokoll. 
Dieser EU-Beitrag zur weltweiten Finanzierung wird kontinuierlich bis auf 35 Mrd. 
Euro pro Jahr im Jahr 2020 ansteigen und Teil einer internationalen Finanzierung durch die 
Industrienationen von Anpassungs- und Klimaschutzmaßnahmen in den 
Entwicklungsländern von 120 Mrd. Euro bis 2020 sein. 
Die Bereitstellung der Finanzierung durch die Industrienationen wird von diesen 
garantiert, ist neu und zusätzlich zu bestehenden Entwicklungshilfegeldern (ODAs) 
und ist unabhängig von jährlichen Budgetprozessen der EU-Mitgliedsstaaten. 
4. Klimaschutz zu Hause („domestic action“) und Umgang mit „heißer Luft“ 
Die EU verlangt weltweit ein Auslaufen von CDM und JI mit dem Ende des Kyoto- 
Protokolls. Nach 2012 werden Grüne Projekte und Politiken in den 
Entwicklungsländern aus dem Topf für Anpassung und Klimaschutz finanziert 
werden, ohne dass weiterhin ein Transfer von CO2-Rechten von den 
Entwicklungsländern zu den Industrieländern möglich ist. 
Die Europäische Union tritt für eine Streichung von übrig gebliebenen, nicht 
konsumierten staatlichen Verschmutzungsrechten (Assigned Amount Units) ein. 
Diese „heiße Luft“, die v.a. nach dem wirtschaftlichen Zusammenbruch der 
ehemaligen Ostblockländer entstanden ist, soll in den Reduktionsperioden ab 2013 
nicht mehr zur Verfügung stehen. 
5. Nein zu Atom und anderen Risikotechnologien 
Sollte der CDM weiter bestehen, fordert die EU, dass der Ausschluss der Atomkraft 
und fossilem CCS („carbon capture & storage“) eingehalten wird. 
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Appendix 7: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 14: Descriptive statistics for resolutions showing number of observations, mean, 
standard deviations, minimum and maximum values.  
 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Resolutions 3,866 0.4855 1.117 0 12 
Sentiment 983 -0.115 1.339 -2 2 
Ratio 727 1.560 14.026 0 375 
Government 5,410 0.267 0.442 0 1 
Formal Rights 5,614 1.443 0.501 0.833 2.166 
Presidency 5,747 0.123 0.328 0 1 
Public 
Euroscepticism 
5,243 -0.318 0.161 -0.62 0.11 
Issue 
Entrepreneurship 
5,177 -0.475 3.751 -8.331 12.768 
Party Position 5,177 5.281 1.502 1.75 7 
Internal Dissent 5,177 3.129 1.474 .77 8.91 
Left-Right 
Position 
5,155 3.888 2.635 0.055 9.67 
Seat Share 5,166 0.188 0.182 0 0.616 
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Appendix 8: Robustness Checks Resolutions 
 
 A first robustness checks operationalizes the concept of issue entrepreneurs in a 
binary rather than continuous way (Table 15). For this analysis, as issue 
entrepreneurship score (based on CHES) of 2 was used as a cut-off point to group 
parties into issue entrepreneurs and non-issue entrepreneurs. The coefficient for the 
issue entrepreneurship dummy is again significant and in the expected direction. The 
results of the analysis thus seem to be robust for a number of different 
operationalization, highlighting the validity of the findings of this paper. 
 As described above, data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) were used 
to operationalise the issue entrepreneurship score, following Hobolt and De Vries 
(2015, p. 285). A potential criticism of this operationalisation is that there might be an 
endogeneity problem because the observations of the experts might be influenced by the 
activity of national parliaments and parties in the first place. To control for this, the 
analysis was also run using the EU position data (negative mentions subtracted from 
positive mentions of the EU, per110-per108) from the Comparative Manifestos Project 
(CMP, 2015). Given that in contrast to the CHES survey, the CMP is based on an 
analysis of party manifestos, endogeneity is not likely to be a problem. The analysis 
with the alternative measure yielded very similar results to the analysis discussed above 
and are displayed below in Table 16. The coefficient for the CMP EU position is 
significant for all models except for the overall valence, the valence of unsuccessful 
resolutions and the ratio. In contrast to the issue entrepreneurship score, the CMP EU 
position is constructed in such a way that more positive mentions of the EU in party 
manifestos lead to a higher score. Thus, the coefficient is negative where the issue 
entrepreneurship score was expected to be positive, and vice versa.  
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 As a further robustness check, the models were run with dummies for party 
families instead of a position score as a continuous variable (Table 17). This measure 
makes it possible to assess whether indeed particular types of parties are responsible for 
an increase in resolutions. It becomes obvious that nationalist parties generally initiate 
more and more critical resolutions. However, Green and Liberal parties also issue 
significantly more resolutions than the baseline category (Social Democratic Parties). 
The resolutions of Nationalist parties are also generally more critical, as are resolutions 
of extreme left parties 
 A final group of model estimates the results for random intercepts at the level 
party groups and countries (Table 18).  
.  
  
 
 
1
5
2
 
 
         Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model 7 
Issue Entrepreneur > 1 (Dummy) 0.743*** -0.327 0.911*** -0.657*** -0.404** -0.293*** -0.100 
 (0.203) (0.680) (0.222) (0.119) (0.200) (0.086) (0.078) 
Internal Dissent 0.068 -0.105 0.038 -0.102*** 0.005 -0.076** 0.009 
 (0.068) (0.143) (0.082) (0.038) (0.056) (0.034) (0.024) 
Left / Right Position -0.033* 0.026 -0.030 -0.013 0.018 -0.012 -0.044*** 
 (0.018) (0.041) (0.020) (0.020) (0.036) (0.013) (0.014) 
Formal Powers 0.352 0.574 0.173 0.247* 1.878*** 0.255 0.094 
 (0.333) (0.429) (0.379) (0.140) (0.330) (0.160) 0.090 
Government -0.320*** 1.102*** -1.402*** 1.357*** 0.077 0.565*** 0.009 
 (0.094) (0.185) (0.122) (0.136) (0.217) (0.131) (0.112) 
Presidency 0.097 -0.327 0.209 -0.191 0.901* -0.039 0.142 
 (0.144) (0.262) (0.164) (0.161) (0.460) (0.110) (0.094) 
Euroscepticism -2.647*** -1.763 -1.712* 0.317 0.174 0.181 0.143 
 (0.774) (1.445) (0.915) (0.284) (0.554) (0.272) (0.227) 
Euroscepticism x Issue Ent> 1  3.987*** 0.721 4.295***     
 (0.678) (2.109) (0.734)     
Euroscepticsm x Internal Dissent 0.290 0.415 -0.188     
 (0.189) (0.356) (0.227)     
Seat share  -0.780** 2.290** -0.707* 0.249 0.315 0.206 0.028 
 (0.356) (0.930) (0.427) (0.376) (0.512) (0.330) (0.182) 
Constant -4.186*** -8.643*** -3.886*** 0.042 -1.645 -0.453 0.370 
 (0.702) (1.116) (0.806) (0.572) (1.014) (0.451) (0.366) 
Variance (Country) 3.603 9.97e-34 39.626 3.50e-19 0.125 7.98e-19   5.86e-18 
 (3.712)   (1.17e-18) (41.529)  . (0.147) (2.08e-17) (1.45e-16) 
        
Table 15 Robustness 
check for the analysis 
of resolutions using 
issue entrepreneur 
score >1 as dummy.  
Model 1: All 
resolutions (count), 
Model 2: successful 
resolutions (count), 
Model 3: Unsuccessful 
resolutions (count), 
Model 4: All 
resolutions (valence), 
Model 5 successful 
resolutions (valence), 
Model 6 unsuccessful 
resolutions (valence), 
Model 7: Ratio 
unsuccessful 
resolution 
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5
3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
Variance (Party Group) 3.876 1.067878 2.336 0.003 4.02e-16 1.88e-19   0.008 
 (2.080) (0.450)  (2.106) (0.010) (5.50e-
15)   
(2.06e-18)  (0.009) 
Variance (Residual)    0.643   0.255 0.250 0.526 
    (0.078) (0.032) (0.021) (0.025) 
Variance explained    47% 59% 61% 30% 
Inter-class correlation (country)    0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 
Inter –class correlation (party family)    0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01 
AIC 5940.626 3104.425 3933.054 1039.409 234.2344 386.5718 1953.253 
BIC 6038.151 3195.854 4030.578 1091.994 274.5937 435.7032 2020.06 
Observations 3,244 3,244 3,244 422 132 247 873 
Parties  25 26 25 20 15 15 15 
Countries  5 5 5 5 5 4 4 
  
 
 
1
5
4
 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Mode 7 
CMPEU -0.175*** 
 
-0.0919 -0.217*** 0.00271 0.0748** 0.0152 -0.037 
 (0.0600) (0.101) (0.0777) (0.0364) (0.0363) (0.0317) (0.018) 
Internal Dissent 0.174 0.0117 0.249* -0.171*** 0.0541 -0.00826 -0.014 
 (0.112) (0.182) (0.147) (0.0588) (0.0767) (0.0497) (0.027) 
Left/Right CMP 0.0129*** 0.0211** 0.0150*** 0.000384 -0.00347 0.00273 0.000 
 (0.00331) (0.0103) (0.00393) (0.00516) (0.00729) (0.00231) (0.001) 
Formal Rights -1.838* 0.0677 0.193 0.212 1.717*** 0.0441 0.196 
 (1.087) (0.602) (1.529) (0.268) (0.334) (0.341) (0.136) 
Government -0.443*** 0.895*** -1.441*** 1.350*** 0.682** 0.0253 0.191 
 (0.118) (0.193) (0.162) (0.185) (0.278) (0.159) (0.136) 
Presidency 0.0944 -0.259 0.128 -0.228 1.172*** -0.0766 0.224 
 (0.149) (0.251) (0.184) (0.173) (0.429) (0.102) (0.099) 
Euroscepticism 0.893 -0.624 0.992 -0.239 -0.437 -0.312 0.022 
 (1.071) (1.804) (1.324) (0.461) (0.381) (0.466) (0.099) 
Curoscepticismprop X CMPEU -0.985*** -0.568* -0.993***     
 (0.205) (0.341) (0.262)     
Euroscepticismprop X Dissentparty 0.509* 0.717* 0.184     
 (0.266) (0.423) (0.343)     
Seatshare 0.0220 1.167 0.506 1.276** 0.960* -0.0690 0.086 
 (0.445) (1.021) (0.584) (0.601) (0.509) (0.353) (0.215) 
Constant 0.667 -8.598*** -3.444 -0.885 -1.495 -0.246 0.607 
 (2.165) (1.377) (3.092) (0.821) (1.107) (0.852) (0.375) 
        
Table 16: Robustness 
check for the analysis 
of resolutions using 
CMP scores.’ 
Model 1: Al 
resolutions (count), 
Model 2: successful 
resolutions (count), 
Model 3: Unsuccessful 
resolutions (count), 
Model 4: All 
resolutions (valence), 
Model 5 successful 
resolutions 
(valence),Model 6 
unsuccessful 
resolutions (valence), 
Model 7: Ratio 
unsuccessful 
resolutions 
 
  
 
 
1
5
5
 
Variance (Country) 15.074 5.18e-24 20.823 8.24e-17 8.18e-25 1.14e-24 6.96e-21   
 (12.850) (2.05e-11)   (28.353) (2.46e-15) . .  (1.84e-19) 
Variance (Party Group) 3.256 1.588 0.347 0.052 8.22e-26 6.20e-26 1.84e-21 
 (1.694) (0.729) (0.429) (0.077) (1.09e-24) (7.63e-22) (2.47e-20) 
Variance (Residual)    0.657 0.246 0.187 0.561 
    (0.071) (0.034) (0.021) (0.030) 
Variance explained    45% 61% 71% 25% 
Inter-class correlation (country)    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Inter –class correlation (party family)    0.07 0.00  0.00 0.00 
AIC 4218.421 2318.545 2673.092 724.167 175.448 196.77 1538.584 
BIC 4312.041 2406.314 2766.712 775.2033 209.8251 235.6456 1601.644 
Observations 2,569 2,569 2,569 283 104 147 668 
Parties 26 26 26 21 21 21 16 
Number of groups 5 5 5 5 4 2 4 
 
  
 
 
1
5
6
 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model 7  
Internal Dissent -0.0656* -0.269*** 0.0927** -0.183*** -0.120*** -0.145*** 0.025 
 (0.0357) (0.0628) (0.0440) (0.0306) (0.0352) (0.0259) (0.024) 
Left / Right Position -0.0150 0.0424 -0.0417 0.0521*** 0.0604** 0.0112 -0.110*** 
 (0.0226) (0.0424) (0.0264) (0.0196) (0.0278) (0.0157) (0.030) 
Formal Powers 0.866*** 0.473 0.439 -0.102 1.357*** -0.0344 0.105 
 (0.314) (0.464) (0.391) (0.251) (0.134) (0.112) (0.088) 
Government -0.391*** 1.100*** -1.509*** 1.851*** 0.00300 1.451*** -0.018 
 (0.0950) (0.185) (0.126) (0.0834) (0.113) (0.0808) (0.113) 
Presidency 0.0588 -0.343 0.156 -0.0106 0.121 -0.0276 0.150 
 (0.142) (0.261) (0.164) (0.117) (0.174) (0.106) (0.093) 
Euroscepticism -0.974** -0.685 -1.413*** 0.407 -0.299 0.156 -0.169 
 (0.421) (0.779) (0.523) (0.357) (0.276) (0.240) (0.257) 
Seat share 1.981*** 2.504** 1.035 0.491 -0.454 2.049*** -0.001 
 (0.706) (0.973) (1.030) (0.543) (0.455) (0.521) (0.182) 
ECO † 0.998*** 0.227 0.652** 0.184 -0.163 0.364** -0.121 
 (0.223) (0.711) (0.304) (0.424) (0.189) (0.148) (0.080) 
COM †  -0.236 -1.129 -0.317 -0.786** -1.429*** -0.489*** -0.273** 
 (0.274) (0.798) (0.348) (0.258) (0.621) (0.241) (0.111) 
LIB † 0.774*** -1.118 0.897*** -0.159 -0.332 0.040 0.122 
 (0.234) (0.832) (0.309) (0.392) (0.214) (0.158) (0.117) 
CHR † 0.0511 -0.994 0.427** -0.226 -0.321** 0.00650 0.336 
 (0.139) (0.759) (0.174) (0.433) (0.136) (0.103) (0.139) 
CON†  -1.328 -1.172* -0.141 -0.179 0.348* -1.334*** 0.211 
 (1.237) (0.650) (1.254) (0.384) (0.188) (0.310) (1.237)) 
NAT†  0.656*** -0.375 0.726*** -0.969** -0.699** -0.622*** 0.330 
 (0.224) (0.816) (0.271) (0.440) (0.273) (0.151) (0.222) 
Constant -5.769*** -7.877*** -5.181*** -0.202 0.588 -1.580*** -0.245*** 
 (0.732) (1.043) (0.901) (0.471) (0.601) (0.280) (0.406) 
Variance (Country) 0.052   6.13e-34 30.385  1.44e-21 4.19e-19 6.26e-19 1.61e-17   
 (0.819)   (1.52e-18)   (33.641) (2.98e-20 )  (9.20e-18) (1.64e-16 )  (3.36e-16) 
        
Table 17 Robustness 
check for the analysis of 
resolution using party 
families.  
Model 1: Al resolutions 
(count), Model 2: 
successful resolutions 
(count), Model 3: 
Unsuccessful resolutions 
(count), Model 4: All 
resolutions (valence), 
Model 5 successful 
resolutions 
(valence),Model 6 
unsuccessful resolutions 
(valence), Model 7: Ratio 
unsuccessful resolutions 
† Dummy for party family 
based on CMP. Omitted 
baseline category: Social 
Democratic Parties (SOC).  
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Variance (Party Group) 4.668 0.860 0 2.58 3.04e-23 1.08e-21 5.19e-20 8.27e-19 
 (2.410) (0.391) (2.268) (2.91e-22) (1.37e-20)   (1.22e-18) (9.74e-18) 
Variance (Residual)    0.629 0.244 0.244 0.522 
    (0.043) (0.030) (0.287) (0.025) 
Variance explained    48% 61% 61% 30% 
Inter-class correlation (country)    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Inter –class correlation (party family)    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AIC 5923.794 3107.972 3933.705 1093.209   293.3449 390.5692 1949.209 
BIC 6039.604 3217.688 4043.42 1170.728 349.9029 453.8109 2039.876 
Observations 3,244 3,244 3,244 422 132 247 873 
Parties 26 26 26 21 21 21 16 
Countries 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 
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 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model 7 
Issue Entrepreneur 0.0868*** -0.0197 0.102*** -0.0659*** -0.0186 -0.0251** -0.024* 
 (0.0200) (0.0709) (0.0222) (0.0165) (0.0390) (0.0113) (0.124) 
Internal Dissent 0.0735 -0.0585 0.0161 -0.0844* -0.0280 -0.00569 0.006 
 (0.0743) (0.152) (0.0904) (0.0432) (0.0657) (0.0397) (0.124)) 
Left/Right -0.0137 0.0432 -0.0106 -0.0176 0.0188 -0.0134 -0.040 
 (0.0171) (0.0386) (0.0192) (0.0198) (0.0333) (0.0134) (0.015) 
Formal Rights 0.464 0.497 0.109 0.232 2.099*** 0.249 0.100 
 (0.336) (0.469) (0.380) (0.161) (0.402) (0.200) (0.092) 
Government -0.356*** 1.165*** -1.433*** 1.358*** 0.0650 0.448*** 0.001 
 (0.0944) (0.186) (0.124) (0.141) (0.202) (0.140) (0.112) 
Presidency 0.0921 -0.221 0.199 -0.203 1.085** -0.0637 0.137 
 (0.142) (0.250) (0.165) (0.161) (0.429) (0.112) (0.094) 
Euroscepticism  -1.324* -1.690 -0.186 0.0322 0.234 0.0758 0.117 
 (0.767) (1.523) (0.886) (0.300) (0.644) (0.293) (0.231)) 
Euroscepticism x Issue Ent 0.516*** 0.374 0.605***     
  (0.0901) (0.267) (0.100)     
Euroscepticism x Internal Dissent 0.277 0.583 -0.261     
 (0.196) (0.365) (0.234)     
Seat Share -0.211 2.276*** -0.726* 0.599 0.458 0.274 0.256 
 (0.324) (0.737) (0.418) (0.392) (0.470) (0.334) (0.183) 
Constant -4.776*** -9.607*** -3.610*** -0.474 -2.241** -0.631 0.295 
 (0.683) (1.102) (0.793) (0.569) (0.974) (0.491) (0.358) 
Variance (Country) 1.592 0.00 37.85 1.72e-13 .1164236 5.41e-23   9.89e-19 
 (2.306) (0.00) (42.51) 3.47e-12 (0.157) (6.50e-22) (2.41e-17) 
Variance (Party Group) 3.308 0.926** 2.153 0.008 3.45e-17 5.41e-23 0.009 
 (2.065) (0.419) (2.187) 0.015 (4.73e-16) (6.50e-22) (0.104) 
Table 18: 
Robustness check 
for the analysis 
with random 
intercepts for 
party groups and 
countries. 
Model 1: Al 
resolutions 
(count), Model 2: 
successful 
resolutions 
(count), Model 3: 
Unsuccessful 
resolutions 
(count), Model 4: 
All resolutions 
(valence), Model 5 
successful 
resolutions 
(valence), Model 6 
unsuccessful 
resolutions 
(valence), Model 
7: Ratio 
unsuccessful 
resolutions 
. 
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Variance (Residual)    0.646 0.256 0.255 0.524 
    (0.046)   (0.033) (0.023) (0.056) 
Variance explained    47% 59% 61% 31% 
Inter-class correlation (country)    0.00 0.31 0.00 0.00 
Inter –class correlation (party 
family) 
   0.02 0.00 0.00 0.17 
AIC 5881.248   3052.536 3887.883   1035.951 234.3758 388.2056 1538.584 
BIC 5978.307 3143.529 3984.942 1092.448 274.735 437.2232 1601.644 
Observations 3,185 3,185 3,185 418 132 245 873 
Party families    17 13 12 15 
Countries 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 
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Paper 3: Parliamentary Scrutiny and the Fiscal Compact: Issue 
Entrepreneurs, Parliamentary Activity and Effectiveness 
 
 
Abstract  
 
The management of the Euro crisis in general and the recent Fiscal Compact as a 
response to it in particular provide a highly pertinent case to study parliamentary 
activity in EU related matters in a situation of high salience. This paper finds that the 
most active parties in debating the Fiscal Compact and framing it to the public were 
issue entrepreneurs - parties for which Europe is extremely salient and which are 
Eurosceptic. The presence of these parties and their interaction with mainstream parties 
shaped the way the Treaty was scrutinized in national parliaments. Mainstream 
opposition parties could have a significant influence when they were able to tie their 
agreement to the Treaty to ‘side payments’ on other issues. Moreover, rebel Members of 
Parliament (MPs) in mainstream government parties had some significant influence on 
the governments’ position. The paper thus shows that the presence of issue 
entrepreneurs and the patterns of their interaction with mainstream parties were the most 
important factors determining how active a parliament was in scrutinising the Fiscal 
Compact. Formal ratification powers and macroeconomic factors were of secondary 
importance. However, as the case of the issue entrepreneurs illustrates, effectiveness in 
the sense of policy influence is not usually the consequence of activity, nor is it 
necessarily its goal. These findings have implications beyond the role of national 
parliaments in ratifying international treaties for the evaluation of the parliamentary 
activity of EU affairs in general.  
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Introduction 
 
 The recent Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic 
and Monetary Union (TSCG), commonly referred to as the Fiscal Compact, has 
received significant attention in the media and in academic circles as an important 
reaction to the Eurocrisis. The scrutiny of the Fiscal Compact in and impact on national 
parliaments has been particularly important in this context. The Treaty presents itself as 
a pertinent case study to analyse the activity of national parliaments in scrutinising 
‘history making decisions (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999), but also teaches important 
lessons on how parliamentary scrutiny works in general in contexts of high salience and 
politicization. This paper thus aims to analyse in detail the factors which determined 
how the parliaments of Austria, Germany, Ireland and the United Kingdom scrutinised 
the Fiscal Compact.    
 The findings of this paper suggest that issue entrepreneurs are the drivers of 
activity in parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs. Issue entrepreneurs frequently 
contribute to debates in the plenary, initiate many resolutions in committees and often 
resort to extra-parliamentary means of protest. These strategies are generally the same 
for all issue entrepreneurs, but left-wing parties focus more on the economic 
consequences of the Fiscal Compact while right-wing parties concentrate on questions 
of sovereignty. Issue entrepreneurs from both sides of the political spectrum use their 
criticism to appeal to different audiences. The presence of issue entrepreneurs strongly 
influences the extent and pattern of scrutiny activity of mainstream parties. Parliament 
as a whole thus becomes more active, especially with regard to the communication 
function. In terms of effectiveness of parliamentary involvement, the presence of issue 
entrepreneurs can be detrimental. The scrutiny process can become strongly politicized 
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and driven along ideological lines. A consequence of this is that there is an ‘overload’ 
of scrutiny capacity and a focus on broad questions relating to the legitimacy of the 
European Union instead of practical points which could actually be influenced by 
parliament.  
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: First, the relevant  literature 
on the role of national parliaments in treat changes and the theoretical framework 
including the definition of issue entrepreneurs for this paper are presented. Third, the 
methodology and case selection are elaborated on. The fourth section contains the main 
part of the analysis. The last section provides a discussion of the findings. 
 
 
Theoretical Framework: The Driving Force of Issue Entrepreneurs  
 
 ‘Issue entrepreneurs’ are defined as parties which see the EU critical and for 
which European integration is salient (Hobolt and De Vries, 2015, p. 3). Moreover, they 
must have a position on European integration which differentiates them from the other 
parties represented  in the respective national parliament. In other words, they adopt a 
larger ‘framing distance’, i.e. their framing of the issue of European integration differs 
more from mainstream parties than the mainstream parties differ among each other (Van 
der Wardt, 2015, p. 841). The definition of issue entrepreneurs thus includes decidedly 
Eurosceptic parties, such as the Freedom Party (FPO) in Austria, but also parties such as 
Die Linke which diverges in its position on the EU from all other parties in Germany in 
the time period studied, but would not necessarily be classified as Eurosceptic in other 
partisan contexts. Whether a party can be classified as an issue entrepreneur thus always 
depends on its position vis-à-vis other parties in the party system at hand at a given 
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point in time. There are thus differences in the extent of Euroscepticism of the issue 
entrepreneurs: it can be strong or ‘hard’ (for example in the case of the FPO) or rather 
moderate and ‘soft’ (for example in the case of Die Linke) (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 
2002, p. 7). Moreover, the presence of an issue entrepreneur in the political system, 
even though not represented in the national parliament, can have a substantive impact 
on how European issues are debated and scrutinised by mainstream parties. The United 
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the United Kingdom is a case in point here. 
Issue entrepreneurs can be positioned on opposite sides of the political spectrum. 
Usually they can be considered as extreme right wing parties, such as FPO and the 
Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZO), or as ‘hard left’ parties such as Die Linke in 
Germany. The different issue entrepreneurs studied here are summarized in Table 17.  
 
Table 19: Types of issue entrepreneurs.  
Party Country Position Euroscepticis
m 
Status Ever in 
Gov 
BZO Austria Right soft opposition Yes 
FPO Austria Right hard opposition Yes 
Die Linke German
y 
Left soft opposition At 
subnationa
l level 
Sinn Fein Ireland Left/Nationalis
m 
hard opposition No* 
Irish 
Independent
s 
Ireland Left(/Right) various opposition No 
UKIP UK Right hard Not in 
parliamen
t 
No 
* Republic of Ireland 
 
The strategies issue entrepreneurs employ can be classified according to 
different parliamentary venues. In the plenary, they are likely to frequently engage in 
debates on European issues and use these debates to fundamentally criticize the 
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government’s position towards the EU or the EU membership of the country as such. In 
committees, they frequently initiate resolutions on EU related issues criticizing the 
position of the government. Moreover, issue entrepreneurs sometimes use extra-
parliamentary venues to attack the EU position of the government, for example by 
legally challenging the legitimacy of EU-related policies. Given that issue entrepreneurs 
are by definition very rarely members of government coalitions and engage in 
‘fundamental opposition’, their activity is mostly aimed at communicating their position 
to their Eurosceptic electorate. Even though issue entrepreneurs differ in their 
opposition to Europe, what is relevant for their role in driving parliamentary activity is 
their position on the EU vis-à-vis the other parties represented in the respective national 
parliament. Substantively, the criticism of issue entrepreneurs depends on their political 
stance: right-wing parties criticize the loss of sovereignty whereas left-wing parties 
focus on the economic consequences of the Treaty and on the lack of involvement of 
European institutions.  
The different types of issue entrepreneurs nevertheless use the same strategies 
(see Table 18). By being active communicators, they try to establish ownership of an 
issue, in this case EU affairs (Dahlberg and Martinsson, 2015, p. 826). Being perceived 
as ‘owning’ an issue has positive effects for challenger parties, since they become 
featured more often in the media and are thus more visible to the electorate (Van der 
Brug and Berghout, 2015, p. 882). Issue entrepreneurs appeal to their Eurosceptic voters 
in debates and criticize the government on fundamental issues relating to EU affairs 
which are not necessarily related to the actual topic discussed. In committees, they are 
likely to initiate a large number of resolutions, which are routinely rejected by the other 
parties. Strong activity of issue entrepreneurs or ideological polarization in committees 
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is thus likely to increase activity, but might actually diminish effectiveness by clogging 
up the committee and by focusing on ideological debates instead of technical issues on 
which parliament could actually have an impact. 
 The Fiscal Compact has proven to be a very divisive issue for parties throughout 
Europe. Internal dissent is understood here as a situation when an MP or a group of MPs 
makes speeches, issue statements or votes against the official position of the party 
leadership. The criticism can be nuanced or fundamental. According to the competing 
principals theory (CPT) internal dissent arises when MPs are faced with diverging 
preferences of their two principals, the voters and the party leadership (Carey, 2007). 
Being perceived as divided can have very detrimental effects and can even lead to party 
death, so the party leadership will try to avoid dissent from becoming apparent (Kam, 
2009). Steenbergen and Scott find in an analysis based on expert surveys that Europe is 
salient for parties with low divisions, less salient for those with a medium level of 
internal division on the issue and very salient for highly divided parties (2004, p. 186). 
Spoon confirmed these findings in an analysis of party manifestos (2012, p. 10). A 
similar pattern could also be expected for the treatment of the Fiscal Compact. 
Parties tend to adopt issue entrepreneurial strategies if they are coherent on the 
issue in question (Hobolt and De Vries, 2015, p. 19). If mainstream parties are divided, 
we can expect them to refrain from public activities which might make these divisions 
apparent. The party leadership might thus try to prevent ‘rebel’ MPs from speaking in 
the plenary. However, if a substantial faction of the government majority revolts, the 
threat of defection can be seen as a highly effective means of influence for backbench 
MPs. Issue entrepreneurs, on the other hand, can be expected to instrumentalise these 
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divisions in other parties by relying on Europe as a ‘wedge issue’ (Van de Wardt, De 
Vries and Hobolt, 2014, p. 997).   
The behaviour of mainstream parties themselves is very important in 
determining the potential success of new challenger parties or issue entrepreneurs 
(Meguid, 2008, p. 30). Specifically, the behaviour of the spatially non-neighbouring 
party (for example the Labour Party in the case of UKIP or the Christian Democratic 
Union/Christian Social Union [CDU/CSU] case of Die Linke in Germany) is of crucial 
importance (p. 32). Meguid finds that a niche party has most chances of success when 
(in a spatial model with three parties) one mainstream party is dismissive of the claims 
of the challenger party and the other adversarial (p. 33). Parties which are closely 
associated with a particular issue benefit from that issue being topical at a particular 
moment according to saliency-based theory (Budge, 2015, p. 767). Mainstream parties 
might thus try to use an issue which was championed by issue entrepreneurs to cover it 
themselves in the form of issue convergence as a reaction to the activity of issue 
entrepreneurs (Walgrave, Tresch and Lefevre, 2015, p. 779). It will be more difficult for 
issue entrepreneurs to establish ownership of an issue if mainstream parties also 
compete on it (Dahlberg and Martinsson, 2015, p. 829).  
Mainstream opposition parties are often as divided on Europe as government 
parties. Therefore, they might also refrain from active scrutiny in this situation. 
However, when the agreement of (mainstream) opposition parties is necessary for the 
adoption of a legal act due to supermajority requirements, mainstream opposition 
parties can have considerable influence on some aspects of the governments’ position or 
might negotiate favours in other areas (Puntscher Riekmann and Wydra, 2013, p. 656). 
These ‘side payments’ for the opposition are common in negotiating international 
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agreements and can in some cases improve the overall bargaining outcome (Rector, 
2011). They can also be used to secure agreement from smaller coalition partners 
(Lindvall, 2010).  
In contrast to issue entrepreneurs, mainstream parties are generally part of a pro-
European consensus (Puntscher Riekmann and Wydra, 2013, p. 579). Since the ability 
of parties to rapidly switch their position on issues is constrained by both internal 
factors and the voter’s reactions, mainstream opposition parties cannot attack the 
government and become active in the same way as issue entrepreneurs do (Budge, 2015, 
p. 772). Moreover, in proportional representation (PR) systems, they might anticipate to 
become (again) part of a coalition in the future so they might not want to increase their 
framing distance too much from the coalition partner by being too active on a 
controversial topic (Van de Wardt, 2015, p. 862). 
 
Table 20: Strategies employed by the different actors in the scrutiny process.  
Type of Party Scrutiny Activity Effectiveness Mechanism 
Issue entrepreneurs High  Low  try to 
influence public 
opinion (sometimes 
modify message 
depending  on 
audience) 
 try to appeal to 
MPs at the fringes of 
mainstream parties to 
defect 
Debates, 
resolutions, 
extra-
parliamentary 
means 
Mainstream 
opposition 
Low (nuanced 
position, generally 
supportive of 
government) 
Moderate  high 
when government 
needs support in 
domestic 
implementation 
Side-payments 
in domestic 
implementation, 
second chambers 
Government 
majority 
Low, strong when 
dissent is very high 
High  indirect 
anticipation of 
preferences 
Indirect 
pressure, dissent 
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Method and Case Selection 
 
 Methodologically, this paper relies foremost on document analysis 
(parliamentary debates and reports as well as newspaper articles). In addition, to 
contextualise the findings,fourteen semi-structured interviews which were conducted 
between May and July 2014. The interviews were carried out in person, over the phone 
or via email questionnaires. Since the purpose of this paper is to uncover the exact 
mechanism which issue entrepreneurs use to influence parliamentary scrutiny of the 
Fiscal Compact and how mainstream parties react to their activity, an in-depth 
qualitative approach was the most promising research strategy. Each interview lasted 
about forty-five minutes. Most interviews were conducted via the telephone. A 
complete list of interviews can be found in Appendix 9. 
 The interviewees were selected in order to provide a good spreac between the 
different types of parties (issue entrepreneurs as well as mainstream opposition and 
government parties). Moreover, two members of upper chambers (the House of Lords 
and the Irish Seaned) were interviewed. While the focus of the thesis is generally on the 
activity of lower chambers, members of upper chambers are in a unique position as  
knowledgeable yet somewhat removed observers of the scrutiny process. Moreover, 
some second chambers, such as the House of Lords and the German Bundesrat played  
an active role in the treatment of the TSCG. However, the relatively small number of 
inetrviews and their uneven distribution accorss countries and parties clearly limits the 
extent from to which genealrisations can be drawn from the interviews alone. Their 
purpose was thus overall to cross-check finigs from the document and newspaper 
analysis and to gain additional contextual information.  
  
169 
 
Four countries were selected for analysis in the case study: Austria, Germany, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom. These four countries were chosen because of their 
variation on a number of important institutional variables, different party systems and in 
particular a different manifestation of issue entrepreneurs While Germany and to a 
lesser extent Austria can be described as ‘creditor’ countries, Ireland was strongly effect 
by the Euro crisis and was in need of a bailout. Some authors found that countries in 
receipt of financial aid from the Troika seemed to be generally very active when 
scrutinising crisis related legal acts (Auel and Hoeing, 2014, p. 13). The UK, by 
contrast, is a non-Eurozone member and has thus an ‘outsider’s view’ on the Fiscal 
Compact, but is still indirectly affected by it. This additional variation will make it 
possible to analyse different forms of parliamentary activity with regard to the TSCG. 
Ireland is the only country in which a referendum was required for the ratification of the 
Treaty. 
Moreover, Ireland is the only country in which a referendum was required for 
the ratification of the Treaty. This was required by a decision of the Attorney General 
that the Fiscal Compact implied significant changes which were covered under the 
conditions formulated in the “Crotty’ judgement of the Irish Supreme Court in 1987 
(Sunday Business Post, 18 December 2011). The judgement stated that a referendum 
was required when a treaty changed ‘altere[d] the essential scope or objectives of the 
[European] communities (ibid.). Therefore, a situation can be analysed in which 
parliament is not the only ratifying institution, which adds another  relevant dimension 
to the analysis and had a strog impact on the behaviour of issue entrereneurs and thus on 
the activity of parliaments as a whole, as explained below.  
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The Fiscal Compact Treaty was signed on 2 March 2012 by 25 EU governments 
(the EU 27 states excluding the UK and the Czech Republic) and entered into force on 1 
January 2013. The Treaty was in many ways a reaction to the sovereign debt crisis of 
many Eurozone member states. Its main aims are ‘to foster budgetary discipline, to 
strengthen the coordination of economic policies and to improve the governance of the 
Euro area’ (Besselink and Reestman, 2012, p. 1). The TSCG remains outside of the EU 
treaty framework (Ioannou, Leblond and Niemann, 2015, p. 161). However, it is 
envisaged to be incorporated into the framework by 2018 (European Commission, 
2012). Treaty changes at the European level are often dominated by the ‘core 
executives’ (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999, p. 14). The decision-making process was 
characterised by a rather weak role of supranational institutions and followed rather an 
intergovernmental logic, as stated by Chang (2013). The Treaty is thus a least likely 
case  or ‘crucial  case’ (Ecksetein, 1975) for active parliamentary involevement. 
According to Gerring ‘[T]he crucial case is a most difficult test for an argument and 
hence provides what is, arguably, the strongest sort of evidence possible in a 
nonexperimental, single-case setting’ (Gerring, 2007, p.232).  
The TSCG is especially suitable for the purpose of this paper because it contains 
provisions, which are of immediate relevance for national parliaments (Besselink and 
Reestman, 2012, p. 5). The Fiscal Compact has thus potentially a very strong impact on 
each country signing it, in effect limiting the leeway of economic policy in the future. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that the national parliaments will have scrutinised the 
Treaty thoroughly, making it a suitable case of high parliamentary 
involvement/salience. It has to be acknowledged that the Fiscal Compact as an 
international treaty represents a special case of parliamentary scrutiny and not all 
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patterns of activity can be transferred to more day-to-day forms of scrutiny. However, 
crisis related measurers clearly dominated the ‘European’ work of MPs in the last six 
years. In general, all parliaments can be expected to be more active in the case of the 
Fiscal Compact or the Euro-crisis in general compared to the scrutiny of regular legal 
acts. However, interviews showed that the same mechanisms and strategies described in 
this paper for the TSCG are also at work in the scrutiny of regular legal act. 
 
 
Activities of National Parliaments in Scrutinising the Fiscal Compact 
 
The Role of Issue Entrepreneurs and their Communication Strategies  
 
The main argument of this paper is that issue entrepreneurs were stimulating 
parliamentary activity by enticing mainstream parties to become active in the scrutiny of 
the Fiscal Compact. In the following, it is explained which strategies issue 
entrepreneurs used to generate public attention and to influence the position of 
mainstream parties. Issue entrepreneurs were clearly very active in all four countries. 
They engaged actively in debates and initiated a large number of resolutions on the 
fiscal compact. Only issue entrepreneurs clearly and coherently opposed the Fiscal 
Compact on a general level (Interview 6B). In so doing, they received a lot of media 
attention.  
This became especially obvious in the Irish Case with Sinn Fein, which received 
a strongly disproportionate amount of air time compared to its seat share (The Journal, 
26 February 2012). Sinn Féin was also most skilful in exploiting exploiting the fact that 
a referendum on the issue was held. The party tried to take ownership of the issue and 
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portrayed itself as the driving force behind it. Arguably, the referendum thus reinforced 
the position of issue-entrepreneurs in driving parliamentary activity in the form of 
debates. In the eyes of government and mainstream opposition MPs, the work of Sinn 
Fein consisted mostly of ‘making noise’, and their work in the committee was not 
necessarily of technical value (Interview 1C). A media report described the actions of 
Sinn Fein as ‘parliamentary pyrotechnics’ (Sunday Independent, 4 March 2012). 
Nevertheless, Eurosceptic and anti-austerity parties were able to draw a lot of public and 
media attention from the discussion of the fiscal compact in Ireland (ibid.). Sinn Fein 
Leader Gary Adams suggested a public debate between him and the Taoiseach on the 
issue of the referendum, which was however rejected (Irish Daily Mail, 30 May 2012).  
The Irish case thus again highlights a recurring theme: issue entrepreneurs do 
strongly increase parliamentary activity in EU affairs, but often fail to contribute to 
parliamentary impact – or are indeed even detrimental to the latter – even more so when 
additional salience is lent to an issue in a referrndum. There main aim seems to be to get 
public attention, media resonance and to signal to their voters. Sinn Fein seems to have 
been successful with this strategy, as its perceived leadership of the ‘No’ campaign. 
This finding is in line with arguments in the literature that owning an issue increases the 
public visibility of niche parties (Van der Brug and Berghout, 2015, p. 882). However, 
Ireland is the only country covered in this study in which a refrednum on the Fiscal 
Compact was held. In contrast to Sinn Fein and smaller Irish left-wing parties in 
Ireland, issue entrepreneurs in other countries could not benefit from such an event 
which drew additional attention of the public. Therefore, they had to focus more on 
parliamentary debates or extra-parliamentary forms of engagement such as court cases 
of public demonstrations.  
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Issue entrepreneurs can also drive activity if they are not represented in 
parliament, as in the case of UKIP until 2014
7
, which dominated the discourse in the 
media and significantly influenced the strategy of the Conservatives and to a lesser 
extent of the other mainstream parties. A Labour MP acknowledged that UKIP was 
‘dominating the debate on Europe’ in the last Parliament (Interview 1D). A Eurosceptic 
Conservative MP also agreed that ‘UKIP (…) leads the debate’ (Interview 2D). 
Therefore, even though UKIP was not represented in the House of Commons, its 
presence in the political system and in the media put it in the position of an ‘extra-
parliamentary issue entrepreneur’, which had considerable impact on how the issue of 
Europe was treated by the other parties represented in parliament, and especially by the 
Conservative Party.  
In contrast to mainstream parties, issue entrepreneurs concentrated a significant 
part of their effort on extra-parliamentary forms of activity. Public demonstration 
against the Treaty were organised by BZO, FPO and Die Linke to build up pressure on 
the government (Der Standard, 27 June 2012; TAZ, 28 June 2012). These parties also 
challenged the TSCG in the Constitutional Courts of their respective countries (Der 
Standard, 8 March 2013; Der Spiegel, 29 June 2012). Their activities set issue 
entrepreneurs apart from mainstream opposition parties in that they complement their 
parliamentary activity with other forms of activism. 
Most interestingly, issue entrepreneurs relied on the Fiscal Compact as a ‘wedge 
issue’ to divide mainstream parties. The aim was to make agreement to the Treaty more 
costly for mainstream opposition parties, as a party worker for Die Linke acknowledged 
(Interview 6B). The strategy became most obvious in the case of the United Kingdom, 
                                                     
7
 In October 2014 Conservative MP Douglas Carswell defect to UKIP and subsequently stepped down to 
trigger a by-election. He was subsequently elected for his constituency of Claction as a UKIP MP.  
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where both government and opposition MPs acknowledged the issue ownership of 
UKIP for this topic and the difficulties this posed with regard to dissenters in their own 
ranks (Interviews 1D, 2D, 3D).  
While the different type of issue entrepreneurs all showed similar patterns of 
activity, there were marked difference with regard to their substantive focus. Left-wing 
issue entrepreneurs, such as Die Linke or various small left-wing parties in Ireland 
focused on the economic impact of the Treaty with regard to strict deficit rules and debt 
reduction (Interview 6B). By contrast, right-wing issue entrepreneurs such as BZO, 
FPO and UKIP focused especially of constitutional questions of sovereignty. In the 
words of an FPO MP, the Treaty represented a ‘coup against the constitution’ 
(Nationalrat 164. Sitzung, p. 137). A distinctive position was occupied by Sinn Fein in 
Ireland, which focused on both economic and constitutional criticisms (Dáil Debate 29 
February 2012, p. 406).  
It thus becomes clear that issue entrepreneurs mostly relied on controversial and 
active engagement in plenary debates, extra-parliamentary forms of influence such as 
legal action and demonstrations as well as an active use of parliamentary instruments 
such as resolutions or questions. A particular approach of issue entrepreneurs was to 
have a dual communication strategy to appeal to the general public on the one hand 
regarding concerns of parliamentary sovereignty and to their particular extreme left- or 
right-wing constituents over questions of economic justice and the threat of a loss of 
national sovereignty on the other. In so doing, they also tried to foster divisions in the 
spatially neighbouring mainstream parties by appealing to voters and MPs on the 
fringes of the mainstream parties by using Europe a ‘wedge issue’ (Van de Wardt, De 
Vries and Hobolt, 2014, p. 997).  
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The Reaction of Government Parties to the Activity of Issue Entrepreneurs  
 
 How then did the government parties react to the activity of issue entrepreneurs 
and their attempts to use the Fiscal Compact as a ‘wedge issue’? As Meguid has found, 
the success of niche parties which occupy new issue dimension depends crucially on the 
behaviour of the mainstream parties themselves in reaction to the new entrant (2008, p. 
30). Mainstream parties have three different strategies at their disposal: dismissive, 
accommodative and adversarial (ibid.). When using a dismissive strategy, mainstream 
government parties can be expected to be least active since this strategy entails ‘non-
action’ towards the activity of the issue entrepreneurs (p. 28). The overall activity of 
parliament can also be expected to decrease since the salience of the issue is likely to 
diminish while the issue entrepreneur maintains ownership of the issue (p. 30).  
Elements of this strategy could be observed in a number of cases covered in this 
paper. In Austria, the government parties justified the Fiscal Compact in rather 
defensive and functional terms against the attacks of issue entrepreneurs. The Fiscal 
Compact was framed by the governing parties SPO and OVP as a necessity to prevent 
future debt-related problems in Europe (Nationalrat 146. Sitzung, p. 146). In Ireland, the 
Taoiseach was accused by his own backbenchers of defending the fiscal compact and 
the ‘Yes’ vote in the referendum not forcefully enough (Irish Daily Mail, 7 May 2012). 
The Fiscal Compact was thus not actively explained, but rather ‘defended’ in the light 
of current economic necessities against the attacks of the issue entrepreneurs. 
 Another strategy employed by mainstream parties is the ‘accommodative’ 
approach. When using this strategy, mainstream parties emulate the niche party’s’ 
position (Meguid, 2008, p. 28). The aim then is to take over voters from the niche party 
and according to Meguid, when voters will indeed desert the niche party for a 
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mainstream party with a similar policy stance – issue ownership will transfer to the 
mainstream party (p. 28). This strategy will lead to an increase of issue salience and 
thus to overall more parliamentary activity (p. 30). 
An accommodative position was chosen by the Conservative Party in the United 
Kingdom. An Eurosceptic MP stated in an interview that the he saw the use of EU 
institutions in the context of the Fiscal Compact a typical example of the European 
Union’s frequent breaches of legal principles (Interview 2D). The same MP also 
advocates electoral pacts between UKIP and the Conservative party (ibid.). The 
Conservative Party thus tried deal with the threat of UKIP by taking a similarly 
Eurosceptic stance on the Fiscal Compact – a successful ‘accommodating’ strategy 
according to Meguid (2008, p. 30). The activity of the Conservative backbenchers was 
thus an attempt to re-establish ownership of the issue from UKIP and thus a reaction to 
the latter party’s activity (Dahlberg and Martinsson, 2015, p. 829). Government parties 
were thus not actively driving the parliamentary treatment of the Fiscal Compact, but 
reacting to issue entrepreneurs. However, as mainstream parties join the issue 
entrepreneurs in talking about an issue, both its salience and parliamentary activity in 
the matter increase (Meguid, 2008, p. 30). 
 The final option for mainstream is to adopt an adversarial strategy in which the 
mainstream party explicitly ‘declares its hostility to towards the niche party’s policy 
stance’ (Meguid, 2008, p. 29). This strategy is supposed to strengthen the niche parties’ 
ownership of the issue (p. 30). Since the mainstream party actively engages in the 
debate on the issue, its salience is set to rise (ibid.). We can thus also expect an increase 
in overall parliamentary activity. An adversarial strategy was chosen by the German 
government consisting of CSU/CSU and the Free Democrats (FDP). The government 
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defended the Fiscal Compact and described it as an indispensable means to prevent 
future crises in Europe. Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble stated that the Fiscal 
Compact showed a ‘fundamental change in mentality in Europe’ with regard to fiscal 
discipline and underlined its interconnectedness with the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) (Bundestag, 172. Sitzung, p. 20211). In the UK, the junior coalition partner, the 
Liberal Democrats, followed an adversial strategy. Some Liberal Democrat MPs saw 
themselves clearly as a counterforce to the Eurosceptic MPs in the European Affairs 
Committee and therefore attended the Committee meetings regularly. One Liberal 
Democrat MP stated: ‘I want to be there to put on a fight when needed’ (Interview 3D). 
In the UK, cooperation in the Committees did not always take place along party lines, 
since Europe has become an increasingly divisive and politicized issue in the British 
context. This ideological polarization seems to hamper the effectiveness of 
parliamentary involvement in EU affairs in the UK.  
  
 
The Bargaining Strategies of Mainstream Opposition Parties  
 
 In many respects, mainstream opposition parties were in an even more difficult 
position than government parties. While they had the same strategies at their disposal as 
government parties to deal with the activity of issue entrepreneurs, they still had to 
differentiate themselves from the government. Moreover, they were generally pro-
European and tried to defend their credentials on this position (Puntscher Riekmann and 
Wydra, 2013, p. 579). Mainstream opposition parties were thus unwilling to mobilise 
against the government on EU matters as issue entrepreneurs do since they want to 
avoid awakening the ‘sleeping giant’ of European integration in domestic politics. Van 
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der Eijk and Franklin claim that European integration is an issue on which European 
voters hold meaningful attitudes (2007, p. 37). However, their alignment on this 
dimension cuts across the left-right axis (p. 39). Voters have thus no possibility to vote 
according to their preferences on this dimension as far as mainstream parties are 
concerned (p.42). Mainstream opposition parties therefore also want to avoid mobilising 
voters on this dimension since this would expose internal divisions on this issue (p. 48).  
 Some mainstream parties decided to implement a dismissive strategy towards 
issue entrepreneurs and consequently were not very active. An example for this is the 
Labour Party in the UK. Many MPs recognized that UKIP represented a similar threat 
to them as for the Conservatives (Interview 1D). Moreover, the party has no clear stance 
of Europe at the moment (ibid.). In the context of the current Eurosceptic political 
climate and the threat of UKIP, the strategy of the party could be described as ‘lest said, 
soonest mended’ (ibid). As a consequence, the Labour Party was thus rather reluctant in 
terms of activity in the form of debates. A similarly dismissive strategy was employed 
by Fianna Fáil in Ireland. Fianna Fáil as a ‘mainstream’ opposition party generally 
supports the government, and only tries to differentiate itself on relatively minor or 
procedural points. However, Fianna Fáil found it difficult to communicate its position 
between supporting the government and demanding more far-reaching changes (Irish 
Examiner, 2 March 2012). This situation is typical for mainstream opposition parties 
and often hampers their activity.  
 An accommodating strategy was chosen by the Green Party in Austria, which 
sided with the issue entrepreneurs BZO and FPO in its rejection of the Fiscal Compact. 
The Green Party thus criticized the Fiscal Compact from a supranationalist/democratic 
deficit point of view, but also from a left-wing economic position (Wendler, 2014b, p. 
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562). The Greens appealed to their particular constituency by favouring growth 
stimulating policies at the European level, while no agreeing to further disciplinary 
measures in the form of the Fiscal Compact. This became especially obvious since the 
Green Party agreed to the ESM, but not to the Fiscal Compact. The Green Party had 
thus the particular role as a mediator between government and issue entrepreneurs and 
joined BZO and FPO in legal action against the Treaty – a role rarely played by 
mainstream opposition parties but viable when applying a accommodating strategy 
(Interview 1A). In Germany, mainstream opposition parties also stressed the necessity 
of more growth enhancing policies (Maatsch, 2014, p. 112; Pedrazzini and Pinto, 2013, 
p. 17) and increased integration (Closa and Maatsch, 2014, p. 840). The accommodative 
strategy made the opposition active in the treatment of the Fiscal Compact, contributing 
to overall parliamentary activity. It also shows that mainstream opposition parties had to 
strike a balance between acknowledging the claims of issue entrepreneurs and 
differentiating themselves from the government without giving up their general support 
for the Fiscal Compact and European integration. In some cases, this enables them to 
hold a position which bridges the difference between governments and issue 
entrepreneurs.  
 No mainstream opposition party engaged in a clearly adversial strategy. This is 
not surprising with regard to the effect of the interaction of mainstream party strategies 
and their impact on the activity of issue entrepreneurs identified by Meguid (2008, p. 
34). These patterns are also likely to have an impact on overall parliamentary activity in 
EU affairs. When both government and opposition mainstream parties are dismissive, as 
in the Irish case, the impact of issue entrepreneurs will be limited. If a mainstream party 
is dismissive and another one accommodative, as in Austria, the impact of issue 
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entrepreneurs is set to diminish as well. By contrast, when one mainstream party is 
accommodative and other adversarial, as in the UK, the impact of the issue entrepreneur 
increases. Finally, if one party is adversial and the other accommodative, the impact of 
the issue entrepreneur will depend on whether the accommodative or the adversarial 
strategy is stronger. In the German case, the adversarial strategy of the government was 
stronger than the accommodative impact of the opposition, so that the impact of the 
issue entrepreneur increased.  
 It thus becomes clear that mainstream opposition parties found themselves in a 
very difficult positon. They were generally more pro-European than the government but 
were faced with an increasingly Eurosceptic public opinion. They ran the risk of being 
squeezed between issue entrepreneurs with their aggressive rhetoric on the one hand and 
the arguments of the government on the other. Moreover, they want to avoid becoming 
too active on a controversial topic since increasing their ‘issue distance’ too much might 
hamper their plans for future government participation (Van de Wardt, 2015, p. 844). 
The German SPD is a case in point here. However, when their approval was needed to 
ratify the Treaty mainstream opposition parties could have some real influence on the 
government’s position or secure ‘pork’ in the form of side-payments on other issues 
(Rector, 2011). Nevertheless, some mainstream opposition MPs voted with the issue 
entrepreneurs against the Treaty. In the following, the causes and consequences of 
internal dissent within parties on the TSCG as well as the interplay of this lack of 
cohesion with public opinion is examined. 
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The Interplay of Internal Dissent and Public Opinion 
  
 Issue entrepreneurs were the only parties which remained cohesive on the issue. 
There was significant dissent within some government parties, such as in Germany and 
the United Kingdom. In Germany, four per cent of FDP MPs and two per cent of 
CDU/CSU MPs voted against. Interestingly, the leadership of CDU/CSU, SPD and 
Greens attempted to change the allocation of speaking times in the Bundestag so that 
the party leadership had more control over individual MPs (Hamburger Abendblatt, 16 
April 2012). Especially the FDP leadership was a vocal advocate of these measures, 
which was then however abandoned due to protests from numerous MPs and criticism 
from the President of the Bundestag (Der Spiegel, 16 April 2012). This indicates that 
the party leadership already anticipated internal dissent and was trying to prevent it 
from becoming public in plenary debates. Another example of even more extreme 
internal dissent within government parties was the United Kingdom. The Eurosceptic 
Chairman of the European Union Scrutiny Committee in the House of Commons, 
William Cash (Conservatives), triggered an emergency debate on the Fiscal Compact 
Treaty. However, the Fiscal Compact itself was not extensively discussed in the debate. 
Instead, the future of the UK in the European Union and the latter’s perceived 
undemocratic nature formed the core of the debate. As the Conservative MP John 
Redwood noted ‘This debate is about democracy itself’ (House of Commons 29.2.2012, 
Column 319). William Cash called the Treaty ‘unlawful’ (ibid.). An Eurosceptic MP 
stated in an interview that he saw the use of EU Institutions in the context of the Fiscal 
Compact as a typical example of the European Union’s frequent breaches of legal 
principles (Interview 2D).  
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 Even though, as explained above, they were to a large extent reacting to extra-
parliamentary pressure from UKIP, the Conservative backbenchers formed had a strong 
impact on parliamentary activity. Given the extremely strong level of dissent within the 
Conservative Party, it was not possible for the Prime Minister and the party leadership 
to contain the voices anymore, even though it tried to do so.  
The extent to which the MPs felt public pressure with regard to the Fiscal 
Compact varied greatly. According to a CDU MP, the conservative public in Germany 
(‘Buergerliche Oeffentlichkeit’) supported the strict fiscal rules of the TSCG so that 
‘The Club Med countries won’t be able to tear everything down again’ and ‘we won’t 
have to pay for the sins of others again’ (Interview 5B). Fiscal discipline in Europe was 
thus the most important issue perceived by the public (Interview 2B). There was thus a 
stronger pressure with regard to the Fiscal Compact on the centre-right coalition parties. 
Arguably, the Fiscal Compact was less pertinent for the left-wing mainstream 
opposition parties, who would also have agreed to rescue measures without the Treaty. 
However, the interest from the general public in this matter and in EU affairs in general 
was rather limited (Interview 5B).  
 Ireland was in many ways a special case in this regard. In Ireland, the governing 
Fine Gael party realized that their constituents who often come from a business 
background supported the austerity measures (Interview 1C). In general, the ratification 
of the TSCG in Ireland took place under particular circumstances for two reasons. First, 
the Irish Constitution required a referendum for the ratification of the Treaty, which 
required an amendment to the Constitution. The referendum was initially supported by 
Fianna Fail and Sinn Fein, while the government was at first reluctant (Irish Examiner, 
14 December 2011). However, the Attorney General decided that the impact of the 
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Treaty was significant enough for a referendum to be required (The Guardian, 
28February 2012). The referendum took place on 31 May 2012. The voters clearly 
spoke out in favour of the Treaty, with 60.29% approving it while 39.71% voted against 
(Eurobarometer, 2012b). Generally, economic considerations such as access to bail-out 
funds seemed to have played an important role for those who supported the Treaty, 
whereas opposition to the government and distrust of politician seem to have been the 
most important factors for those voting against (ibid.). The fact that a referendum was 
held had significant implications for the parliamentary scrutiny of the Treaty since 
parliament was not the only ratifying body in the Irish case, with the electorate having a 
direct say in the matter. Second, Ireland was one of the countries, which were most 
strongly affected by the financial crisis, given the exposure of Irish banks to an 
overvalued property market (European Commission, 2014). As a consequence, Ireland 
had to apply for assistance from the EU and the IMF, since the rescue packages for the 
banks further increased the budget deficit (ibid.). The country received overall 67.5 
Million Euros, half of which from the European Union, consisting of loans in the 
context of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) and of bilateral loans (ibid.). Thus, as a recipient country, which was 
hit very hard by the financial crisis, the TSCG was discussed in Ireland in a particular 
political climate and was of extremely high salience. A particular focus of the debates in 
the plenary and in committees has been the impact of the TSCG on future public 
spending and in particular on the health care system (Interview 1C). Thus, the special 
importance of the Fiscal Compact for Ireland led to a situation in which relatively little 
internal dissent within parties occurred (ibid.).  
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In the other member states, virtually all parties studied here were thus divided on 
the fiscal compact to some extent in the sense that there were at least a few party rebels 
who voted against the Treaty. Both government and mainstream opposition parties 
faced this problem. The party leadership often tried to suppress this problem by trying 
to prohibit the rebels from speaking in the plenary if possible. Issue entrepreneurs often 
exposed these attempts and tried to highlight the lines of divisions by pointing out the 
similarities of the rebels’ position with their own. Not surprisingly, parties were more 
divided on the issue where the public was sceptical of the Treaty. In general, strongly 
divided mainstream parties tried to minimise debate of and engagement with the Treaty. 
 
The Effectiveness of Parliamentary Involvement  
 
As mentioned above, parliamentary activity cannot be equated with 
effectiveness. A clear case of effectiveness is evident when parliament manages to 
influence the position of the government from its initial position (Auel, 2007). Effective 
scrutiny would thus mean the ‘ability of parliament to induce the government to change 
its negotiation position in a way it would not have done without parliamentary 
interference…‘ (p.491.). In a few cases, when the majority requirements necessitate 
additional support from opposition parties, this could indeed be achieved. The German 
opposition demanded an accompanying focus on growth-enhancing policies, such as an 
initiative to combat youth unemployment and a financial transactions tax, which were 
then later also advocated and agreed to by Angela Merkel (Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 30 
January 2012; Der Tagesspiegel, 30 April 2012). Moreover, the opposition thus used the 
upper chamber as a second channel to suggest changes and amendments to the Treaty 
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(Interview 1B). As in Austria, the parliamentary opposition was able to exert some 
influence and secure side payments since a two-thirds majority was required. In the 
words of an opposition party researcher: ‘The government had to be forced to act’ 
(ibid.). 
When no such majority requirements are in place, however, the extent to which 
parliament are able to do so, especially in ex-post debates and in the treatment of an 
international Treaty such as the Fiscal Compact is admittedly limited. As expected, Sinn 
Féin and the independent Eurosceptics were especially eager to challenge the 
government in the debates and in committees. However, in the Irish case, this activism 
did not have a strong impact on the government’s policy- given the large majority of the 
governing parties as well as their internal cohesiveness. Therefore, in the Irish case, 
strong activity did not translate into ‘effectiveness’. According to a member of the 
Joint-Committee for European Affairs, the EAC is the weakest committee in the Irish 
Parliament, and its impact is extremely limited – not only with regard to the Fiscal 
Compact (Interview 1C). Even though Sinn Fein and other (left wing) Eurosceptics 
‘made lots of noise’, they did not have an impact on the actual work done in 
committees. Due to a strong whip, it is difficult for backbenchers to criticize their own 
government in the committee. Arguably, in the Joint Committee on European Union 
Affairs there is thus ‘lots of activity, but very little impact’ (Interview 1C).  
Very high levels of internal dissent can have a substantive impact on the 
governments’ position. The British veto was likely strongly influenced by the 
preferences of Eurosceptic MPs within the Conservative Party (The Independent, 10 
December 2011), with the time of the veto also coinciding with a slump in David 
Cameron’s popularity rating and a record number of Britons favouring withdrawal from 
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the European Union (The Independent, 11 December 2011). The Prime Minister’s veto 
of the Fiscal Compact as a Treaty under EU Law might be seen as an anticipation of 
preferences of Eurosceptic MPs, A Conservative MP stated that the interest in and 
salience of the Fiscal Compact for the European Affairs Committee strongly declined 
after the British veto (Interview 2D). The main function of continued scrutiny of the 
developments of the Fiscal Compact might thus rather signalling activity to Eurosceptic 
voters. Faced with the rise of an issue entrepreneur on European issues (UKIP), a 
substantial minority of government backbenchers could significantly influence the 
position of the government and was thus very effective in this sense.  
Generally, parliamentary activity could only have a limited impact on the 
government’s position in the case of the Fiscal Compact. Exceptions were the German 
case, where mainstream opposition parties could have some impact on the government’s 
negotiation position in exchange for their approval. In the UK, government 
backbenchers influenced the government’s position significantly. However, in all 
countries the leeway of mainstream opposition parties and government backbenchers to 
influence the government’s positon would have been larger if the constant activities of 
issue entrepreneurs had not further constrained their room for manoeuvre already 
narrowed by sceptical public opinion. Thus, parties would have been able to debate the 
technicalities and particular aspects of the Treaty – such as more growth enhancing 
policies- in more detail instead of focusing on grand arguments regarding the 
democratic legitimacy of the Treaty and the EU in general.  
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Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 The Fiscal Compact was clearly scrutinised rather actively in the parliaments 
analysed here, which is not surprising given its tremendous importance. In all countries, 
issue entrepreneurs were the drivers of activity. They frequently mention the European 
issue in the debate and relate specific discussion about EU-related issues to more 
general point about the legitimacy of the European Union and their countries continued 
membership of it. Issue entreprenuers use this rhetoric to allude to their Eurosceptic 
voters, and their points are frequently picked up by the media. In that sense, issue 
entrepreneurs strengthened in the profile of the Treaty in the public and contributed to 
parliaments fulfilling their communication function.   
With regard to parties, the analysis illustrates the strategies which different types 
of parties use in the parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs. All types of issue 
entrepreneurs tend to use similar strategies to foster activity. In debates on Europe, they 
speak frequently and connect specific European issues to general points on European 
integration. They also use extra-parliamentary venues, such as challenging the 
government’s EU related actions in front of constitutional courts. In committees, issue 
entrepreneurs initiate a large amount of resolutions. However, these activities have 
rarely an impact on government policy, or any success at all. Issue entrepreneurs 
employ these strategies to send signals to their Eurosceptic voters. Within parliament, 
issue entrepreneurs sometimes hope to appeal to MPs on the fringes of the mainstream 
opposition parties and try to encourage them to defect from the party line. This strategy 
was however not successful in the cases analysed here. When appealing to a (extra 
parliamentary) public, issue entrepreneurs focus on different audiences (for example 
‘right-wing’ or more ‘general’) and modify their messages accordingly. Thus, their 
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communicative strategy remains rather narrow and focused on particular strata of the 
electorate.  
A particularly relevant finding is that the strategies of mainstream parties - both 
in government and opposition –in reaction to issue entrepreneurs was crucial in 
determining overall parliamentary activity. Some mainstream parties, such as the UK 
Conservatives or the Austrian Greens, where accommodative of the demands articulated 
by issue entrepreneurs. Others, such as the German CDU/CSU or the Liberal 
Democrats, had an adversarial strategy of out rightly attacking the issue entrepreneurs. 
A third group of parties, such as the Labour Party in the UK or Fianna Fáil in Ireland, 
remained dismissive of the position of the issue entrepreneurs. Generally, 
accommodative strategies seemed to decrease the activity of issue entrepreneurs while 
dismissive or adversarial strategies lead to an increase in activity. The interaction 
between issue entrepreneurs and mainstream parties is thus crucial in determining 
overall parliamentary activity in EU affairs against the background of changes in public 
opinion.  
With regard to the formal powers of national parliaments in EU affairs, an 
impact on scrutiny activity could not be established. The Irish Parliament, which is said 
to have rather weak formal scrutiny powers, was clearly rather active. A combination of 
strong issue entrepreneurs, little internal dissent and high topicality, enhanced by a 
referendum on the issue, might be the reasons for this. The Austrian parliament also 
showed strong scrutiny activity, also due to strong issue entrepreneurs and little dissent 
in the context of a Eurosceptic public. The UK parliament displayed a relatively high 
level of activity even though the UK is not a member of the Eurozone. This seems to 
contradict arguments focusing on the macroeconomic situation of a country in 
  
189 
 
explaining activity in crisis related measure. In the UK, UKIP as an extra-parliamentary 
issue entrepreneur had an impact on how the issue of Europe was handled by the 
mainstream parties. In Germany, the moderate level of dissent and weak issue 
entrepreneur presence led to rather low levels of activity.  
 Moreover, the analysis yields important lessons for the interplay of activity and 
effectiveness in the parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs. In particular with regard to the 
government control function. Issue entrepreneurs might transform discussions in 
committees into ideological debates, leaving less room for actual deliberation of specific 
points which might have a tangible impact on government policy. This point was raised 
frequently by the interviewees. In general, a strong ideological component in scrutiny 
work on EU affairs might lead to more activity, but less effectiveness. The impact of 
committee work on government policy seems to be limited. Given the majority situation 
in most parliaments, government policy has been agreed in high level negotiations 
among party groups and is merely approved by committees. Nevertheless, the 
negotiations arguably took place in anticipation of parliamentary preferences which pre-
structured the way the negotiations could be conducted. However, interviewees 
frequently expressed dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of committee proceedings. 
Moreover, in the last half decade, the financial crisis has overshadowed almost all other 
EU related activities.  
 Mainstream opposition parties are most likely to have an impact in the form 
‘effective’ parliamentary scrutiny. However, this is notably only the case when the 
government needs the votes of the opposition for the ratification of a legal act, as for 
example the case with the ESM in Austria of in the case of the TSCG in the German 
Bundesrat. The impact of the governmental majority is mostly indirect, with the 
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government anticipating the Eurosceptic backbenchers’ preferences, as for example in 
the case of the British veto on the TSCG. In this particular case the preferences of a 
faction of government backbenchers, was highly significant. In the case of an 
international treaty like the Fiscal Compact, parliaments can generally be expected to be 
less influential than in the case of ‘normal’ legal acts (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999). 
However, as became obvious from interviews, the general patterns of activity and 
effectiveness were the same for the Fiscal Compact; crisis related measures based on 
secondary law and in the case of regular EU legal acts. 
 On a normative level, the findings have important implications for the extent to 
which stronger parliamentary activity can actually lead to more democratic 
accountability and effective parliamentary control in the European Union. If issue 
entrepreneurs largely drive activity, and if their presence makes parliamentary scrutiny 
more ideological and less effective, increased parliamentary activity might not 
necessarily be seen as purely positive with regard to the democratic deficit debate. At 
least, it is necessary to differentiate between the source of parliamentary activity and its 
impact on parliamentary work as well as between different parliamentary functions. 
While issue entrepreneurs clearly communicate EU-related topics quite actively, they 
largely speak to particular, ideologically narrow strata of the public With regard to the 
actual scrutiny function; their criticism is often not targeted and in-depth. An 
institutionalised forum for cooperation of national parliaments in EMU matters as 
suggested by some authors would likely be dominated by the same dynamics, with issue 
entrepreneurial activity fostering a nationalistic point of view from the right or an 
outright opposition to further centralization of economic and monetary control from the 
left. Mainstream parties would have to balance these pressures with their need to 
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support their own governments. Instead of an increase in the powers of national 
parliaments, a strengthening of the role of the European Parliament in matters of 
economic and monetary cooperation might thus be more promising. 
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Appendix 9: List of Interviewees  
 
Table 21: Name and function of the interviewees, date and mode of communication  
ID No Name Country Party Function Communication Date 
1A 1 Dr. Peter Steyrer Austria Greens Party Researcher Skype 14.5.2014*† 
2A 2 Christine Muttonen Austria SPO MP (EAC) Email 23.5.2014 
1B 3 Katrina Villalobos Germany SPD Party Researcher Skype 27.5.2014 
2B 4 Dr Florian Hoeppner (for Norbert Barthle 
MdB) 
Germany CDU Party Researcher Email 25.6.2014 
3B 5 Dr. Florian Toncar Germany FDP MP (Haushaltsausschuss) Skype  26.6.2014* 
4B 6 Thomas Doerflinger Germany CDU MP (EAC) Skype 1.7.2014* 
5B 7 Klaus-Peter Willsch Germany CDU MP (Haushaltsausschuss) Skype 3.7.2014 
6B 8 Alexander Ulrich Germany Die Linke MP (EAC) Email 15.7.2014 
7B 9 Lisa Paus Germany Die Gruenen MP(EAC/Finanzausscuss) Skype 15.9.2014 
1C 10 Colm Burke Ireland Fine Gael Senator (EAC) Skype 19.6.2014 
1D 11 Michael Connarty UK Labour MP (EAC) In person 12.6.2014 
2D 12 Jacob Rees-Mogg UK Conservative MP (EAC) In person 24.6.2014 
3D 13 Mike Thornton UK Liberal 
Democrats 
MP (EAC) In person 26.6.2014 
4D 14 Lord Maclennan of Rogart UK Liberal 
Democrats  
Lord (EAC) In person 8.7.2014 
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Conclusion: The Determinants of the Activity of National Parliaments 
in EU Affairs and their Implications 
 
 
 
This thesis has set out to investigate which factors determine the scrutiny activity of 
national parliaments in European Union affairs. In so doing, it has shown that the 
presence of issue entrepreneurs, Eurosceptic parties for which Europe is salient, internal 
party cohesion and the interplay of these two factors with public opinion on European 
integration can explain variation in scrutiny activity. The formal powers of national 
parliaments do not have a strong impact on activity in the form of debates and 
resolutions. These findings can explain the puzzle why the formal powers of national 
parliaments in EU affairs and their actual scrutiny activity diverge. Moreover, the 
activity brought about by issue entrepreneurs is highly politicized and might thus make 
parliamentary scrutiny less effective than it could be by preventing parliaments from 
sufficiently engaging with the technical details of legal acts. The idea that a further 
empowerment of national parliaments will lead to more democratic accountability thus 
has to be reconsidered. In the following, the empirical and theoretical contribution of 
this thesis is elaborated on. Moreover, the limitations of the thesis are acknowledged 
and potential avenues for future research are sketched out. Finally, the normative 
implications of the findings of the thesis with regard to democratic accountability in the 
European Union and the debate on the democratic deficit are outlined. 
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Empirical Contribution 
 
Empirically, this thesis contributes to the literature on national parliaments in 
European Union affairs by collecting a large amount of original data on the activities of 
national parliaments relating most directly to the communication and government 
control function, debates and resolutions. The datasets were then analysed using 
statistical techniques such as multilevel-models and computer-assisted content analysis. 
Moreover, more than fourteen semi-structured elite interviews were carried out to 
provide qualitative evidence. The thesis thus employs a mixed-methods approach. By 
focusing on six countries (Austria, France, Germany, Spain, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom) and a time period from the 1990s until the 2012, the thesis also sets itself 
apart from previous work by its geographical and temporal scope. The countries 
represent a good spread over the most important independent variables tested in this 
thesis, such as the presence of issue entrepreneurs, party cohesion and public 
Euroscepticism. However, the generalizability of the findings is of course still limited 
and future research could cover a larger number of countries, as explained below. 
 The thesis presents two original datasets on parliamentary activity in the form of 
debates and resolutions. The first paper draws upon more 3084 transcripts of 
parliamentary debates in five parliaments. An analysis of such a large number of 
parliamentary debates for their reference to European affairs has not been undertaken 
before. For the second paper, more than 3466 resolutions were collected from the 
parliaments’ websites. The present thesis not only analyses the number of resolutions, it 
also provides the first analysis of the valence of resolutions, i.e. the extent to which they 
are critical or supportive of the government. For that purpose, the resolutions were 
handed coded on a Lickert-type scale from -2 (very critical) to 2 (very supportive). 
   
195 
 
 
Moreover, the structure of the resolutions was analysed as a proxy for politicization. 
Inspired by the work of Huber and Shipan (2002) on bureaucratic drift, a long preamble 
and a short operational part was seen as evidence for a lack of depth of scrutiny, since 
the preamble often only contains general political points related to the EU and few 
concrete policy recommendations for the legal act at hand. The analysis showed that 
especially the resolutions of issue entrepreneurs had longer preambles and shorter 
operational parts – an indication that they use resolutions mostly to criticize the EU as 
such and not to actually scrutinize EU legal acts with a view to improving the quality of 
legislation. Combined with the finding that issue entrepreneurs initiate a large number 
of resolutions, this fact raises questions with regard to the benefit of strong 
parliamentary activity in terms of democratic accountability, as explained below. This 
innovative approach is the first attempt in the literature to quantitatively assess the 
quality and politicization of resolutions of national parliaments in European Union 
affairs. Moreover, the dataset could be fruitfully used in future research. 
 For the third paper fourteen in-depth qualitative interviews were undertaken 
with members of parliament of different parties as well as party workers in four 
countries. Analysing the parliamentary involvement in the scrutiny of the Fiscal 
Compact, the paper presents a detailed assessment of the parliamentary treatment of this 
seminal international treaty. It was shown how issue entrepreneurs also lead the activity 
– both in the form of debates and resolutions – in the case of ‘history-making decisions’ 
such as the Fiscal Compact (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999). This paper also showes that 
the extent to which parliaments can be active in these types of agreements is limited. 
The interviews provide an in-depth analysis of the motives and strategies of the 
different actors with a particular focus on the strategies of issue entrepreneurs and the 
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reactions of mainstream government and opposition parties to the latter. Empirically, 
the paper thus presents original data which are analysed using both qualitative and 
quantitative methods, leading to the discovery of new facts about the activity of national 
parliaments in EU affairs and the relationship between formal powers of national 
parliaments and their actual activity.   
 
 
Theoretical Contribution 
 
 The main theoretical contribution of this thesis is to provide an explanation of 
parliamentary activity in EU affairs which is firmly based in party politics. The 
theoretical approach of the thesis is original in that it brings together and contributes to 
the literatures on national parliaments in EU affairs, the decline of parliaments in 
general and party competition. In contrast to other work which mostly focuses on 
explaining formal rights of national parliaments, this thesis analyses parliamentary 
activity in EU affairs in a theoretically grounded way. By explaining how the presence 
of issue entrepreneurs, internal party cohesion and public Euroscepticism influence 
activity, this thesis provides a theoretically informed account of why the formal powers 
of national parliaments and actual activity diverge. While party political and public 
opinion factors determine activity, the formal powers of national parliaments might be 
the result of normative considerations (Winzen, 2014). The theoretical contribution of 
this thesis to the literature on national parliaments in the European Union is thus to 
accompany an institutional focus on formal powers with a conceptual framework 
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brining in the role of political parties and in particular issue entrepreneurs as agents of 
activity.  
 The first paper focuses on the communication function of parliaments (Norton, 
1993) in the form of debates and shows how from a theoretical perspectives issue 
entrepreneurs can be seen as being especially likely to be active in this way given that it 
is relatively visible to the public and allow actors to inform about the party’s stance on 
an issue (Auel and Raunio, 2014a, p. 4). Likewise, mainstream parties can be seen as 
especially reluctant to appear as divided in very visible forms of activity. The theoretical 
contribution of this paper could be extended to other topics to show how issue 
entrepreneurs on a particular topic dominate and trigger debate on the issue and thus 
heavily foster the communication function of parliament. 
The second paper builds on the findings of the first and confirms them with 
regard to the activity of national parliaments in the form of the government control and 
scrutiny function (Norton, 1993). This form of activity is generally regarded as less 
public, so it is theoretically relevant to see that issue entrepreneurs are still very active 
in this regard. In contrast to debates, the number of resolutions and their valence does 
not seem to be strongly affected by the extent to which parties are internally divided on 
Europe, possibly because the resolutions feature less prominently in the public 
discourse than debates, and appearing divided is thus less harmful for a party. 
Moreover, it is generally easier for factions of a party or individual MPs to signal 
dissent in a debate (Proksch and Slapin, 2014). In general, parties are less responsive to 
Euroscepticism in the valence of their resolutions compared to debates, indicating that 
party political factors play a more important role. The motions (unsuccessful 
resolutions) of issue entrepreneurs are often concerned with general political points and 
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not with the actual legal act at hand. From a theoretical point of view, this calls into 
question which form of activity can actually be considered as ‘scrutiny’ in European 
Union affairs. What is generally considered scrutiny by national parliaments might 
actually be in fact a form of political signalling. This finding has also important 
normative implications, as discussed in the final section of the conclusion. It thus 
became clear that issue entrepreneurs dominate all forms of activity in EU affairs. This 
is theoretically interesting since it could have been expected that they focus more on one 
particular form of activity, such as the more publicly visible debates, given their limited 
resources. The fact that these parties dominate in both forms of activity further 
highlights the significance of their role.  
The third paper focuses on the micro-mechanisms of the activity of issue 
entrepreneurial activity in the EU affairs. A particular strategy by issue entrepreneurs is 
to use Europe as a ‘wedge issue’ (Van de Wardt, De Vries and Hobolt, 2014, p. 997) 
trying to appeal to Eurosceptic factions of mainstream parties. Moreover, it was shown 
that government backbenchers play an important role since the government anticipates 
their preferences. Moreover, mainstream opposition parties can often secure side-
payments (Rector, 2001) for their agreement with the government. With regard to the 
effectiveness of parliamentary engagement in EU affairs, the fact that there is no clear 
relationship between parliamentary activity and effectiveness is one of the most 
important theoretical findings of this thesis. Strong politicization of the scrutiny process 
brought about by issue entrepreneurs can lead to less intensive engagement with the 
topic at hand and thus to general, less in-depth discussion and scrutiny of European 
issues at the expense of targeted scrutiny. 
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On a general level, this thesis also seeks to contribute to the literature on 
legislative studies more broadly defined. The subfield of legislative studies originated in 
the United States and developed rapidly in the 1970s (e.g. Fenno, 1970, Mayhew, 
1974). In the last three decades, it has become dominated by rational-choice individual-
level approaches (Martin, Saalfeld and Strom, 2014, p. 10). The advantage of these 
approaches is their clear focus and the potential to make comparison across political 
systems (ibid). While this study is firmly situated in a rational-choice institutionalist 
framework, its findings emphasize the fact that there are qualitative differences between 
different types of parties with distinct patterns of activity different parliamentary 
venues, such as in the form of plenary debates or resolutions initiated in European 
Affairs Committees (or other committes which focus on EU related activites, depending 
on the particular scrutiny system). When issue entrepreneur parties are present, the 
general pattern of activity of the legislature in question is strongly influenced by them 
and mainstream parties modulate their behaviour accordingly. Therefore, in policy areas 
in which issue entrepreneurs exist and are vocal- besides European integration, 
immigration is relevant here – parliamentary activity is not ‘business as usual’. 
Following from this, and mirroring the argument recently made by Lapinski with regard 
to the US Congress that ‘policy issue substance is critical for understanding 
contemporary and historical law-making’ (2013, p. 18) this thesis argues that legislative 
studies scholars focusing on European parliamentary systems could benefit from the 
insight that the nature of certain highly contentious issues influence the activity of 
parliamentarians per their divisiveness and salience, and beyond particular institutional 
constraints and procedures in place in the case of EU affairs. Therefore, it is important 
to understand the behaviour of different types of parties with regard to particular issues, 
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and the incentives and constraints they face respectively. In this context, the differences 
between issue entrepreneurs and mainstream parties are arguably more important than 
between government and opposition. The incentives, constraints and opportunities of 
issue entrepreneurs differ significantly from both mainstream government and 
opposition parties. This aspect has frequently been ignored in the American literature 
due to the US two-party system, an has also been absent fom the EU studies literature 
and in particular with regard to the role of national parliaments in EU affairs  
Moreover, the thesis also seeks to contribute to the literature on party politics 
and niche parties. Building on the work of Hobolt and De Vries (2015) and Meguid 
(2008), the thesis shows that when issue entrepreneurs bring a new topic to the 
parliamentary arena, mainstream parties react to it, raising overall levels of activity. The 
interplay of issue entrepreneurs and mainstream parties is thus essential to understand 
when and how an issue becomes prominent in the parliamentary arena. Studying and 
conceptualising issue entrepreneurs is thus not only relevant to understand the strategies 
and success of new and/or extreme parties, but also to improve our knowledge of the 
reaction of mainstream parties to new issues prominent in the party systems and the 
strategies of mainstream parties to deal with these changes. A pertinent question is what 
happens to issues championed by issue entrepreneurs once mainstream parties can no 
longer supress the topic and engage with it. This question is particularly relevant after 
an issue entrepreneur party successfully mobilizes on a new topic in the run up to an 
election in which it was successful. Mainstream parties might then be forced to take on 
the issue themselves, even if it is in a half-hearted manner. Examples for thus type of 
behaviour include the pledge of the UK Conservative Party to hold a referendum on EU 
membership in the aftermath of the success of UKIP in the 2014 EP elections or the 
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adoption of an anti-atomic energy stance by Angela Merkel’s CDU/CSU after the 
German Greens became the strongest party in the regional election in Baden-
Wuertemberg in 2011 in the wake of the Fukushima disaster. This phenomenon has 
been termed ‘issue uptake’ in the US context (Sulkin, 2005). After a while, a new issue 
might become ‘mainstreamed’ (see Gattermann et al., 2013 on the mainstreaming of EU 
affairs). There might thus be a situation where there is no more asymmetry in 
parliamentary activity induced by the strong focus of issue entrepreneurs on the topic 
and the attempts to supress it by mainstream parties. Political competition might return 
to ‘business as usual’ and the dynamics of parliamentary might activity no longer differ 
from other issue areas. However, giving the ever changing and developing nature of the 
European Union, with new issues arising and becoming intertwined with it (as happened 
recently in the context of the refugee crisis) such a situation is unlikely to arise anytime 
soon with regard to EU affairs. The impact of issue entrepreneurs will therefore remain 
strong and the nature and extent of parliamentary activity in EU affairs is likely to 
continue to differ from other policy areas.  
All in all, this thesis thus makes a theoretical contribution to the literature by 
bringing in the incentives of different types of parties in the study of national 
parliaments in the European Union and by providing a new perspective on the role of 
parliaments in the EU in the context of the democratic deficit.  
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Limitations and Potential for Future Research  
 
 This thesis focuses on parliamentary activity in the form of debates and 
resolutions from the 1990s until the 2012. It introduces two novel dataset on 
parliamentary debates and resolutions in EU affairs respectively. In the following, it 
will be explained how the scope of the present thesis could be extended and how 
alternative research methods could be applied to the existing datasets. Moreover, it will 
elaborate on new avenues of research to which the theoretical findings of the thesis give 
rise. 
 A general limitation ot this thesis is pf course that the number of country cases is 
relatively small (only six out of the 28 EU member states were analysed). A particular 
limitation is that all of the countries included are Western European. No country from 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) was included in the analysis. This fact certainly 
limits the generalizability of the findings of this thesis and future studies should ideally 
focus on the impact of issue entrepreneurs on parliamentary activity in CEE in 
particular. However, there are also valid theoreticall and empirical reasons to exclude 
CEE from a study of limited scope. First, at the theoretical level, the party systems in 
Eastern Euroe are still relatively in flux (Tavits, 2008, p. 537). This would make 
application of the concept of ‘issue entrepreneurs’ with regard to their ‘framing 
distance’ (Van der Wardt, 2015, p. 841) as defined in this thesis problematic. It would 
not be clear which party constitutes an issue entrepreneur. Second, on an empirical 
level, over time data for countries from CEE with regard to parliamentary debates and 
resolutions are simply not available. Moreover, several datasets used in the analsysis, 
such as  CHES, do not cove the countries from Central and Eastern Europe for the 
whole time period. Thus, these empirical limitations could potential be overcome in the 
   
203 
 
 
future, and the theoretical concepts could be adapted to fit an analysis of parliamentary 
activity in EU affairs in this region. Such as study would represent a highly pertinent 
contribution to the study of national parliaments in European Union affairs. In the 
following, the individual limitations of the respective papers are explaiend. 
 In the first paper, the activity of national parliaments in the form of debates was 
analysed. While the analysis at the parliamentary (aggregate) level is very useful to 
study the interaction between issue entrepreneurs and mainstream parties, it would be 
desirable to further increase the scope of the party level analysis in the future to analyse 
the particular activity of issue entrepreneurs in the different countries. To break down 
the debates into individual speech segments for an extended time period, additional 
researchers would have to be involved in the project. However, the existing dataset and 
corpus of debates itself ample opportunity to be used in future research. Potentially, 
advanced text analysis techniques such as WordScores of WordFish could be applied to 
analyse differences in the valence of the framing of the EU in the speech acts by 
different parties (see Proksch and Slapin, 2014 for an overview). Moreover, the current 
dictionary could be expanded to extend the analysis to other policy areas, to compare 
EU affairs with other policy areas or in order to analyse the relative importance of 
certain constituent policies (EMU, Justice and Home affairs, etc.) over time and 
between countries. 
 The second paper focuses on the activity of national parliaments in the form of 
resolutions and draws on a dataset consisting of 3466 resolutions from five countries. It 
would of course be desirable to further increase the number of countries covered, ideally 
to the entire EU 28. This was not feasible in the context of this thesis. However, the 
existing dataset could very well be analysed using additional techniques such as 
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WordScores to cross check the findings of the hand-coding regarding the valence of 
resolutions to further underline the robustness of the findings. Moreover, there are also 
limitations inherent to the chosen approach as well. Besides an analysis of the quantity 
of the resolutions and their valence, the particular purpose of the different types of 
resolutions could be analysed. For example, an analysis could distinguish between 
resolutions directly aimed at the government and those providing a ‘Schelling 
conjecture’ (Schelling, 1960), a situation in which the government is supported to 
improve its negotiation position in the Council (Finke, 2014).  
 Parliamentary debates and resolutions are certainly not the only instruments 
national parliaments have at their disposal to become active in EU affairs. Indeed, there 
are many other relevant forms of activity, such as parliamentary questions (Navarro and 
Brourad, 2012), reasoned opinions in the context of the early warning system 
(Gattermann and Hefftler, 2015) and parliamentary reports. However, as explained in 
detail above, debates and resolutions are rguably the clearest emodiement of the 
communication and government control function of parliament in EU affairs 
respectively. As such, they have also been focused on in other works on parliamentary 
activity (Auel, Rozenberg and Tazea, 2015; Rauh, 2015). By contrast, the focus of, for 
example, parliamentary questions, is much more variable and contested (Martin and 
Rozenberg, 2014, p. 1). The focus of the thesis thus allows an analysis of the ‘core 
activities’ of national parliaments in EU affaris, from which the general levels of 
activity as compared to their formal powers can be inferred. However, there are 
certainly aspects and nuances of parliamentary activity – notably with regard to inter-
parliamentary cooperations in the form of the EWS – which have been left out. 
However, empirical analysis of parliamentary activity in that domain have so far rather 
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painted a disappointing  picture with regard to the extent to which national parliaemnts 
are actually successful in using this instrument (e.g. Buzognay and Stuchlik, 2011). The 
core focus on debates and resolutions thus  remains a justifiable and well considered 
choice.  
 While the thesis has established that issue entrepreneurs are the drivers of the 
activity of national parliaments in European Union affairs, it would be very interesting 
to analyse the exact mechanisms at play and the scope conditions of their activity. There 
is thus potentially a problem of endogeneity with regard to the effect of public opinion 
on the actitiy of issue entrepreneurs. Future research will thus have to address a 
potential shortocoming of the analysis of this thesis: the question of causality with 
regard to the extent to which public Euroscepticism brings about the emergence and 
activity of issue entrepeneurs or vice versa. Answering this question is especially 
pertinent given the relatively long time period covered in this thesis. Previous research 
has clearly shown that Eurosceptic elites can mobilise public opinion on Europe (De 
Vries and Edwards, 2009). More generally, it has been shown that pulic Euroscepticism 
and elite Euroscepticism are reinforcing processes (Steenbergen, Edwards and De Vries, 
2007). While the present thesis clearly confirms that the interaction of public 
Eurpscepticism and issue entrereneurs parties is highly significant, it can not give 
definite answer on the direction of causality.  
An approach to overcome this problem would be to investigate what happens in 
terms of parliamentary activity when an issue entrepreneur is first elected to parliament 
or strongly increases its vote share. This could be analysed using the synthetic control 
method (Abadie and Gardezabal, 2003). The approach could be applied to parliaments 
at the subnational level, the European Parliament as well as national parliaments. A 
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particularly pertinent case could be the recent success of Alternative fuer Deutschland, 
(AfD), which is currently represented in several German Landtage, in most of which no 
Eurosceptic party was present beforehand. When using the synthetic control method, the 
researcher compares the development of a ‘treated’ unit (in this case one of the Länder 
in which the AfD was elected into parliament) with a synthetic unit constructed by 
weighing other units which have not received treatment (the ‘donor pool’, in this case 
the other Länder in which the AfD is not present in parliament) but are otherwise 
similar to the unit which has received treatment (Abadie and Gardezabal, 2003). The 
impact of the presence of the AfD as an issue entrepreneur on how Europe is debated in 
the Brandenburg Landtag, for example, and how the mainstream parties react to the 
issue entrepreneur could then be compared to a synthetic Brandenburg in which the AfD 
did not make it into parliament. The synthetic Brandenburg would be constructed from 
the other Länder according to varying weighted variables, depending on the similarities 
between other Länder and Brandenburg. This approach would be superior to simple 
regression analysis comparing the Länder in which the AfD is represented in parliament 
with those parliaments where it is not present, since the synthetic Land will be more 
similar to the Land with AfD presence than any other Land in terms of the independent 
variables (such as public Euroscepticism, party system, economic factors etc.) and the 
dependent variable pre-intervention (i.e. the extent to which Europe was discussed in 
the plenaries of the Landtage before the rise of the AfD). This will make it possible to 
access the causal relationship between parliamentary activity of issue entrepreneurs and 
public Euroscpeticisn. 
 All in all, this thesis provides promising starting points for future research 
further integrating the study of the role of national parliaments in the European Union 
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with the mainstream of party politics and political behaviour. This will make it possible 
to analyse in more detail under which conditions MPs have incentive to become active 
in European Union affairs and when voters favour such activity. A continued focus on 
the actual activity of parliaments in European affairs and the reactions and preference of 
the voters in this matter will help us to understand better how democratic representation 
in the multilevel political system of the European Union works and could be improved. 
 
 
Normative Implications  
 
 The findings of this thesis have relevant implications for the future role of 
national parliaments in the European Union, democratic accountability in the EU as 
well as for the debate on the democratic deficit. It is generally accepted that European 
integration has led to a decrease of the powers of national parliaments by benefiting the 
government in negotiations across different levels of government, shifting law law-
making to the European level, generating information asymmetries which favour the 
government and by shifting the focus to certain policies which the government supports 
at the ideational level (Holzhacker, 2002; Maurer and Wessels, 2001; Moravcsik, 1994). 
Nevertheless, national parliaments have been able to regain some of power and have 
thus been able to ‘fight back’ (Hix and Raunio, 2000).  
 Consequently, there have been strong hopes that national parliaments could help 
to ameliorate the democratic deficit of the European Union – an alleged lack of 
democratic accountability in the EU for a variety of reasons (Weiler et al., 1995, Hix 
and Follesdal, 2006). (Re-)Strengthening national parliaments has been discussed as a 
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potential solution to this problem, especially with what has been called the ‘procedural’ 
dimension of the democratic deficit (Jensen, 2009). These approaches focus in 
particular on electoral, governance and deliberative aspects of democracy the EU level 
(p. 2). Arguably, national parliaments could help to increase democratic accountability 
in all of these three areas, for example by parties mobilising on EU issues, committees 
scrutinising the government in EU affairs and EU topics being debated in the plenary. 
Strengthening formal powers of national parliaments was seen as an avenue to increase 
their involvement in EU affairs and hence to make the EU more democratic (Maurer 
and Wessels, 2001, p. 435). And, indeed, the formal powers of national parliaments 
have been increased significantly throughout the EU in the past two decades (Winzen, 
2012). The increase of these powers has taken the former of setting up European Affairs 
Committees in all member states as well as improved information and control rights 
(ibid.). 
 However, as described in detail above, activity of national parliaments is 
brought about mostly by issue entrepreneurs and not by formal powers. Moreover, the 
activity brought about by issue entrepreneurs is often not concerned with particular legal 
acts, but with general and often unrelated points about the European Union in general. 
This implies that an increase in activity can actually have a negative impact on the 
quality of parliamentary scrutiny and hence on democratic accountability. Since formal 
powers do not seem to have an impact on actual activity, further increasing those 
powers might not necessarily help to make the EU more democratic. The impact a 
further empowerment of national parliaments might have on democratic accountability 
might thus be overstated, and a further strengthening of the powers of the European 
Parliament might be the better alternative.  
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It is important to note that the impact of issue entrepreneurs on parliamentary 
activity differs by parliamentary function. National parliaments are reactive to the 
preferences of the voters in debating EU affairs, and issue entrepreneurs play an 
important role in bringing about this debate, which is desirable from a normative point 
of view in the context of the debate on the democratic deficit. In that sense, they 
contribute to the fulfilment of the communication function of parliament. However, they 
do so indirectly inciting other parties to talk about Europe, since they appeal mostly to a 
narrow stratum of the public sympathetic to their arguments in their own debates. 
Nevertheless, the abovementioned negative effect on the depth and detail of scrutiny 
leads to a less positive assessment of the impact of issue entrepreneurs on the 
government control or scrutiny function. With regard to this aspect of parliamentary 
activity, the impact of issue entrepreneurs might thus be seen as negative from a 
normative point of view.  
As Paper 3 shows, the strong role of issue entrepreneurs and nationalistic 
discourse means that establishing a new body consisting of national MPs to oversee 
EMU matters or increase inter-parliamentary cooperation in that regard, as for example 
proposed by Bellamy and Weale (2015, p. 272) might not be a advisable, since this new 
institution would be subject to the same dynamics as currently national parliaments. It 
could be expected that such a body would remain rather ineffective and limited to rather 
general discussions as it is currently the case with COSAC (Cygan, 2013, p. 177). Other 
forms of horizontal parliamentary communication, such as the EWS, are also rather 
limited in their success (e.g. Buzognay and Stuchlik, 2011). It is thus unlikely that an 
inter-parliamentary body in a highly contested policy area could work efficiently. The 
same can be said of a ‘red card’ which would allow national parliaments to block EU 
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legislation as proposed in recent Op-eds (Booth, 2014; Terry, 2014) Further increasing 
the collective formal powers of national parliaments and enabling them to issue a ‘red 
card’ would likely not be practical given the divergence between formal powers and 
actual activity analysed in this thesis.  
 There is arguably one aspect of activity in which national parliaments could play 
and important role. As has been shown, especially when issue entrepreneurs are present, 
national parliament can become quite active in debating EU affairs and are responsive 
to changes in the preferences of the electorate. Potentially, national parliaments should 
focus more on this aspect of parliamentary activity in EU affairs. By so doing, they 
could foster the extent to which citizens are informed about European issues and engage 
with them. The government control or scrutiny function could then be fulfilled by the 
European Parliament, which is arguably in a better position to carry out technical 
scrutiny. On the other hand national parliaments are better placed to fulfil the 
communication function, since the media coverage of the EP is still somewhat limited 
(Gattermann, 2013, Wendler, 2014a).  
 With regard to the long standing claim of the ‘decline of parliaments; (Andersen 
and Burns, 1996; Blondel, 1970; Heidar and Koole, 1996; Lindseth, 2010, Mazey1979) 
this thesis argues that what might look like a decline in the European context, as a 
consequence of ‘Europeanization’ or the influence of the EU more broadly defined, 
might in fact be the beginning diffusion of various parliamentary tasks (such as the 
communication or scrutiny function) across various levels of governance in a multilevel 
parliamentary filed (Benz, 2013; Crum and Fossum, 2009; Jancic, 2012; Neyer, 2014) 
or even across different types of intuitions in a political system such as the European 
Union. In other words, the functions which traditionally have been united in the 
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institution of the sovereign national parliament might have been split up between 
different levels and across institutions. For example, the law-making function might 
increasingly been fulfilled by the Council with the European Parliament as co-legislator, 
the scrutiny or government control function is largely fulfilled by the European 
Parliament while the national parliaments are in the best position to focus on the 
communication function and can in this capacity help to make the EU more democratic. 
Previous studies have acknowledged the particular suitability of national parliaments to 
publicly communicate EU related issues, thereby increasing transparency (Auel, 2007, 
p. 504). Moreover, research has found that parliaments specialize in different aspects of 
EU related activity, so that some are more active in the form of debates while they are 
weaker on other issues (Auel, Rozenberg and Tacea, 2015, p. 286). The present study 
underlines this point and develops it by arguing that given the crucial role of issue 
entrepreneurs and Euroscepticism in bringing about activity in EU affairs in national 
parliaments and the dynamics resulting from this phenomenon, national parliaments 
should focus on the communication function while leaving other parliamentary 
functions to other levels and institutions. This thesis thus argues that the institution of 
‘Parliament’ does not necessarily decline. For each of the traditional functions of 
Parliament to be fulfilled in an adequate way, they might have to be further split and 
clarified between different institutions in a multilevel system. Different parliamentary 
functions might thus best be carried by different institutions in the European Union to 
make it more democratic. 
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